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Good morning, and we welcome everyone to this first panel. We're so excited to have our guests 
with us this morning. Let me do a brief introduction so we can get into this conversation. This 
morning, we have Atty. Joanna Schwartz with us from UCLA. Atty. Schwartz is one of the legal 
experts that we came across when we were researching this space. We're so elated to have her be 
part of this conversation, and we will be glad to learn what she's able to bring to the table in terms 
of understanding qualified immunity and the George Floyd Act as it stands in Texas.  
We also have April Frazier Camara, who has become a great colleague of mine, and who we now 
understand we have a lot in common. We are both from the same state of Tennessee, and we also 
know that she's a great legal mind. We're glad to have her here representing Washington, DC, and 
her group. April, we're so glad to have you here. We look forward to having a conversation, and 
we know that you're going to add a lot to what we bring to the table today.  
We also have Chris Colbert, who is an expert in his own right. He will be able to explain his 
experience in interviewing individuals who have been family members of victims of qualified 
immunity and police abuse. 
Now, let's kick this off with a conversation. Joanna, we have had plenty of previous discussions 
about qualified immunity and what that means. Can you tell us, in your own words, what qualified 
immunity means? Also, what are some of the most pressing challenges when dealing with qualified 
immunity around the country? 
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Joanna Schwartz  
Thank you and thank you so much for having me here. It's an honor to be part of this conversation.  
Qualified immunity is a defense that law enforcement officers and other government officials can 
raise when they are sued for money or damages in a civil rights suit. It happens when a person 
brings forward a case saying their constitutional rights have been violated. Then, a police officer 
or other government official can raise the defense of qualified immunity that indicates the case 
against should be dismissed, not because they didn't violate the Constitution, but because the right 
that was violated was not clearly established. What the definition of ‘clearly established’ is has 
changed over the years.  
This doctrine was created by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has repeatedly issued 
divisions that make it harder to achieve this goal. Still, today, if you read the Supreme Court's 
decision, the message that they are clearly sending is that in order for a right to be ‘clearly 
established,’ or for a person to get past the qualified immunity defense, they have to find a prior 
court decision from court system they are part of (i.e., Court of Appeals) that held identical conduct 
as unconstitutional. If they can't find a case, as in the police officer has violated someone's rights 
in a way that hasn't been done before, then the officer can be dismissed from the suit. 
The cases have to have very similar facts. There is a case, Baxter v. Bracey1 in which a person was 
suspected of a burglary. He sat down, raised his hands in the air, and surrendered.  The police still 
released their dogs on him. The dogs beat, bit, and maimed him.  
This person brought forward a lawsuit, and the officers claimed qualified immunity. There was a 
prior case where police dogs had been released on someone who had surrendered lying down.2 In 
that case, the court said that the action was unconstitutional, and it was excessive force.  
The court considering the case of the man who had had the dog released on him while he was 
sitting with his hands in the air said, "The factual differences between someone lying on the ground 
and someone sitting with their hands in the air are enough to mean that the law was not clearly 
established."  
The Supreme Court has made it even harder to move past this hurdle because they have told courts 
that they can grant qualified immunity without ruling whether the officer's conduct was 
unconstitutional. So, on the one hand, they're telling plaintiffs, "You have to find a prior case with 
virtually identical facts." And, on the other hand, they're telling courts, "You don't have to decide 
whether the Constitution was violated."3 There's a lot of things wrong with qualified immunity. 
The officer's intent doesn't matter to the analysis. The officer can intentionally violate the law 
knowing their actions were wrong. However, if there is not a prior court decision, it doesn't matter. 
The final thing to note is the standard requiring a prior court decision with virtually identical facts 
 
1 Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020). 
2Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 2012). 
3 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) 
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is justified by the Supreme Court on the idea that officers need to notice that what they are doing 
is wrong.  
I've done research that reveals that officers are never educated about these cases. They're not told 
about the facts and underlying circumstances of every single court decision. They would never 
have the time to do that in their training. So, the whole notion that we need a prior court decision 
has no basis in how officers are actually trained.  
The qualified immunity defense is justified as a protection for officers because they need financial 
protection from liability. I've done research that shows that officers virtually never pay in 
settlements or judgments entered against them. The whole justification for this defense, which is 
so harmful to people whose rights have been violated, isn't even needed under the justification that 
defenders of the doctrine offer for it.  
Those are some of the problems with qualified immunity. 
Howard Henderson 
Thanks so much. Now, I want to get you in this conversation, Atty. April Frazier Camara. Again, 
I didn't want to spend a lot of time on the front end introducing everyone because I want to get into 
the conversation. You are an expert and a force to be reckoned with because you bring together 
some unique pieces to this conversation. One is in your position as the Director of the Black Public 
Defender Association associated with the National Legal Aid & Defender Association.  
Talk to me about how you see all of this in terms of dealing with police officers, dealing with 
qualified immunity, and the impact of qualified immunity on the role of a public defender. How 
do you think it impacts the criminal justice system? 
April Frazier Camara  
First of all, thank you, Professor Henderson, for inviting me here today and organizing this 
amazing symposium to talk about this important issue. As you said, I'm the co-founder of the Black 
Public Defender Association, and one critical piece that we realized was missing, even in the public 
defender community, is an analysis of race and the criminal legal system. For Black defenders, we 
understand both professionally and personally how this impacts our communities. We also know 
the history of qualified immunity and it being used as a tool to justify the terrorism in our 
community by law enforcement. 
One missing component, oftentimes when we do the legal analysis, is exploring historically how 
this tool has been used for legal justification of terrorism inflicted upon the Black community by 
law enforcement. Thus, there is no legal recourse for the Black community.  
When we look at the origin of these doctrines, people have to understand why they have been so 
narrowly tailored and interpreted by the Supreme Court. You cannot divorce that analysis from an 
analysis of American history and the horrors of White supremacy in this country. That's what our 
conversations around policy reform, as Black defenders, bring together – the history of racism and 
the horrors of the criminal legal system. 
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As many of you know, 80% of people who come in contact with the criminal legal system are 
represented by public defenders. They cannot afford counsel. Oftentimes as public defenders, we 
see ordinary daily injustices that law enforcement and prosecutors turn a blind eye to the client we 
meet in lockup. The client has a black eye and is a female client who complains about an officer 
touching her inappropriately. Unless you get to the level of abuse and harm in cases like George 
Floyd, very rarely do you hear about those daily injustices that take place. It really, truly is a part 
of the culture of many law enforcement communities, but it is also a culture of the system that 
allows people to be harmed with there being no consequences.  
For public defenders, what does it take for an officer like Derek Chauvin to have the courage to 
publicly lynch someone on a busy street in daylight? It took a number of ordinary, daily abuses 
and injustices that were never addressed, and oftentimes, public defenders may have raised those 
issues in court. They may have clients file complaints with the Citizen Complaint Review Board, 
and those calls are oftentimes ignored. 
That's where we get to the level of abuse that makes the news because we allow for those daily 
injustices that happen every day. We may pass by a traffic stop where we see someone being 
abused or their rights being violated, and those daily abuses are never addressed. Then we get to a 
national awakening because you lynch someone in public.  
I want to talk about how important it is for us to tie this legal analysis to the history of racism and 
White supremacy in this country. We also have to talk about how the American legal system has 
legalized a lot of the abuse. It's time for us to challenge them. Similar to Brown v. Board of 
Education, just because it's "legal" does not mean that it is just or equitable. 
Howard Henderson 
You've given us so much, April and Professor Schwartz. I wish I could take notes on what you 
both have given us. Unfortunately, I have to moderate this panel, and hopefully, my students are 
taking copious notes for me.   
Chris, you bring a unique perspective to this conversation. When we look at your background, and 
when we understand where you're coming from, you have done some great work in making sure 
that people get this story in mainstream America. Particularly when we look at the projects that 
you've worked on around the country and the people you've worked with - one, in particular, comes 
to mind. Your project tells a story and helps us understand what it means to be victimized by the 
police in this country. Can you help us bring this down to the level where you've talked to the 
families of these victims and what you’ve learned through interviewing these individuals around 
the country? 
Chris Colbert 
Thank you, I'm very much humbled by being on this stage with all these great thought leaders and 
the great work that you all are doing.  
We worked on a project called Say Their Name, a podcast series where we were going around the 
country talking to families about their loved ones who have been killed or assaulted by police. As 
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you were setting up there, it is important that we hear directly from these families because we don't 
often hear from them, and if we do, they tend to be in sound bites and clickbait articles that are 
meant to get your attention. These narratives tend to be controlled by the media and by the police, 
and so we wanted to hand this platform over to the families to give their perspective because let's 
just assume that the media's doing nothing nefarious. They still tend to take the police's side in 
terms of what the story is. They will run with that immediately, and part of that is because the 
media service is all about being the first out of the gate. A lot of times, they don't have time to fact-
check things. They're just taking the police at their word, which many times is incorrect, as we 
found talking to these families.  That's where it's important to talk to these families – to get their 
perspective and understanding not only of what happened but their journey for justice.  
That's also where it plays into this qualified immunity conversation as these families are 
victimized. When they lose their loved one, or their loved one is assaulted, then there is a re-
victimization that happens as you go through the court system. They delay the process to be able 
to get restitution. Obviously, now with COVID, you have other delays that are beyond their regular 
delay tactics. Now, you actually have a pandemic on top of that. But that costs money. That costs 
emotional and mental strain on these families on top of what they're already experiencing. Then 
when you look at qualified immunity, you are up against an unwinnable foe, as was touched on by 
Professor Schwartz earlier. 
You have to prove now what the intent was or what the officer was feeling. How do you disprove 
what the officer is feeling if they're telling you they felt scared for their life?  
One case in particular that I wanted to mention here is that of Robbie Tolan in Bellaire, Texas, 
which is just outside of Houston. Robbie was shot back in 2008, I believe, and he did live to tell 
his own story. I say it's kind of fortunate that he lived to tell his story, but let's not forget that he 
has lived every single day with the physical and emotional trauma of what he experienced. So, let's 
not look at him as a great success story. He is living this every single day, but at the same time, 
his family was actually able to fight all the way to the Supreme Court and win a case on qualified 
immunity.4 It took them almost eight years to fight and get that case heard and won in the Supreme 
Court. To do so, they had to sell their home. This is a family where the father was a Major League 
Baseball player, almost a Hall of Fame baseball player on top of that. Robbie Tolan, the one who 
was shot, was actually drafted to the Washington Nationals and was in his first year of climbing 
up that system.  
His career was taken away from him from being shot, and a family that is that well-off still had to 
sell their home to be able to fight against qualified immunity. That shows you how difficult it is 
and the strain that it takes on a family, just from a financial standpoint. Let's also remember that 
they had a home to sell. Not all families have a home to sell. They don't have those means to get 
money. Robbie’s family also had favors from lawyers who were giving them pro bono work and 
things like that. That's not to throw the blame at the lawyers here. They also have to get paid to 
make a living. 
 
4 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) 
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At the same time, the system is set up for failure for many of our communities. I'm just going to 
recount one thing that a family member told us. Once, when they were in the courts, the judge said 
to the jurors, "If you think that the officer may have feared for their life, you must acquit." If that 
is what we're up against, we can't win. 
 With them [Robbie’s family] winning the Supreme Court case within its first, I believe, five or 
six months, that case was cited in helping over 500 other court cases just within that first five 
months. That being said, we are still facing qualified immunity as an issue. Even though that is a 
precedent, it's not being applied at a great enough rate and scale to be able to actually help in the 
way that we need to.  
We need to change laws. We can't just have a precedent. We have to change laws. 
Howard Henderson 
Chris, I really appreciate that because you provided us some context to this.  
Joanna, let me ask you a question. You put out an interesting article in 2018, The Case Against 
Qualified Immunity5, where you articulated the chinks in the armor of qualified immunity, per se. 
We are in the Fifth Circuit right now, well I am, and we understand what that means for qualified 
immunity. You articulated the places where qualified immunity received greater levels of support 
from the courts. Can you speak to that? What does that mean for us to be in these uniquely 
draconian areas of the country where qualified immunity seems to be a lot stronger than others? 
And, can you speak to how qualified immunity looks different in circuits like the Fifth Circuit? 
Joanna Schwartz 
Yes, thank you for that question. I really appreciate that. Chris mentioned Robbie Tolan as well as 
the case out of the Fifth Circuit out of the Northern District of Texas. I've looked at qualified 
immunity in Texas. With no disrespect for your state, Texas is the worst when it comes to qualified 
immunity. The Fifth Circuit, which is the Court of Appeals that hears cases that come out of Texas, 
is the worst Court of Appeals. You have a really, really hard road to climb when it comes to 
qualified immunity.  
One thing they’ve done is allowed the courts to have their own rule, which the Supreme Court has 
never said is the right rule. The rule is that if a defendant argues qualified immunity or raises 
qualified immunity, there are heightened pleading requirements on the plaintiff at the beginning. 
Meaning the plaintiff has to come forward with additional facts to show exactly what happened in 
the case that can defeat qualified immunity. And then Texas law doesn't require law enforcement 
agencies to turn over any information related to these cases so long as it's part of an ongoing 
investigation. There's pressure on either side. The laws that the police do not have to turn over any 
information, and then the court says, "You have to give us detailed information about what 
happened before you can go forward." 
 
5 Joanna Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1797 (2018) 
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There was a case brought by the family of a man named Tony Timpa out of Dallas, Texas . He 
was killed beneath the knee of two police officers who put their weight on him while he was 
handcuffed and his feet were zip-tied.6 The officers held him down for 14 minutes until he died. 
This was a case in which the family couldn't know anything about what happened because he had 
passed away unlike, Robbie Tolan, whose family was around him. Tony Timpa had no family, and 
he was no longer there to tell his story. There was video footage, including body camera video, 
that the city of Dallas refused to turn over because there was an ongoing investigation. The lawyer 
and the family had to file a complaint with bare-bones information that they were able to glean 
from the police incident report. Then the city tried to get the case dismissed because the complaint 
didn't have enough information, even though the city was holding the information and refused to 
turn it over.  
That's a rule specific to Texas, which impacts the difficulty in state law regarding qualified 
immunity. The judges are very sympathetic to qualified immunity, which has further effect in that 
lawyers are reluctant to bring these cases forward. As Chris said, lawyers have to keep the lights 
on. Lawyers try to bring these cases forward and invest tens of thousands of dollars of their own 
money because in these cases, lawyers do not get paid unless their client wins. Then, they get a 
portion. 
They invest 10, 20, 30 thousand dollars of their own money, and then the case gets dismissed. The 
lawyer thinks, "You know what? I'm going to go back to my personal injury cases. I'm going to go 
back to my medical malpractice cases. This stuff is too hard."  
I looked at lawsuit filings in the city of Houston, a city with thousands of police officers and 
millions of people, over a two-year period. In two years, I found 25 cases alleging police 
misconduct. In Philadelphia, a city of comparable size, there were 10 times as many lawsuits. In 
Houston, during that two-year period, there were five cases where a plaintiff recovered anything 
in those suits. In four of the five cases, someone had died. In the fifth, deadly force was used, but 
they managed not to perish. In Philadelphia, there were 10 times as many verdicts and were 100 
times more awarded to plaintiffs in these cases. In the city of Houston, there was not a single 
person in that two-year period who recovered anything for false arrest, wrongful searches, or 
anything that didn't include force. That is partially because of qualified immunity, but it's also all 
the downstream effects, such as the fact that lawyers are concerned about bringing these cases 
forward. There is not a functioning system of civil rights enforcement, in my view, right now in 
the state of Texas because Texas state law is combined with qualified immunity. 
Howard Henderson 
I appreciate when you contextualize it to Texas and Houston and understanding what it looks like 
in relation to the national landscape.  
 
6 Timpa v. Dillard, Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-3089-N, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118365 (N.D. Tex. 2020)(appeal 
filed (Aug. 27, 2020)(No. 20-10876). 
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Atty. Frazier Camara, one of the points that I didn't bring up was the fact that you are the chair of 
the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section. Can criminal justice reform actualize 
without adequately addressing qualified immunity? 
April Frazer Camara 
I think the answer is no. Professor Schwartz brought up a really good point about enforcement. It's 
a myriad of issues of accountability. The focus is on police misconduct, but as someone who has 
clients that are kept in cages, I'm concerned about prison conditions and how people are 
dehumanized in general in the criminal legal system. The relief under Section 1983 has been 
stripped. Prison rights advocates have not been able to enforce humane conditions for people who 
are incarcerated. This is whether or not we are going to allow for the enforcement of civil and 
human rights within the criminal legal system.  
I don't think we can talk about comprehensive criminal legal system reform without talking about 
qualified immunity. When she shared those numbers about Houston, we have to talk about how 
that plays into the culture within the Black community. If you live somewhere where you see 
rampant police misconduct, and there's never accountability, no one ever wins. You want us to 
have faith in this same system, but the integrity of the criminal legal system is tied to whether or 
not there is enforcement as well.  
We need to dismantle the criminal legal system and rebuild a much smaller and humane system. 
But for those who have faith in the existing system, you should be concerned because how do you 
expect communities to have faith in a system that never protects them? They never win, and they 
never feel like people who are bad actors are being held responsible. 
Howard Henderson 
Chris, I want to piggyback off what Atty. Frazier Camara has laid out around the defund the police 
conversation and its role in qualified immunity being one of those spaces where we need a lot of 
change. From a person who is well-versed in media messaging, what role does the media's message 
play in our approach to qualified immunity? I mean this in terms of educating the public and 
understanding how we may go about making change. We've seen what social media has been able 
to do over the last three years in terms of galvanizing people, particularly young people, around a 
common message and fighting for social justice.  
Can you speak to how you may suggest that the media can utilize its best practices to help reform 
the criminal justice system and, most notably in our case, qualified immunity? 
Chris Colbert 
Media plays a very large part in all of this. They're the ones that control the narrative, and 
depending on who they're getting their information from, it is how the public will interpret these 
situations going forward. From that standpoint alone, in terms of who they are deciding is giving 
the correct facts, how are they giving fair balance to the actual families?  
I see very few times that the families are truly given a platform. Part of that is doing quick news 
stories that are a minute to three or five minutes long. You can't capsulate what has happened in 
8
The Bridge: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Legal & Social Policy, Vol. 6 [2021], Art. 2
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/thebridge/vol6/iss1/2
Transcription of 2021: Police Misconduct & Qualified Immunity Symposium: Reimagining “We the People” 
Panel I:  The Criminal Justice System: "George Floyd Bill" & Qualified Immunity 
that amount of time. We need to take a new look at how we do our media coverage or, at least as 
citizens, have a realization that, "Okay, this is just introducing me to the story. I have to dig deeper 
somewhere else to get more." That's where I implore other media companies to do what we have 
done in terms of handing over our platform to the families and their advocates to talk about their 
perspectives. 
In terms of how it then plays into qualified immunity, I think it's talking directly to the families 
about their experiences. For instance, Markeeta Thomas’, who's also in the Houston area, brother 
Danny Ray Thomas, was killed in 2018. He had a manic episode in the middle of the street with 
his pants around his ankles and hands at his sides. There was no way he could've had a weapon. 
He had a mental health struggle that was all predicated on his children being killed by his wife a 
few months earlier. Instead of responding with somebody who could give him mental health care, 
they sent an officer who, within seconds of coming out of his car, shot and killed him.7 
As Markeeta was trying to fight and get some kind of restitution, the prosecutors would come to 
her to get information. None of the information that she gave was presented in court. None of it – 
including information indicating the officer had actually threatened her brother months earlier. The 
officer said, "I'm going to, one day, catch you and shoot you in the back." He didn't shoot him in 
the back when he killed him. He shot him in his front. But at the same time, there was a threat that 
was never brought up in the court case. That kind of information is what the public needs to hear 
to understand that this system is rigged. It's set up in a way that is not going to provide restitution 
for these families.  
And that's where the media can come into play. We have to hand our platforms over to these 
families and their advocates to be able to give us that other side of the story. Or, from my 
perspective, the real story. 
Howard Henderson 
We're going to close out shortly because I want to make [sic} sure we respect our time, but this 
conversation is so powerful.  
Joanna, you lay out what you see as a prescription to change this situation. You identify certain 
factors that you think need to be in place to make it happen, but you also discussed in one of your 
articles about police training. What they're trained to do, what they're not trained to do and, and 
how that impacts how they interpret legislation, particularly Graham v. Connor.  
If we're going to change qualified immunity in this country, what are those key elements that need 
to be in place? How do we get there? 
Joanna Schwartz 
Well, it's the big question. My point of view is that we need to end qualified immunity. Officers 
do not need qualified immunity. Part of the reason for that is there are so many other protections 
 




Henderson et al.: The Criminal Justice System: "George Floyd Bill" & Qualified Immunity
Produced by The Earl Carl Institute for Legal and Social Policy, Inc., Spring 2011
Transcription of 2021: Police Misconduct & Qualified Immunity Symposium: Reimagining “We the People” 
Panel I:  The Criminal Justice System: "George Floyd Bill" & Qualified Immunity 
that are already in place for law enforcement. Defenders of qualified immunity say, "We need the 
defense so that officers acting in good faith aren't bankrupted for split-second mistakes that they 
make." But the evidence shows that officers almost never pay anything in these cases. There is no 
danger of bankruptcy there. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, in the 
Graham versus Connor8 case, which is the bedrock for police training and the Fourth Amendment, 
says that officers can make reasonable mistakes. They can shoot the wrong person, search the 
wrong person, or arrest the wrong person as long as the mistake was reasonable. I mentioned that 
because those decisions, those mistakes are still going to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
even if qualified immunity goes away.  
There's a separate conversation that if we were to get rid of qualified immunity, should the Fourth 
Amendment be in the structure that it gives so much discretion and so much leeway to government 
decisions? I personally don't think it should, but that's the second set of conversations. 
If qualified immunity goes away, it means that the cost, burdens, and complications of litigating 
these cases are going to get lower. It means that more lawyers will probably be willing to take 
these cases. It means that when these cases are filed, the focus is going to be on what the officers 
did in terms of whether they violated the Constitution. Not whether someone can find a prior court 
decision. The focus will be on what the officers actually did, and that’s really important.  
There are going to be more decisions that are issued by courts that explain what the Constitution 
requires. Right now, there's a lot of decisions that grant qualified immunity but don't explain 
whether the law was violated. To the extent that police departments want to train their officers 
about the law, qualified immunity makes it harder to even understand what the law is. There are a 
lot of important things that ending qualified immunity will do, but it is not a cure-all.  
In connecting to Ms. Frazier Camara's comment in the beginning, ending qualified immunity is a 
very important piece of the puzzle. Qualified immunity is a manifestation of racism in the criminal 
justice system and abuse of power in the system. But ending qualified immunity on its own is not 
going to end everything. There is still that backdrop. It's the most important first step that a state 
legislature, Congress, or the Supreme Court could take. But there is a lot more to be done in terms 
of training in the way we think about what the police’s role is in our society and how we think 
about investigating and supervising the officers that we do have.  
It's one piece, but it's an important piece. 
Howard Henderson 
Atty. Frazier Camara, what's step number two? Where do we go from here?  
Because oftentimes, we have panel discussions, and we pontificate about a problem, but you're 
very solutions-oriented. 
 
8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 
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I've watched the work that you all do, and you focus on addressing problems with solutions that 
make a difference and are racially equitable. In the recent piece we put out on Saving Black Lives 
as a collaborative effort, we talked about the fact that race neutrality doesn't necessarily exist.  
From your perspective, what should step two be? 
April Frazer Camara  
We have to have a very serious conversation in America about reparations. We have to do 
something to right the wrongs of the past. When we talk about all of the cases, all of the harm that 
has been done to Black, Brown, and un-resourced communities, it's one thing to repeal or change 
qualified immunity, but what happens to Markeeta? 
My uncle died in jail, and, fortunately, we got a settlement. But what do you do to repair the harm 
that you have done for centuries to Brown and Black communities through the defense of qualified 
immunity? Reparations have to be a part of the conversation.  
Let me just say this about where we are as a country: There is a need for us to focus on unity and 
how we move forward, but you cannot unify a country until you confront and address the harm 
that has been done. That's why we have to talk about reparations, and we have to talk about how 
do we offer restitution to people who have been harmed by the system. 
Howard Henderson 
That's a good point and one that we oftentimes are afraid to have conversations about.  
Chris, I'll give you the final word before we close. We're on the campus that has a historical law 
school, Thurgood Marshall School of Law. We also have the Barbara Jordan - Mickey Leland 
School of Public Affairs, and we have the School of Communication. We are located in the heart 
of Houston, Texas, and in the belly of the Fifth Circuit. From your perspective as a media person, 
what can be done to make sure we help this Fifth Circuit move in the right direction? 
Chris Colbert 
There are a lot of steps. There's not going to be a one-size-fit-all for any of this. Accountability is 
something that is big, and in the grand scheme of things, I think a public database that allows us 
to see the records of police officers and their history is key.  
As it's been touched on before, there tends to be a pattern of escalation where officers see they can 
get away with things. Then, eventually, someone dies, or they actually kill somebody. They do 
that over and over again. But, they may be moved around to different regions. A public database 
will help us hold our public officials' feet to the fire around these things.  
It also can help us combat qualified immunity. I'm not a lawyer, so I don't know this for certain, 
but a database can allow us to see, "Oh, this person has a history of claiming they feared for their 
life. Well, there's a pattern that shows they're going after specific people and harming them in 
different ways so that qualified immunity doesn't apply here."  
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Specific to Houston and the Fifth Circuit, it is a situation that is rigged against communities of 
color. From a media standpoint, we have to tell these in-depth stories of these individuals. I hate 
to bring up the same thing again, but in terms of what the media can do, they have to make sure 
that they're giving an opportunity to the lawyers, like yourselves, and these families to talk about 
what it is that they're up against. Or how they have been re-victimized in this process so that the 
world can understand, "Okay, this is a specific area that needs addressing." Houston specifically 
has an issue that needs to be addressed. 
Howard Henderson 
Professor Schwartz, Atty. Frazier Camara, and Chris Colbert, you have given us something to take 
with us to develop an action plan, which is very powerful. We understand that it's going to take 
unique conversations, and it's going to take collaborative efforts from folks like you all, so we 
appreciate you.  
Larry Taylor 
Wait, Howard. I do appreciate staying on time. Right now, we're going to open it up for some 
questions and answers from the attendees to the panelists. 
Professor, you were absolutely correct – practicing civil rights in the state of Texas is a tremendous 
uphill battle. One of the things I'd like to mention is qualified immunity doesn't necessarily just 
stay within criminal law or criminal activity. You also have activities, like in Breonna Taylor’s 
case, that involve someone who is a bystander of a criminal investigation, or some kind of criminal 
activity, that is injured but also prohibited from getting justice because of this qualified immunity. 
The Texas Supreme Court has written an opinion that has basically shut the door on an opportunity 
for that type of justice to come forth. I just wanted to make sure that I put that out there. 
The first question we have is, "What kind of pressure can we put on the city hall officials to address 
these issues? I live in Dallas. We have a new police chief and are in a city council that is majority 
African-American." Great discussion. Howard let's go ahead and get you involved. What do you 
think, my friend? 
Howard Henderson 
First of all, I'm a Ph.D. in criminal justice. I would be foolish if I wanted to take a stab at that, but 
I will say this: I think the best thing to do is to link up with experts like Atty. Frazier Camara, 
Professor Schwartz, and Chris Colbert. We need to be able to identify the problem but also keep 
highlighting the individuals that are engaged in this process. People don't know who's on the city 
council, so they can't hold people accountable. They don't know who they are, and there's no light 
being shed on these people who are making critical decisions at a very local level. We tend to think 
about a lot of these issues from a federal standpoint, but the reality of it is 80% of our criminal 
justice system is a local issue. We need to begin to look at it from that standpoint, but I open that 
up to the experts on the panel. 
Larry Taylor 
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I was just going to say that being here at Texas Southern as a graduate of our law school, there this 
movement of reforms taking place. Dr. Henderson talked about the importance of collaboration, 
but the community should be driving what the solutions are. That means making sure you tap into 
the expertise of legal experts and media because we have to be aligned with what the community 
sees as the solution. I think it's a great question, and for people who study these issues 
academically, such as public defenders and people who work in the system, you can't be moving 
these reforms if you're not in alignment with the community. The power is in our communities and 
in the work that Chris is doing to elevate the voices. Even as public defenders, we should not be 
the voice. It's the voice of directly impacted people. Any effort should be driven by the community, 
and experts should only be coming in to advise, not to lead the movement. 
Thank you. Dr. Schwartz, someone asked if you could define qualified immunity one more time. 
Joanna Schwartz 
Sure, I know it's hard to understand. It sort of makes your head spin when you actually hear it.  
The Supreme Court created it, and it says that officers have qualified immunity unless they violated 
clearly established law. The way that they've defined clearly established law is that it can't be 
defined at a state of generality like the standard for Graham v. Connor.9 It has to be specific, 
particularized to the facts before them. So what it comes to mean in practice is that a plaintiff has 
to find a prior court decision where a court held that an officer acted unconstitutionally, and the 
way in which that officer acted is factually very similar to the case at hand. 
Larry Taylor 
Thank you, Professor. One of the attendees asked, and I'll go ahead and answer this one, "How can 
we keep in contact or find more information out about the speakers?"  
If you take a look on your screens, you can go down to the schedule, and at this particular event, 
there is a section where you can actually click on the speakers. Their information will pull up their 
bios, emails, and any social media they may have. That information is available to you on the 
actual platform itself.  
Next question, and Chris, I'll throw this one at you. The question is, "The police body cameras, 
what kind of effect have they had on changing or addressing this issue?" 
Chris Colbert 
I think all footage is good. It gives us more to work with, but unfortunately, we're seeing that that 
is not making a full difference either. We're still up against the qualified immunity aspect of, "Did 
you fear for your life?" and you can't see that on the video. We can, but in the court of law, we still 
cannot prove what is in someone's mind. The video doesn't show what is in someone's mind, so as 
much as those videos help – and we should continue to push to make sure we have those body 
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That being said, we still need to push to make sure there are requirements for all officers. Not 
every police department makes it a requirement. Just looking at LA, LA’s police department and 
LA’s sheriff department have different requirements in terms of utilizing body cams. The sheriff's 
department doesn't have to, whereas the police department has a higher rate of having to use them. 
Also, there's ensuring that they're on at all times. We're seeing a lot now where the body cams are 
turned on after the shooting happens or after the assault happens. Yes, it's great that you get some 
of that back time, but you get no audio. You can't see what that verbal communication back and 
forth between the officer and the victim was. So, they can claim that they gave all these warnings, 
but there's no audio to support it. We still have to set up systems and make sure they are used 
properly. 
Just to pivot real quick to the last question I answered in terms of the media's responsibility, one 
other aspect that I didn't mention because we were really focusing on qualified immunity is that 
it's the media's responsibility to also tell the story of these individuals. Who were they as human 
beings? We continue to look at them as hashtags and statistics, and that does a disservice to them 
and their families. We hold police at such high stature, so when we see these victims who are 
killed, many times, the media will run with a mugshot or run with some kind of football picture 
that vilifies them or makes them look more aggressive than maybe they really were. I know from 
talking to the families that they have not been consulted about what photo to use for their loved 
one. They've never been asked if they have a picture for them or ask who this human being is, so 
they're not just seen as a statistic or as a villain if they were not. That's the other piece for media – 
we need to tell the actual stories of these human beings and memorialize them so we can get behind 
them.  They are humans, just like our brothers, sisters, mothers, and fathers. I just wanted to make 
sure I added that piece in as well. 
Larry Taylor 
I'm going to try to leave us with some hope that things are actually moving forward. Professor, 
could you tell us of any success stories with legislation that is moving qualified immunity forward? 
Howard Henderson 
Absolutely. There are states across the country that are introducing and considering bills that would 
create a right to sue under the state constitution without qualified immunity as a defense. Texas is 
considering that kind of bill right now, and I hope that it gets passed.  
In June of 2020, Colorado passed an exciting statute.10 You could look it up. It's Senate Bill 217 
in Colorado, and it creates the right to sue for violation of the state constitution with no qualified 
immunity as a defense. There's a couple of other things that it does to support really important 
parts of the process, such as it provides for attorney's fees for people who bring these state law 
claims. It also requires that the city pays for the settlement and judgment in any case unless the 
officer was convicted of a crime. I disagree with that part, but I'll take it in general. The statute 
also says that if the city finds that their officer has acted in bad faith, they will require the officer 
 
10 Colorado Revised Statutes, § 13-21-131. 
14
The Bridge: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Legal & Social Policy, Vol. 6 [2021], Art. 2
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/thebridge/vol6/iss1/2
Transcription of 2021: Police Misconduct & Qualified Immunity Symposium: Reimagining “We the People” 
Panel I:  The Criminal Justice System: "George Floyd Bill" & Qualified Immunity 
to pay up to $25,000 or 5% of the settlement or judgment, whichever is less. If they can't pay that 
amount, then the city will cover that rest. I think that that's a really exciting portion as well. 
It creates some financial responsibility for the officer, but it doesn't leave the person whose rights 
have been violated without compensation. In my mind, making sure that people whose rights have 
been violated get some form of compensation, which will never be enough to make them fully 
whole, is a really important first step. Colorado's statute is a model for us for the future, in terms 
of state law with no qualified immunity, attorney's fees, required indemnification, and a financial 
sanction for officers. 
Larry, I wanted to highlight New York City Council is actually considering a bill to create a 
reparations fund for victims of police misconduct. A lot of great movement is taking place at the 
local and state level. I would tell people to be creative and not be weighted to a narrow fix. We 
have to be creative in figuring out strategies to not only correct behavior moving forward but 
addressing how we restore people who have been wronged in the past. 
Larry Taylor 
I can just piggyback off of both of those, I don't know if everybody in the audience understands 
this, but when you see settlements that happen for these families, that money is coming from 
taxpayers' money. That's not coming from the police departments. That's not coming from the 
officer themselves. As Professor Schwartz mentioned before, it's great what Colorado is doing 
because once you start hitting people in their pockets, that's when change begins to happen. I just 
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INTRODUCTION
In many ways, qualified immunity’s shield against government damages
liability is stronger than ever.  The United States Supreme Court has made
clear that qualified immunity should protect “all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.”1  The Court dedicates an outsized
portion of its docket to reviewing—and virtually always reversing—denials of
qualified immunity in the lower courts.2  In these decisions, the Court regu-
larly chides courts for denying qualified immunity motions given the impor-
tance of the doctrine “to society as a whole.”3  And the Court’s recent
qualified immunity decisions make it seem nearly impossible to find clearly
established law that would defeat the defense.4
But there are also cracks in qualified immunity’s armor.  Most recently,
in his concurrence in Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Thomas criticized the doctrine
for bearing little resemblance to the common law at the time the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 became law, and for being defined by “precisely the sort of ‘free-
wheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the power to
make.”5  Indeed, Justice Thomas recommended that “[i]n an appropriate
case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”6  Much
attention has been paid to Justice Thomas’s call to reconsider qualified
immunity doctrine in Ziglar.7  But Justices have been raising questions about
1 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
2 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82 (2018)
(observing that the Supreme Court has decided thirty qualified immunity cases since 1982,
and has found that defendants violated clearly established law in just two of those cases).
The Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018), and
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018), puts the count at thirty-two.  Twenty of those
decisions have been issued within the past ten years.  If one includes cases in which quali-
fied immunity is invoked less directly, the count would be higher. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton,
134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
3 See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017) (“In the last five years, this
Court has issued a number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity
cases.  The Court has found this necessary both because qualified immunity is important to
‘society as a whole,’ and because as ‘an immunity from suit,’ qualified immunity ‘is effec-
tively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’  Today it is again necessary to
reiterate the longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at
a high level of generality.’” (first quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.
Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015); then quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)));
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3 (“Because of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to soci-
ety as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual
officers to liability.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982))).
4 See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s recent quali-
fied immunity decisions).
5 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012)).
6 Id. at 1872.
7 See, e.g., Will Baude, “In an Appropriate Case, We Should Reconsider Our Qualified Immu-
nity Jurisprudence,” WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 19, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/19/in-an-appropriate-case-
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qualified immunity for decades.  In 1997, Justice Breyer suggested that
defendants should not be protected by qualified immunity if they are certain
to be shielded from financial liability by their employer.8  In 1992, Justice
Kennedy indicated that qualified immunity doctrine might be unnecessary to
shield government defendants from trial given the Court’s summary judg-
ment jurisprudence.9  In 2015, and again in 2018, Justice Sotomayor
expressed concern that the Court’s qualified immunity decisions contribute
to a culture of police violence.10
If the Court did find an appropriate case to reconsider qualified immu-
nity, and took seriously available evidence about qualified immunity’s histori-
cal precedents and current operation, the Court could not justify the
continued existence of the doctrine in its current form.  Ample evidence
undermines the purported common-law foundations for qualified immu-
nity.11  Research examining contemporary civil rights litigation against state
and local law enforcement shows that qualified immunity also fails to achieve
its intended policy aims.  Qualified immunity does not shield individual
we-should-reconsider-our-qualified-immunity-jurisprudence/?utm_term=.18443bf27fbd
(describing Justice Thomas’s concurrence as offering “some promising skepticism . . .
about the doctrine of qualified immunity”); Matt Ford, American Policing Goes to the Supreme
Court, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/
supreme-court-carpenter-cases/541524/ (describing Justice Thomas’s concurrence as “a
glimmer of light . . . for qualified-immunity critics”); Perry Grossman, Clarence Thomas to the
Rescue?, SLATE (June 21, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru-
dence/2017/06/in_ziglar_v_abbasi_clarence_thomas_signals_his_support_for_civil_rights
.html (describing Justice Thomas’s concurrence as “the most direct call for change [of
qualified immunity doctrine] to date”).
8 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997) (concluding that private
prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity in part because “insurance increases
the likelihood of employee indemnification and to that extent reduces the employment-
discouraging fear of unwarranted liability potential applicants face”).
9 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Harlow was
decided at a time when the standards applicable to summary judgment made it difficult for
a defendant to secure summary judgment regarding a factual question such as subjective
intent, even when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the question; and in Harlow we
relied on that fact in adopting an objective standard for qualified immunity.  However,
subsequent clarifications to summary-judgment law have alleviated that problem . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
10 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“When
Mullenix confronted his superior officer after the shooting, his first words were, ‘How’s
that for proactive?’ . . .  [T]he comment seems to me revealing of the culture this Court’s
decision supports when it calls it reasonable—or even reasonably reasonable—to use
deadly force for no discernible gain and over a supervisor’s express order to ‘stand by.’  By
sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162
(2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision reversing
the Ninth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity for an officer who shot a woman holding a
knife “tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that
palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished”).
11 See infra Part I for further discussion of this argument.
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officers from financial liability.12  It almost never shields government officials
from costs and burdens associated with discovery and trial in filed cases.13
And it appears unnecessary to encourage vigorous enforcement of the law.14
The Court could, alternatively, overhaul or eliminate qualified immunity
because—as Justice Sotomayor has observed—its application all too often
“renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”15  Although few
cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, multiple aspects of the
doctrine—including its disregard of officers’ bad faith, exacting require-
ments to clearly establish the law, and license to courts to grant qualified
immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional claims—hamper
the development of constitutional law and may send the message that officers
can disregard the law without consequence.  The fact that qualified immunity
doctrine fails to protect government officials from financial liability or other
burdens of suit makes the doctrine’s imbalance between government and
individual interests especially concerning and unwarranted.
If a majority of the Court is convinced by one or more of these argu-
ments, they should restrict or do away with the qualified immunity defense
altogether.  In fact, five of the Justices currently on the Court have authored
or joined opinions expressing sympathy with one or more of these argu-
ments.16  Why, then, has the Court continued so vigorously to apply the doc-
trine, often in unanimous or per curiam decisions?  In my view, the most
likely explanation is that Justices fear eliminating or restricting qualified
immunity would alter the nature and scope of policing or constitutional liti-
gation in ways that would harm government officials and society more gener-
ally.17  For reasons that I will describe elsewhere, I believe there would be no
parade of horribles were qualified immunity eliminated.18  But even if the
Court does not find my assurances to be convincing, unsubstantiated fears
about the future are insufficient reason to maintain a doctrine unmoored to
common-law principles, unable or unnecessary to achieve the Court’s policy
goals, and unduly deferential to government interests.  The Justices can end
qualified immunity in a single decision, and they should end it now.
12 See infra Section II.A for further discussion of this argument.
13 See infra Section II.B for further discussion of this argument.
14 See infra Section II.C for further discussion of this argument.
15 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see infra Part III for further
discussion of this argument.
16 See supra notes 5, 8–10 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas’s concur-
rence in Ziglar, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Richardson (which was joined by Justice Gins-
burg), Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Wyatt, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Mullenix, and
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Kisela (which was joined by Justice Ginsburg)).
17 For some alternative explanations for the Court’s behavior, see infra notes 220–23
and accompanying text.
18 See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity (unpublished manuscript) (draft
on file with author).
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY HAS NO BASIS IN THE COMMON LAW
Qualified immunity shields executive branch officials from damages lia-
bility, even when they have violated the Constitution, if they have not violated
“clearly established law.”19  The Supreme Court first announced that execu-
tive officers were entitled to qualified immunity in 1967.20  In that decision,
Pierson v. Ray, the Court described qualified immunity as grounded in com-
mon-law defenses of good faith and probable cause that were available for
state-law false arrest and imprisonment claims.21  The Court in Pierson
appeared to focus on common-law defenses available in Mississippi at the
time the case was filed.22  But, in subsequent cases, the Court has repeatedly
explained that qualified immunity is drawn from common-law defenses that
were in effect in 1871, when Section 1983 became law.23
Despite the Court’s repeated invocation of the common law, several
scholars have shown that history does not support the Court’s claims about
qualified immunity’s common-law foundations.  When the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was passed, government officials could not assert a good faith defense to
liability.24  A government official found liable could petition for indemnifica-
tion and thereby escape financial liability.25  But if a government official
engaged in illegal conduct he was liable without regard to his subjective good
faith.26  Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a good faith defense
19 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
20 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
21 Id. at 556–57 (“We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which
the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false
arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983.”).
22 See id. at 555 (making clear that the good faith defense that the court of appeals
recognized, and the Court extended to Section 1983 claims, was drawn from a “limited
privilege under the common law of Mississippi”).
23 See Baude, supra note 2, at 53–54; see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012)
(“Our decisions have recognized similar immunities under § 1983, reasoning that common
law protections ‘well grounded in history and reason’ had not been abrogated ‘by covert
inclusion in the general language’ of § 1983.” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
418 (1976))); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (asking whether immuni-
ties “were so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that ‘we presume that
Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish’ them” (quoting
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“[O]ur role is to
interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy
choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law
tradition.”).
24 See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 16–17
(2017); see also Baude, supra note 2, at 55; David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for
Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (1972); Ann Woolhandler, Pat-
terns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–22 (1987).
25 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnifica-
tion and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1924 (2010).
26 See Baude, supra note 2, at 56; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States:
A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 465 (2010).
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to liability under Section 1983 after it became law.27  The Court’s conclusion
in Pierson that a good faith immunity protected the defendant officers from
liability is simply “inconsistent with the common law and many of the Court’s
own decisions.”28
Moreover, even if one believed that the Court’s decision in Pierson accu-
rately reflected the common law, today’s qualified immunity doctrine bears
little resemblance to the protections announced in Pierson.  Although quali-
fied immunity was initially available to government officials who acted with a
subjective, good faith belief that their conduct was lawful, the Supreme
Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, eliminated consideration of officers’ subjective
intent and focused instead on whether officers’ conduct was objectively
unreasonable.29  Even when a plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant was
acting in bad faith, that evidence is considered irrelevant to the qualified
immunity analysis.30  The Court has repeatedly made clear that a plaintiff
seeking to show that an officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable must
find binding precedent or a consensus of cases so factually similar that every
officer would know that their conduct was unlawful.31  Defendants are enti-
tled to interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials.32  And qualified
immunity applies to all types of constitutional claims, not only claims for
which an officer’s good faith might otherwise be relevant.33  None of these
aspects of qualified immunity can be found in the common law when Section
1983 became law, or in Pierson.
To its credit, the Supreme Court has long recognized that it cannot
ground its qualified immunity jurisprudence in the common law.  Indeed,
thirty years ago, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it had “completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law.”34  The Court reformulated qualified immunity with a specific
goal in mind—to shield government officials against various harms associ-
ated with insubstantial lawsuits.35  In the next Part, I will show that qualified
immunity is neither necessary nor particularly well suited to achieve this goal.
But Justice Thomas has recently raised a more fundamental critique of the
Court’s turn away from the common law.
In his concurrence in Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Thomas writes that quali-
fied immunity should conform to the “common-law backdrop against which
27 See Baude, supra note 2, at 57 (describing Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)).
28 Alschuler, supra note 26, at 504; see also Woolhandler, supra note 24, at 464 n.375.
29 See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 506 (“A justice who favored giving § 1983 its original
meaning or who sought to restore the remedial regime favored by the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment could not have approved of either Pierson or Harlow.”).
30 See, e.g., infra note 126 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mullenix v. Luna).
31 See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (describing these decisions).
32 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985).
33 See Baude, supra note 2, at 60–61 (describing this as a “mismatch problem”).
34 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
35 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Congress enacted the 1871 Act,” rather than “the sort of ‘freewheeling policy
choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the power to make.”36  If four
other Justices share Justice Thomas’s view, then they could vote to limit quali-
fied immunity to those defenses available at common law in 1871.37  As the
discussion in this Part makes clear, conforming qualified immunity doctrine
to the common law in place in 1871 would require dramatically limiting qual-
ified immunity doctrine or doing away with the defense altogether.  On the
other hand, if five or more Justices do not mind that qualified immunity
doctrine currently takes a form far different than the common law in 1871,
and do not mind that the doctrine has been structured by the Court to
advance its interest in shielding government officials from burdens associ-
ated with being sued, then it becomes important to consider the extent to
which the doctrine achieves its policy goals.  I turn to this topic next.
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT ACHIEVE ITS INTENDED POLICY GOALS
When the Court created qualified immunity in 1967, it explained that
the doctrine would protect government officials acting in good faith from
financial liability.38  Fifteen years later, the Court expanded the list of govern-
ment interests advanced by qualified immunity to include protection against
“the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,” “the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office,” and “the danger that fear
of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.’”39  In its most recent decisions, the Court focuses primarily on quali-
fied immunity’s presumed ability to shield government officials from burdens
associated with discovery and trial.40  The Court claims that qualified immu-
nity achieves these policy goals, but has offered no evidence to support this
claim.41  Instead, all available evidence undermines each of the Court’s pol-
icy justifications for the doctrine.
I have examined the extent to which qualified immunity doctrine serves
its policy goals in lawsuits filed against state and local law enforcement.  I
36 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012)).
37 Justice Kennedy has raised similar concerns, observing that because qualified immu-
nity was drawn from common-law defenses available when Section 1983 was enacted,
“[t]hat suggests . . . that we may not transform what existed at common law based on our
notions of policy or efficiency.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 171–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38 See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see also infra notes 44–45 and
accompanying text.
39 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
40 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 15 (2017)
(describing these decisions).
41 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“The Harlow standard is specifically
designed to ‘avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment,’ and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal.”
(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
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have found, contrary to the Court’s assertions, that qualified immunity is
unnecessary to shield law enforcement officers from the financial burdens of
being sued because they are virtually never required to contribute to settle-
ments and judgments entered against them.  I have additionally found that
qualified immunity is unnecessary and ill-suited to shield government offi-
cials from burdens of discovery and trial, as it is very rarely the reason that
suits against law enforcement officers are dismissed.  Finally, available evi-
dence suggests that the threat of being sued does not play a meaningful role
in job application decisions or officers’ decisions on the street.
It could be that different types of government actors have different rules
on indemnification or that litigation against these actors is resolved in differ-
ent ways.  But this possibility does not weaken the case against qualified
immunity.  Law enforcement is a common defendant in Section 1983 cases,
and cases involving law enforcement have played a significant role in the
development of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.42
Moreover, given available evidence of qualified immunity’s failure to achieve
its intended policy goals, the burden should now rest on other types of gov-
ernment officials to show how they are different.43
A. Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Officers from Financial Burdens
Qualified immunity has long been justified as a shield from financial
liability.  As the Court explained in Pierson, qualified immunity was necessary
because “[a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between
being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”44  The fear of
damages liability has repeatedly been invoked by the Court as justification for
qualified immunity.45  But my research has shown that state and local law
42 See Baude, supra note 2, at 88–90 (showing that thirteen of the Supreme Court’s
thirty qualified immunity cases since 1982 have involved state or local law enforcement
defendants).  The Supreme Court’s 2018 decisions in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577 (2018), and Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018), also involved local law enforce-
ment defendants.  Accordingly, fifteen of the Court’s thirty-two qualified immunity deci-
sions have considered the propriety of qualified immunity for state or local law
enforcement defendants.  Another seven cases have involved federal law enforcement
officers.
43 I disagree with the view that the methodological limitations of these studies—
including their focus on law enforcement defendants—necessitate further research
“[b]efore calling for a blanket elimination of qualified immunity.”  Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853, 1878 (2018).  Although empirical studies will always have methodological limitations
and there will always be additional empirical questions that can be posed and answered, all
available evidence supports the conclusion that qualified immunity doctrine does not
achieve its intended policy objectives.  The burden should now shift to skeptics to unearth
convincing evidence that supports a contrary conclusion.
44 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
45 See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (“Special problems arise . . .
when government officials are exposed to liability for damages.  To the extent that the
24
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enforcement officers should have no fear of being mulcted in damages.  A
combination of state laws, local policies, and litigation dynamics ensures that
officers are virtually never required to pay anything toward settlements and
judgments entered against them.
In a prior study, I gathered information from eighty-one state and local
law enforcement agencies—including forty-four of the nation’s largest agen-
cies and thirty-seven smaller agencies—regarding the total number of dam-
ages actions naming an individual officer that resulted in a payment to a
plaintiff over a six-year period, the amount paid to plaintiffs in these cases,
the number of instances in which an individual officer contributed to a pay-
ment, and the amount the officer(s) contributed.46  I found that officers
employed by these eighty-one jurisdictions virtually never contributed to set-
tlements and judgments during the six-year study period.47  I additionally
concluded, based on correspondence with government officials in the course
of my research, that law enforcement officers almost never pay for defense
counsel—instead, counsel is provided by the municipality, the municipal
insurer, or the union.48
Among the forty-four largest agencies in my study, 9225 cases were
resolved with payments to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs were paid more than $735
million in these cases.49  But individual officers contributed to settlements in
just 0.41% of these cases, and paid approximately 0.02% of the total awards
to plaintiffs.50  Although punitive damages are specifically intended to pun-
ish defendants who act with “evil motive or intent,” or “reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others,”51 officers did not pay
a penny of the more than $9.3 million that juries awarded in punitive dam-
ages during the study period.52  Indeed, I found multiple instances in which
threat of liability encourages these officials to carry out their duties in a lawful and appro-
priate manner, and to pay their victims when they do not, it accomplishes exactly what it
should.  By its nature, however, the threat of liability can create perverse incentives that
operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties.”); Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (reporting that “public officers require [some form of immu-
nity protection] to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from
potentially disabling threats of liability”).  This fear was also invoked by Justice Gorsuch
when he was on the Tenth Circuit. See Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1141 (10th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The qualified
immunity doctrine . . . is intended to protect diligent law enforcement officers, in appro-
priate cases, from the whipsaw of tort lawsuits seeking money damages . . . . Before a law
enforcement officer may be held financially liable, the Supreme Court requires a plaintiff
to establish not only that his or her rights were violated but also that those rights were
[clearly established].”).
46 For additional information about the jurisdictions, my methodology, and my find-
ings, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 902–12 (2014).
47 See generally id.
48 Id. at 915–16.
49 Id. at 890.
50 Id.
51 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
52 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 917–18.
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government attorneys used evidence about officers’ limited financial
resources in efforts to reduce punitive damages awards after trial—argu-
ments that suggested officers would be personally responsible for satisfying
those awards—only to indemnify the officers after courts entered final judg-
ments in the cases.53  And on the rare occasions that officers did contribute
to settlements or judgments, their contributions were modest: no officer paid
more than $25,000, and the median contribution by an officer was $2250.54
No more than five of the forty-four largest jurisdictions in my study required
officers to contribute anything during the six-year study period, and none of
the thirty-seven smaller jurisdictions in my study required officers to do so.55
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, “officers are more likely to be struck by
lightning” than to contribute to a settlement or judgment over the course of
their career.56
Although officers virtually never contribute to settlements and judg-
ments, different mechanisms protect officers from financial liability around
the country.  Some jurisdictions must indemnify officers for actions taken in
the course and scope of their employment as a matter of law.57  Some juris-
dictions can indemnify officers, but are not required to do so.58  And some
jurisdictions prohibit indemnification of officers under any circumstance.59
Yet these policy variations do not lead to variation in outcome—regardless of
the underlying policies, officers virtually never pay.60  Cities and counties fol-
low state laws requiring indemnification when they exist.  When indemnifica-
tion is discretionary, cities and counties virtually always decide to indemnify
officers.  And when cities and counties prohibit indemnification, some gov-
ernment officials view that prohibition as relevant only to the satisfaction of
judgments and agree to pay settlements to resolve claims against their
officers.61  Other jurisdictions appear to indemnify their officers in violation
of governing law.62
Even on the rare occasions that governments refuse to indemnify their
officers, officers virtually never end up paying anything from their own pock-
ets for a variety of reasons.  When a city declines to indemnify an officer, the
plaintiff may proceed against the municipality instead.63  Some plaintiffs
53 See id. at 933–36.
54 Id. at 939.
55 Id. at 960.
56 Id. at 914.
57 See id. at 905 n.93.
58 See id. at 906 n.94.
59 See id. at 906 n.95.
60 See id. at 919.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 919–23.
63 I learned of one such example in interviews conducted for a related project. See
Telephone Interview with E.D. Pa. Attorney A at 10 (on file with author) (describing a
police shooting case in which the city of Philadelphia declined to indemnify the officer,
and the attorney proceeded against the City: “[H]e’s completely judgment proof.  He can’t
even hold a job, he worked for a couple of months at Home Depot and he got fired.  And,
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decide not to try to collect judgments against officers who are not indemni-
fied—presumably because the officers have limited personal assets.64  Plain-
tiffs sometimes agree not to enforce their judgments against officers in
exchange for post-trial settlements with the government.65  Plaintiffs some-
times challenge the government’s decision not to indemnify, but do not sub-
sequently seek to collect against the officer if they are unsuccessful.66  Other
officers have successfully challenged their employers’ decision not to indem-
nify; in these cases the plaintiffs were ultimately paid by the jurisdictions.67
An officer denied indemnification may assign his right to challenge the city’s
decision to the plaintiff in exchange for an agreement not to enforce the
judgment against the officer.68  And in two recent cases, the City of Cleve-
land denied officers indemnification for multimillion-dollar verdicts, then
hired bankruptcy attorneys for the officers to discharge the debts.69  In each
of these cases, officer defendants, their government employers, and plaintiffs
have responded differently to government decisions not to indemnify.  But
the result in each of these cases was the same—the individual officers did not
pay.
The Supreme Court has suggested, in another context, that qualified
immunity is unnecessary to protect defendants who are otherwise insulated
from financial liability.  In Richardson v. McKnight, the Court denied private
prison guards qualified immunity in part because, Justice Breyer wrote, pri-
vate employment “increases the likelihood of employee indemnification and
you know, I was left in a position where I had a pretty good case against him on the police
shooting, but it would have been futile.  I didn’t want to take a verdict against him.  I didn’t
want to take any damages against him.  So . . . I’m proceeding against the municipality and
we’ll see how that goes.”).
64 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 929.
65 See id. at 921–22.  I recently interviewed an attorney who described a case in which
this type of negotiation occurred after trial. See Telephone Interview with N.D. Ohio Attor-
ney C at 8 (on file with author) (describing a case in which the jury awarded $200,000 in
compensatory damages and $450,000 in punitive damages against an officer; the city said
that it would not indemnify the officer’s punitive damages award; the defendants appealed
the verdict; and the parties agreed to settle the case for $200,000 plus attorneys’ fees, paid
for by the city, in exchange for the defendants’ agreement to withdraw the appeal).
66 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 931.  I recently interviewed an attorney who reported
that, after he won a jury verdict against a Philadelphia police officer and the city declined
to indemnify the officer, the attorney represented the police officer in a case against the
city, seeking indemnification. See Telephone Interview with E.D. Pa. Attorney D at 8 (on
file with author).  The attorney lost in the state appellate court. See id.
67 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 930–31.
68 See id. at 929.
69 See Radley Balko, Cleveland’s Vile, Embarrassing Scheme to Avoid Paying Victims of Police
Abuse, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/
wp/2016/01/20/clevelands-vile-embarrassing-scheme-to-avoid-paying-victims-of-police-
abuse/?utm_term=.a874f9fc1c31; Kyle Swenson, How Cleveland’s Trying to Get Out of Paying
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to that extent reduces the employment-discouraging fear of unwarranted lia-
bility potential applicants face.”70  Likewise, the Court in Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence held that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity in
part because concerns about the “injustice . . . of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise
discretion” are “simply not implicated when the damages award comes not
from the official’s pocket, but from the public treasury.”71
State and local law enforcement officers are as insulated from the threat
of financial liability as are private prison guards, and as are individual officers
in claims against the government.  There should be no concerns about the
injustice of subjecting state and local law enforcement officers to financial
liability because the money to satisfy those awards comes from the public
treasury.  To the extent that Justice Breyer (who authored Richardson) or any
other Justice views qualified immunity as a doctrine justified by the need to
shield government officials from the threat of financial liability,72 evidence
that law enforcement officers virtually never contribute anything to settle-
ments and judgments entered against them demonstrates that qualified
immunity does not—and need not—serve this policy goal.  And there is no
evidence to suggest that other types of government officials face financial
liability more frequently.
B. Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Officers from Burdens
of Litigation in Filed Cases
The Court has also justified qualified immunity as a protection from the
burdens of discovery and trial in “insubstantial” cases.73  In Harlow, the Court
explained that the resolution of constitutional clams “may entail broad-rang-
ing discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s
professional colleagues,” and that “[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government.”74  The Court appears to have become
increasingly committed to this justification for qualified immunity doctrine.
In 1992, the Court wrote that “the risk of ‘distraction’ alone cannot be suffi-
cient grounds for an immunity.”75  But, by 2009, the Court reversed course,
explaining that “the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immu-
70 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997).
71 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980).
72 It is unclear how strongly Justices currently on the Court hold this view.  In Sheehan,
Justice Alito’s decision for the Court noted in passing that the likelihood that the officer
defendants in the case would be indemnified was irrelevant to their qualified immunity
analysis. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015)
(“Whatever contractual obligations San Francisco may (or may not) have to represent and
indemnify the officers are not our concern.  At a minimum, these officers have a personal
interest in the correctness of the judgment below, which holds that they may have violated
the Constitution.”).
73 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982).
74 Id. at 817.
75 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411.
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nity doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘“insubstantial claims” against gov-
ernment officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.’”76
If the “driving force” behind qualified immunity is to resolve insubstan-
tial claims before discovery, the doctrine is utterly miserable at achieving its
goal.  In a prior study, I reviewed the dockets of 1183 Section 1983 lawsuits
filed against law enforcement officers and agencies over a two-year period in
five federal districts.77  I found that just seven of these 1183 cases (0.6%)
were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before discovery.78  Qualified
immunity is little better at shielding government officials from trial—just
thirty-eight (3.2%) of the 1183 cases in my dataset were dismissed before trial
on qualified immunity grounds.79  Although I do not know how many of
these 1183 cases the Court would consider “insubstantial,”80 the Court has
explained that it intends qualified immunity to protect “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”81  Unless the vast
majority of law enforcement officer defendants are “plainly incompetent” or
“knowingly violate the law,” the doctrine is not functioning as expected in
filed cases.82
My data suggest that qualified immunity screens out so few filed cases
before discovery and trial because it is, in many ways, poorly designed to
achieve its goal.  First, qualified immunity cannot be raised by municipalities,
and cannot be raised by government defendants in cases seeking solely equi-
table relief.  In my study, ninety-nine (8.4%) of the 1183 Section 1983 cases
filed against law enforcement fell into one or both of these categories.83  Sec-
ond, courts should reject qualified immunity arguments in motions to dis-
miss so long as the plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim for relief, and
should reject qualified immunity arguments in summary judgment motions
76 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” (quoting
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment))).
77 For additional information about the districts and my methodology, see Schwartz,
supra note 40, at 19–25.
78 Id. at 60.
79 See id.
80 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
81 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
82 Id.
83 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 27.  Some might wonder whether these filing prac-
tices are evidence that qualified immunity encourages cases seeking institutional and for-
ward-looking remedies.  This may be true to some extent—fifty-four of these ninety-nine
cases were filed by attorneys, and the unavailability of qualified immunity for these claims
might have influenced their filing decisions.  (The other forty-five cases were filed by pro
se litigants who were unlikely to know about these intricacies of qualified immunity doc-
trine.)  Some might view the encouragement of institutional and forward-looking remedies
to be a positive side effect of qualified immunity doctrine.  Note, however, that none of
these ninety-nine cases resulted in a court decision finding a constitutional violation or an
award of injunctive or declaratory relief.
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so long as the plaintiff has created a factual dispute about whether the officer
violated her clearly established rights.84  District courts in my dataset wrote
multiple opinions making clear that they understood qualified immunity was
intended to resolve cases before discovery and trial, but denying the motions
because the plaintiffs had met their burdens.85  Third, even when courts
grant defendants’ qualified immunity motions, the grants will not be disposi-
tive so long as additional claims or defendants remain in the cases.  In my
study, courts granted fifty-three qualified immunity motions in full, but only
thirty-four (64.2%) grants were dispositive; in the others, additional claims or
parties continued to expose government officials to the possible burdens of
discovery and trial.86  For each of these reasons, qualified immunity is ill-
suited to play the role the Court expects it to play in the resolution of consti-
tutional claims.
My findings also suggest that qualified immunity doctrine plays a limited
role in the disposition of constitutional claims against law enforcement
because there are so many other ways in which suits can be dismissed before
discovery and trial.  Courts dismissed 126 (10.7%) of the cases in my dataset
before defendants responded because the plaintiffs filed frivolous claims,
failed to serve defendants, or failed to prosecute their cases.87  Even when
defendants could raise qualified immunity, they often chose not to do so.
Defendants moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds in just 13.9% of
the cases in which they could raise the defense.88  In two-thirds of their
motions to dismiss, defendants did not include a qualified immunity argu-
ment.89  Qualified immunity played a similarly limited role in district courts’
decisions.  When defendants raised qualified immunity in their motions to
dismiss and courts granted those motions, courts three times more often
granted the motions on grounds other than qualified immunity.90  Defend-
ants were more likely to raise qualified immunity at summary judgment,
courts were more likely to grant defendants’ summary judgment motions on
qualified immunity grounds, and these summary judgment grants were more
often dispositive.91  Yet, even when defendants raised qualified immunity in
their summary judgment motions, courts more often than not granted those
motions on other grounds.92
Decades ago, Justice Kennedy recognized that the Supreme Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence duplicates other procedural barriers the
Court has erected.  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court eliminated
consideration of officers’ subjective intent to facilitate resolution of qualified
84 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 55–56.
85 See id. at 54–55.
86 Id. at 44.
87 Id. at 56.
88 Id. at 31.
89 See id. at 34.
90 See id. at 39.
91 See id. at 48–49.
92 See id. at 39.
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immunity motions at summary judgment.93  Four years after Harlow, the
Supreme Court issued three decisions that clarified and heightened the stan-
dard for defeating summary judgment.94  And six years after that, Justice
Kennedy observed, in Wyatt v. Cole, that those summary judgment decisions
might have obviated the need for Harlow.95  My research confirms Justice
Kennedy’s view.  District courts’ decisions suggest that the Court’s summary
judgment standards—not to mention its standards for pleadings and for con-
stitutional violations—largely obviate the need for qualified immunity doc-
trine to screen out cases before trial.
Further research can explore the role that qualified immunity plays in
the litigation of constitutional claims against other types of government offi-
cials.  But all available evidence indicates that qualified immunity does little
to shield government officials from discovery and trial in filed cases, and that
the doctrine is both ill-suited and unnecessary to play its intended role.
C. Qualified Immunity Does Not Protect Against Overdeterrence
The only remaining justification that the Supreme Court has offered for
qualified immunity is that it protects against overdeterrence.  The Court fears
that damages actions may “deter[ ] . . . able citizens from acceptance of pub-
lic office” and “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties,”
and expects that qualified immunity will protect against these ills.96  Yet there
are three reasons to believe that qualified immunity does not actually serve as
a shield against overdeterrence.
First, available evidence offers little support for the Supreme Court’s
concern that the threat of litigation “dampen[s] the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties.”97  Multiple studies have found that law enforcement
officers infrequently think about the threat of being sued when performing
their jobs.98  Notably, many of these same studies found that a substantial
93 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
94 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
95 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to
decide “whether or not it was appropriate for the Court in Harlow to depart from history in
the name of public policy,” but concluding that he “would not extend that approach to
other contexts” because, although “Harlow was decided at a time when the standards appli-
cable to summary judgment made it difficult for a defendant to secure summary judgment
regarding a factual question such as subjective intent” “subsequent clarifications to sum-
mary-judgment law have alleviated that problem”).
96 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (second alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
97 Id. (citation omitted).
98 See VICTOR E. KAPPELER, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 7 (4th ed. 2006)
(concluding, based on several studies, that “the prospect of civil liability has a deterrent
effect in the abstract study environment but that it does not have a major impact on field
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percentage of officers believe lawsuits deter unlawful behavior99 and believe
that officers should be subject to civil liability.100  Taken together, these find-
practices”); Arthur H. Garrison, Law Enforcement Civil Liability Under Federal Law and Atti-
tudes on Civil Liability: A Survey of University, Municipal and State Police Officers, 18 POLICE
STUD. INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 19, 26 (1995) (finding that 87% of state police officers, 95%
of municipal police officers, and 100% of university police officers surveyed did not con-
sider the threat of a lawsuit among their “top ten thoughts” when stopping a vehicle or
engaging in a personal interaction); Daniel E. Hall et al., Suing Cops and Corrections Officers:
Officer Attitudes and Experiences About Civil Liability, 26 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES
& MGMT. 529, 542 (2003) (surveying sheriff’s deputies, corrections officers, and municipal
police officers in a southern state and finding that 62 percent of respondents “either dis-
agreed or strongly disagreed that the threat of civil liability hinders their ability to perform
their duties,” but that “46 percent of the respondents indicated that the threat of civil
liability was among the top ten thoughts they had when performing emergency duties”);
Tom “Tad” Hughes, Police Officers and Civil Liability: “The Ties that Bind”?, 24 POLICING:
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 240, 256 (2001) (reporting that a survey of Cincinnati
police officers revealed that “78.2 percent of officers disagree or strongly disagree that they
consider the potential for being sued when they stop a citizen”); Eric G. Lambert et al.,
Litigation Views Among Jail Staff: An Exploratory and Descriptive Study, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 70,
79, 81 (2003) (reporting that when corrections officers were asked whether civil liability
“influenced their decision making when performing emergency duties, 28 percent said
that it did, 63 percent said that it did not, and 9 percent were unsure,” and that “[m]ore
than 70 percent of the respondents indicated that civil lawsuits did not hinder their ability
to do their jobs”); Kenneth J. Novak et al., Strange Bedfellows: Civil Liability and Aggressive
Policing, 26 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 352, 360, 363 (2003) (finding
that officers “tended to disagree” with the statement: “when I stop a citizen one of the first
things that goes through my mind is the potential for being sued,” but that “22 percent
agreed or strongly agreed that they were cognizant of the potential for being sued during
encounters with citizens”).  Note that another study found that a higher percentage of
police chiefs were influenced by the threat of litigation when making decisions affecting
the public. See Michael S. Vaughn et al., Assessing Legal Liabilities in Law Enforcement: Police
Chiefs’ Views, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3 (2001).
99 See Garrison, supra note 98 (finding that 62% of a sample of fifty officers from state,
municipal, and university law enforcement agencies in Pennsylvania agreed with the state-
ment “[t]he police officer who knows he can be sued for violating an individual’s civil
rights is deterred from violating an individual’s civil rights”); Hall et al., supra note 98, at
541 (finding that 48% of respondents “either agreed or strongly agreed that the threat of
civil liability deters misconduct among criminal justice employees”); Hughes, supra note 98
(finding that 38% of officers believe the threat of liability deters civil rights violations);
Lambert et al., supra note 98, at 80 (reporting that 50% of officers surveyed agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement “[t]he threat of a civil suit deters negligent and unlaw-
ful behavior by public safety officials,” and just 14% agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement “[t]he threat of a civil suit hinders my ability to perform my duties”).
100 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 98, at 25 (reporting that 52% of officers surveyed
disagreed with the statement: “police officers should not be subject to civil suits by citi-
zens”); Hall et al., supra note 98, at 538 (finding that 62% of officers surveyed “agreed or
strongly agreed that officers should be personally subject to civil liability for violating the
civil rights of citizens,” and that “72 percent agreed or strongly agreed that officers should
be personally liable for their negligence”); Hughes, supra note 98, at 254 (finding 57.2% of
officers surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement: “police officers should
not be subject to civil suits by citizens”); Lambert et al., supra note 98, at 79 (finding
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ings suggest that many officers believe lawsuits deter misbehavior by other
officers, but do not themselves think about the threat of civil liability when
performing their duties.
Second, to the extent that people are deterred from becoming police
officers and officers are deterred from vigorously enforcing the law, available
evidence suggests the threat of civil liability is not the cause.  Instead, depart-
ments’ difficulty recruiting officers has been attributed to high-profile shoot-
ings, negative publicity about the police, strained relationships with
communities of color, tight budgets, low unemployment rates, and the reduc-
tion of retirement benefits.101  Similarly, a recent survey found that a major-
ity of officers believe recent high-profile shootings of Black men—not civil
suits or the threat of liability—have made their job harder and discouraged
them from stopping and questioning people they consider suspicious.102
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the threat of liability
deters officers, it is far from clear that qualified immunity could mitigate
those deterrent effects.  Presumably, the Court expects that the threat of
financial sanctions and the burdens associated with participating in discovery
and trial discourage people from applying for government positions or chill
officer behavior on the job.  And presumably the Court believes that quali-
fied immunity limits those negative effects of lawsuits by shielding govern-
ment officials from financial liability and the burdens of litigation.  But I have
shown that indemnification practices and litigation dynamics already shield
government officials from financial sanctions, obviating the need for quali-
fied immunity to serve that role.  I have also shown that qualified immunity
“[a]lmost 59 percent [of jail staff surveyed] believed that public safety officers should be
subject to civil suits for violating the rights of citizens”); Novak et al., supra note 98, at 364
(finding that “[t]he preponderance of officers disagreed with the statement that ‘officers
should not be subject to civil suits by citizens’”); Vaughn et al., supra note 98 (finding that
92% of police chiefs surveyed believed officers should be subject to civil suits).
101 See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Nick Penzenstadler, Police Redouble Efforts to Recruit
Diverse Officers, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/
01/21/police-redoubling-efforts-to-recruit-diverse-officers/21574081 (describing “tight
budgets and strained relationships with communities of color” as the reasons police depart-
ments have struggled to meet their goals of diversifying their police departments); Daniel
Denvir, Who Wants to Be a Police Officer?, CITYLAB (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/
crime/2015/04/who-wants-to-be-a-police-officer/391017 (reporting Chuck Wexler, the
executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, as saying: “[A]ll of the negative
images of the police have made it more difficult to hire and recruit candidates into this
profession”); Oliver Yates Libaw, Police Face Severe Shortage of Recruits, ABC NEWS (July 10,
2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=96570 (attributing the low rate of police
applicants to low unemployment, relatively low law enforcement salaries, and rigorous
physical and psychological tests and other prerequisites for law enforcement jobs); William
J. Woska, Police Officer Recruitment—A Decade Later, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Apr. 2016), http://
www.policechiefmagazine.org/police-officer-recruitment/ (describing a number of chal-
lenges of officer recruitment, including bad publicity, community anger, job competition
from the technology sector, the recession, and the reduction in law enforcement retire-
ment benefits).
102 RICH MORIN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BEHIND THE BADGE 15 (2017).
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does little to shield government officials from discovery and trial in filed
cases.  If the burdens of discovery and trial do in fact discourage potential job
applicants and chill officers’ behavior, qualified immunity doctrine can do
little in practice to counteract these effects.
There would likely be disagreement among the Justices—and there
would certainly be disagreement among the public—about what would con-
stitute optimal deterrence of law enforcement officers.  But regardless of how
“unflinching” one believes an officer should be in the “discharge of their
duties,”103 the threat of being sued appears to play little role in the decisions
of job applicants and officers on the street.  And qualified immunity doctrine
could do little to mitigate whatever concerns about liability do exist.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION HOLLOW
The Supreme Court might alternatively decide to eliminate or limit qual-
ified immunity doctrine because, in Justice Sotomayor’s words, it “renders
the protections” of the Constitution “hollow.”104  Although Justice
Sotomayor raised this concern regarding one case in particular, Mullenix v.
Luna, it is a concern that could well be raised about the Court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence more generally.  Although qualified immunity is the
reason few Section 1983 cases against law enforcement are dismissed, the
Court’s qualified immunity decisions have nevertheless made it increasingly
difficult for plaintiffs to show that defendants have violated clearly estab-
lished law, and increasingly easy for courts to avoid defining the contours of
constitutional rights.
When qualified immunity was first announced by the Supreme Court in
1967, it was described as a good faith defense from liability.  For the next
fifteen years, defendants seeking immunity were required to show both that
their conduct was objectively reasonable and that they had a “good faith”
belief that their conduct was proper.105  But, in 1982, the Court eliminated
the subjective prong of the defense, entitling a defendant to qualified immu-
nity so long as he did not violate “law [that] was clearly established at the
time an action occurred.”106
The Court’s definition of “clearly established” law has narrowed signifi-
cantly over the past thirty-five years.  Although the Court once held that a
plaintiff could defeat qualified immunity by showing an obvious constitu-
tional violation,107 the Court’s subsequent decisions have required that plain-
tiffs point to “controlling authority in their jurisdiction” or a “consensus of
cases of persuasive authority.”108  In its most recent decisions, the Court has
only been willing to assume arguendo that circuit precedent or a consensus
103 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (citation omitted).
104 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16.
106 Id. at 818.
107 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
108 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
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of cases can clearly establish the law—suggesting that Supreme Court prece-
dent is the only surefire way to clearly establish the law.109
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity decisions require
that the prior precedent clearly establishing the law have facts exceedingly
similar to those in the instant case.  Although the Court has repeatedly
assured plaintiffs that it “ ‘do[es] not require a case directly on point’ for a
right to be clearly established,” it has also repeatedly cautioned that “ ‘clearly
established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’”110
Indeed, the Court has stated—and regularly restated—that government offi-
cials violate clearly established law only when “‘[t]he contours of [a] right
[are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have under-
stood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”111  In recent years, the
Court has reversed several lower court denials of qualified immunity because
the lower court “misunderstood the ‘clearly established’ analysis” and “failed
to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the
defendant] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.”112
The challenge of identifying clearly established law is heightened fur-
ther by the Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, which allows courts to
grant qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional vio-
lation.113  Courts considering qualified immunity motions are faced with two
questions—whether a defendant has violated the Constitution, and whether
the constitutional right was clearly established.  In 2001, the Supreme Court
instructed lower courts deciding qualified immunity motions to answer both
questions: The Court reasoned that requiring lower courts to rule on the
constitutionality of a defendant’s behavior would allow “the law’s elaboration
from case to case . . . .  The law might be deprived of this explanation were a
court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established
that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”114
In 2009, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reversed itself and held that lower
courts could grant qualified immunity without first ruling on the constitu-
tionality of a defendant’s behavior.115
Taken together, the Court’s qualified immunity decisions have created a
vicious cycle.  The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts that they must
109 See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN.
L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 70–71 (2016) (describing this shift in the Supreme Court’s quali-
fied immunity decisions in recent years).
110 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017) (alteration in original) (first quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 306, 308 (2015); and then quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
111 Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Ander-
son v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
112 White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; see also supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (describing
the frequency with which the Supreme Court grants certiorari and reverses qualified
immunity denials and the Court’s criticisms of these lower court opinions).
113 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
114 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
115 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223–24.
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grant qualified immunity unless they can find a prior Supreme Court deci-
sion, binding precedent, or consensus of cases in which “an officer acting
under similar circumstances”116 has been found to have violated the Consti-
tution.  Yet the Court has also advised lower courts that they can grant quali-
fied immunity without ruling on plaintiffs’ underlying constitutional
claims—reducing the frequency with which lower courts announce clearly
established law.117  And the Supreme Court is among the worst offenders on
this score; although the Supreme Court has suggested in recent decisions
that it may be the only body that can clearly establish the law for qualified
immunity purposes,118 it repeatedly grants qualified immunity without ruling
on the underlying constitutional claim.119  This precise illogic is on full dis-
play in Mullenix v. Luna, the Supreme Court decision that provoked Justice
Sotomayor’s expression of concern about the damage qualified immunity
does to the Constitution.
In Mullenix, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that
qualified immunity protected Texas Department of Public Safety Officer
Mullenix from liability for killing Israel Leija, Jr., as he was fleeing arrest for
violating misdemeanor probation.120  Officer Mullenix “fired six rounds in
the dark at a car traveling 85 miles per hour . . . without any training in that
tactic, against the wait order of his superior officer, and less than a second
before the car hit spike strips deployed to stop it.”121  Mullenix’s first words
to his supervisor after the shooting were, “How’s that for proactive?”—appar-
ently referring to an earlier conversation in which the supervisor “suggested
that [Mullenix] was not enterprising enough.”122  The district court denied
Mullenix’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.  But, in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held
that the trooper did not violate clearly established law.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed three of its prior deci-
sions involving law enforcement officers who shot fleeing suspects,123 one of
which granted the officer qualified immunity without ruling on the underly-
ing constitutional claim.124  The Court then described these cases as creating
a “hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted.”125  Finally, the Court
116 White, 137 S. Ct. at 552.
117 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 37 (2015) (comparing several studies that examine qualified immunity decisions
before and after Saucier and Pearson, and finding that courts after Pearson decide constitu-
tional questions less frequently and are also less likely to find constitutional violations when
granting qualified immunity).
118 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119 See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1887 (2018) (describing several of these cases).
120 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per curiam).
121 Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 309–11 (opinion of the Court).
124 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
125 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309.
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relied on this uncertainty to grant qualified immunity, but did not decide
whether Mullenix violated the Constitution—and so did not clear the haze.
Mullenix’s remark to his supervisor played no role in the analysis, as “an
officer’s actual intentions are irrelevant” to the qualified immunity analy-
sis.126  Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, wrote that the Court’s decision “sanc-
tion[s] a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing” and thereby “renders
the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”127
Concerns that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence renders the
Constitution hollow are even more acute for constitutional claims involving
new technologies and techniques.  Despite the Court’s discussion of the
“hazy legal backdrop” in Mullenix, there are decades of decisions analyzing
when shooting a fleeing suspect constitutes excessive force.128  There are
comparatively fewer cases assessing the constitutional rights of citizens to
record the police or defining when Taser use constitutes excessive force.129
By narrowly defining “clearly established law” and allowing courts to grant
qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional claim,
the Supreme Court leaves important questions about the scope of constitu-
tional rights “needlessly floundering in the lower courts,” as Karen Blum has
written, possibly never to be clarified.130  And even when there is some clarifi-
126 Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg recently raised concerns
about the failure to consider evidence of officer intent in another setting—probable cause
determinations.  The failure to do so, she wrote, “sets the balance too heavily in favor of
police unaccountability to the detriment of Fourth Amendment protection.”  District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 594 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in
part).
127 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, raised similar concerns in her dissent in Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148
(2018).  In that case, Officer Kisela shot the plaintiff when she was holding a kitchen knife
by her side and speaking with her roommate in a “composed and content” manner. Id. at
1155.  Two other officers on the scene held their fire, but Kisela shot Hughes four times
without a prior warning. Id.  Justice Sotomayor found that Kisela violated the Fourth
Amendment and that prior precedent clearly established the unconstitutionality of his con-
duct. Id. at 1157–58, 1161.  She further wrote that the Court’s trend of summarily revers-
ing denials of qualified immunity “transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law
enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment,” and that the
Court’s decision in Kisela “sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers . . . that
they can shoot first and think later.” Id. at 1162.
128 See, e.g., Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309–11 (describing some of these cases).
129 For discussions of the doctrinal confusion in these areas, see Matthew Slaughter,
First Amendment Right to Record Police: When Clearly Established Law Is Not Clear Enough, 49 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 101 (2015); Bailey Jennifer Woolfstead, Don’t Tase Me Bro: A Lack of
Jurisdictional Consensus Across Circuit Lines, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 285 (2012).
130 Blum, supra note 119, at 1895.  Blum describes the slow road to constitutional clarity
in the circuits regarding the existence of a First Amendment right to record the police. Id.
But there are still five circuits by Blum’s count that have not announced such a right.  And
new technologies may create even more complex constitutional questions than those
involved in recording the police. See, e.g., Woolfstead, supra note 129 (describing lack of
agreement among courts about what level of force Tasers constitute and the differences
between using Tasers in “dart mode” and “drive-stun” mode).
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cation about the existence and scope of novel constitutional rights, qualified
immunity may still be granted if the facts of those prior cases are not suffi-
ciently similar to the case at hand.
The Supreme Court has described qualified immunity doctrine as bal-
ancing “two important interests—the need to hold public officials accounta-
ble when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”131  By simultaneously allowing courts to decide qualified immu-
nity motions without reaching the underlying constitutional questions and
requiring plaintiffs to produce circuit or Supreme Court opinions finding
constitutional violations in cases with nearly identical facts, and by ignoring
available evidence of officers’ culpable intent, the Court perpetuates uncer-
tainty about the contours of the Constitution and sends the message to
officers that they may be shielded from damages liability even when they act
in bad faith.
These criticisms of qualified immunity may appear to sit in some tension
with my finding that filed cases are rarely dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds.  If qualified immunity is the reason that less than four percent of
filed cases are dismissed, can it render the protections of the Constitution
hollow?  Unfortunately, the answer is yes.  Qualified immunity doctrine
imperils government accountability in several ways, even as it is the reason
few cases are dismissed.  First, as Justice Sotomayor has explained in Mullenix
and Kisela v. Hughes, the Supreme Court’s flurry of recent decisions granting
qualified immunity—even to officers who have acted unreasonably or in bad
faith—suggest to officers that they can act with impunity.132  As Justice
Sotomayor has written, an opinion like Kisela “tells officers that they can
shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable
conduct will go unpunished.”133  The Supreme Court’s decisions can send
this message to police and the public regardless of how many decisions are
dismissed on qualified immunity grounds in the lower courts.
Second, qualified immunity doctrine may discourage people from bring-
ing cases when their constitutional rights are violated.134  The Supreme
Court’s decisions send the message to plaintiffs’ attorneys that even Section
1983 cases with egregious facts run the risk of dismissal on qualified immu-
nity grounds, and encourage defense counsel to raise qualified immunity at
every turn and immediately appeal district court decisions denying their
motions.135  These dynamics likely increase the cost, complexity, and delay
associated with litigating Section 1983 cases, and these increased risks and
costs may discourage attorneys from taking cases involving novel constitu-
131 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
132 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing Justice Sotomayor’s
concerns).
133 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134 For discussion of this possibility, as well as the possibility that qualified immunity
doctrine causes plaintiffs not to file insubstantial cases, see infra Section IV.C.
135 For further discussion of this possibility, see id. See also Schwartz, supra note 40.
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tional claims and cases that involve clear constitutional violations but low
damages.136  Qualified immunity can play this role in constitutional litigation
while still being the reason few filed cases are dismissed.
Third, decisions allowing courts to grant qualified immunity without rul-
ing on the underlying constitutional claims may compromise police depart-
ments’ policies and trainings.  Many law enforcement agencies’ policies and
trainings hew closely to Supreme Court and circuit decisions.137  When the
Supreme Court and circuit courts issue opinions announcing new constitu-
tional rights—or clarifying that rights do not exist—law enforcement agen-
cies modify their policies and trainings to conform to those opinions.138  But
when the Supreme Court suggests that only its decisions can clearly establish
136 See infra Section IV.C.
137 Ingrid Eagly and I have studied Lexipol LLC, a private company that provides stan-
dardized policies and trainings to 3000 law enforcement agencies in thirty-five states across
the country, including 95% of all California law enforcement agencies. See Ingrid V. Eagly
& Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891
(2018).  Each Lexipol policy is designated as based on “federal law,” “state law,” “best prac-
tices,” or is “discretionary.”  Lexipol representatives warn their subscribers not to change
those policies based on federal and state law.  Jurisdictions understand this message—one
deputy chief explained that policies designated as “best practices” or “discretionary” are
viewed as “optional,” but those that are the “law” are required.  Of course, jurisdictions vary
in the degree to which they rely on court decisions when crafting their policies and train-
ings, but we have found that the dominant private police policymaker relies heavily on
court opinions. See also infra note 139.
138 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 18
(2016) (explaining that after the Fourth Circuit held that using a Taser repeatedly in drive-
stun mode was unconstitutional, “several agencies in jurisdictions covered by the Fourth
Circuit ruling amended their use-of-force and ECW [Electronic Control Weapons] poli-
cies” in response to the decision); Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of
the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 543 (2013) (“After the Court prohibited
random stops of motorists to check their licenses and registration in Delaware v. Prouse, the
District of Columbia Police Department almost immediately overhauled its policies to com-
ply with the new ruling.  More recently, after the Court held that the installation and subse-
quent use of a GPS device to monitor a vehicle’s movements was a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones, the FBI’s general counsel
reported that the decision caused the agency to turn off nearly 3,000 monitoring
devices.”); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567
(2008) (observing that California law enforcement agencies stopped training their officers
not to conduct warrantless searches of trash—a requirement of California constitutional
law—after the United States Supreme Court rejected this prohibition); Charles D. Weis-
selberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001) (examining how
California law enforcement agencies trained officers to comply with a Supreme Court deci-
sion reaffirming Miranda); Patrick Healy, LAPD Commission Adds to Guidelines for Review of
Police Use of Force, NBC L.A. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/
LAPD-Commission-Adds-to-Guidelines-for-Review-of-Police-Use-of-Force-246094151.html
(reporting that a decision by the California Supreme Court that “tactical conduct and deci-
sions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant considerations under California law in
determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability” caused the
Los Angeles Police Commission to change the ways in which it evaluates whether force
used by its officers was proper).
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the law, and then repeatedly grants qualified immunity without ruling on the
underlying constitutional questions, law enforcement agencies have little in
the way of guidance about how to craft their policies.
For example, the Supreme Court has spent countless hours and an out-
sized portion of its docket in recent years deciding whether officers who use
deadly force are entitled to qualified immunity, but these opinions offer vir-
tually no guidance to law enforcement agencies about what constitutes exces-
sive force.  Indeed, the North Star for many departments’ use of force
policies is Graham v. Connor, a Supreme Court decision that is almost thirty
years old and itself provides limited guidance to law enforcement agencies
regarding what constitutes excessive force.139
If qualified immunity doctrine effectively shielded government officials
from burdens associated with litigation in insubstantial cases, one might jus-
tify these impositions on government accountability as a necessary evil.  But
the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence threatens to undermine gov-
ernment accountability in each of these ways without meaningfully achieving
its goals of shielding government defendants from financial exposure and
shielding officials from litigation burdens when they act reasonably.  The fail-
ure of qualified immunity to achieve its intended policy goals makes its nega-
tive impact on government accountability indefensible.
IV. ALTERNATIVE DEFENSES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ARE UNPERSUASIVE
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine is ungrounded in his-
tory, unnecessary or ill-suited to serve its intended policy goals, and counter-
productive to interests in holding government wrongdoers responsible when
they have violated the law.  The Court has said that evidence undermining its
justifications for qualified immunity would be reason to revisit the sensibility
of the defense.140  Yet the Justices might, instead, advance alternative justifi-
cations for qualified immunity.  Commentators have offered three alternative
rationales for qualified immunity that the Court might conceivably adopt.
139 See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 137; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989).  Some progressive agencies are adopting policies and trainings that offer more
specific guidance on use of force than does Graham, but the founder of Lexipol LLC,
which writes police policies for 3000 agencies nationwide, argues that use of force policies
should not go beyond the guidance offered by the Supreme Court in Graham, writing:
Several years ago, our forefathers decided that there would be nine of the
finest legal minds in the country who would interpret the law of the land.  For
almost 30 years, law enforcement has learned to function under the guidance of
the Supreme Court’s “objective reasonableness” standard.  What would happen if
each of the 18,000+ law enforcement agencies in the United States formulated
their own standard “beyond” Graham?
Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 928 (quoting Bruce D. Praet, National Consensus Policy
on Use of Force Should Not Trigger Changes to Agency Policies, LEXIPOL (Jan. 25, 2017), http://
www.lexipol.com/news/use-caution-when-changing-use-of-force-policy-language/).
140 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (observing that evidence
undermining its assumptions about constitutional litigation might “justify reconsideration
of the balance struck” by its qualified immunity jurisprudence).
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The first is that qualified immunity doctrine shields government budgets
from excess liability and thereby encourages government officials to instruct
their officers vigorously to enforce the law.  The second is that qualified
immunity encourages development of constitutional law because it allows
courts to announce new constitutional rights without imposing damages lia-
bility on the officials whose conduct was at issue in the case.  The third is that
qualified immunity protects government defendants from insubstantial suits
by discouraging attorneys from filing such cases.  In this Part, I will explain
why the Court would be ill-advised to adopt any of these rationales for quali-
fied immunity.
A. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Protection
for Government Budgets
Although individual officers virtually never personally satisfy settlements
and judgments entered against them, qualified immunity has been described
as a financial protection for local governments that indemnify their
officers.141  Government officials, concerned about the costs of damages
awards, might encourage inaction by their officers to reduce liability costs.142
If so, qualified immunity would arguably allow government officials to make
decisions without undue concern about the financial impact of those deci-
sions.  In order for qualified immunity to be justified on these grounds, one
must assume that government officials would encourage inaction by their
employees in response to fears of financial liability, and that qualified immu-
nity lessens those concerns and allows government officials instead to
encourage vigorous enforcement of the law.
There are three reasons for skepticism about this rationale for qualified
immunity.  First, this rationale relies on unfounded assumptions about the
flow of information about lawsuits within government bureaucracies.  In
order for lawsuit payouts to influence government officials’ management of
their officers, officials would need enough information about those law-
suits—including the officers named, the underlying facts, and the amount
paid—to make policy and supervision decisions aimed at reducing the costs
of those types of cases in the future.  My research suggests that most law
141 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Consti-
tutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 856 (2007) (noting that widespread
indemnification undermines “the stated justification for qualified immunity,” but “[w]hen
qualified immunity is viewed from the standpoint of a public employer—the party that
bears the economic burden of liability—this doctrine has a compelling justification”).
142 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207,
245–46 (2013) (“Civil-rights judgments and the accompanying awards of attorneys’ fees are
on-budget costs.  At least for states and localities . . . increased on-budget costs mean
higher taxes or cuts in other expenditures.  The political penalties for either choice can be
severe.  There is this additional reason to think, therefore, that while erroneous govern-
ment action and erroneous government inaction may be equally costly to society as a
whole, the former is more likely to trigger on-budget liability and thus to affect and distort
government behavior.”).
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enforcement agencies do not collect this type of information about lawsuits
brought against their officers.143  Indeed, in most departments, there
appears to be minimal effort to track or analyze the nature of claims filed
against their officers or the evidence generated during discovery in those
cases.144  Many large police departments do not even have ready access to
information about the amount paid to satisfy settlements and judgments
against them and their officers.145
The fact that most law enforcement agencies do not systematically
gather and analyze information from damages actions brought against them
does not mean that these suits can never impact policies and practices.  Law-
suits that receive press coverage may capture the attention of police chiefs
and other policy makers, and may inspire departments to institute changes to
prevent future similar cases.146  Information revealed during discovery and
trial—particularly if it is disclosed to the public—can create political pressure
on departments to take action.147  Information generated during litigation
can also be used to support future cases seeking systemic reform.148  Plain-
tiffs sometimes negotiate settlements in damages actions that require reforms
to police policies and trainings.149  And police misconduct attorneys have
told me that sustained litigation pressure on particular departments some-
143 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits
in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010).
144 See id.
145 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 903 (reporting that fifty-eight of the seventy largest
law enforcement agencies to which I submitted public records requests did not have infor-
mation about payouts in lawsuits brought against their agencies and officers and so had to
seek the information from other municipal departments).
146 See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 844
(2012) (describing this possibility).  For example, large litigation payouts and several high-
profile shootings led the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to order an indepen-
dent commission to review the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 1992. See
JAMES G. KOLTS ET AL., LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 1 (1992) (reporting
that the independent commission was prompted by “[a]n increase over the past years in
the number of officer-involved shootings,” “[f]our controversial shootings of minorities by
LASD deputies in August 1991,” and the fact that “Los Angeles County . . . paid $32 million
in claims arising from the operations of the LASD over the past four years”).  Twenty years
later, another independent commission investigated the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Depart-
ment’s handling of the L.A. County Jail, prompted in part, again, by high profile litigation
against the Department. See REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE 42,
185 (2012).
147 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055,
1057 n.7 (2015) (describing studies showing lawsuits have revealed information that has
advanced regulatory efforts in a number of areas).
148 For two examples of complaints that use prior lawsuits to demonstrate a pattern or
practice of misconduct, see Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, An v. City of
New York, 16-cv-05381 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2017); Third Amended Complaint for Damages,
Starr v. County of Los Angeles, 08-cv-00508 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2008).
149 See, e.g., Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Making a Buck While Making a Difference, 21
MICH. J. RACE & L. 251, 254–57 (2016) (describing multiple cases that have led to
reforms).
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times yields positive results.150  But if law enforcement agencies do not keep
track of or analyze basic information about the lawsuits filed and resolved
against their officers, they cannot make policy and supervision decisions
informed by most cases brought against them.
Second, this rationale for qualified immunity assumes that, absent quali-
fied immunity, governments and police departments would feel the costs of
lawsuit payouts so acutely that officials would promote timidity on the part of
their officers as a way to reduce lawsuit costs in the future.  Yet lawsuit
payouts have no financial consequences for the majority of large law enforce-
ment agencies across the country.  In a prior study, I gathered information
about lawsuit budgeting and payment arrangements in sixty-two of the sev-
enty jurisdictions with the largest law enforcement agencies and in jurisdic-
tions with thirty-eight smaller agencies.151  At least 60% of the largest
agencies and 75% of the smaller self-insured agencies in my study feel no
financial consequences when lawsuit costs increase and no financial benefits
when lawsuit costs decline.152  There may well be political pressures associ-
ated with these payouts.153  But those political pressures will not reliably
translate into policy and supervision decisions if the agency in question does
not have enough information about trends in the lawsuits brought against it
to know how to reduce those costs.
It is less certain what impact lawsuits have on the law enforcement agen-
cies that do suffer some financial consequences of payouts.  There are rea-
sons to believe that payouts may influence policies and practices in these
departments to some degree.  But no officials I interviewed during the course
of my study reported that their police department’s financial responsibility
for payouts negatively affected their policy or training decisions, or otherwise
encouraged timidity.154  In order to justify qualified immunity as a means of
encouraging vigorous government decisionmaking, it would be necessary to
show both that lawsuit payouts influence government policy and supervision
decisions, and also that lawsuit payouts cause officials to make policy and
supervision decisions that favor inaction.  Available evidence offers no reason
to believe that is the case.
A final reason for skepticism about this rationale for qualified immunity
is that it relies on the assumption that qualified immunity doctrine signifi-
150 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N.D. Ohio Attorney D (on file with author)
(reporting that his firm’s litigation against the Cleveland Police Department caused the
Department to issue a policy prohibiting officers from shooting at moving vehicles); Tele-
phone Interview with M.D. Fla. Attorney G (on file with author) (describing reforms to the
Florida jail system and the Jacksonville fire department resulting from litigation); Tele-
phone Interview with E.D. Pa. Attorney G (on file with author) (describing political pres-
sures resulting from a series of damages actions that contributed to a mayor’s failure to get
reelected).
151 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016).
152 See id. at 1203.
153 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154 See Schwartz, supra note 151, at 1201.
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cantly reduces liability costs.  My research makes clear that very few lawsuits
are dismissed because of qualified immunity.155  Moreover, qualified immu-
nity may in fact increase the costs of litigating constitutional cases.  In my
docket dataset, defendants raised qualified immunity in 154 motions to dis-
miss—each of which needed to be briefed and argued by the parties.  Seven
(4.5%) of those motions resulted in the dismissal of plaintiffs’ cases.  In those
seven cases, qualified immunity spared defendants money associated with fur-
ther litigation—which might have included discovery, summary judgment,
and trial.  But the parties spent money briefing and arguing qualified immu-
nity in the other 147 motions without a corresponding benefit.  Defendants
raised qualified immunity in 283 summary judgment motions, twenty-seven
of which (9.5%) resulted in dismissal.  In these twenty-seven cases, the litiga-
tion cost savings would have been modest—discovery was already complete,
and the cost of summary judgment practice may in some instances exceed
the cost of going to trial.156  In the other 256 (90.5%) cases, the money and
time spent to brief and argue qualified immunity did not spare the parties
the costs of trial.
The costs of interlocutory appeals are even more difficult to justify.  As
Judge James Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio recently explained,
In the typical case, allowing interlocutory appeals actually increases the bur-
den and expense of litigation both for government officers and for plain-
tiffs . . . because an interlocutory appeal adds another round of substantive
briefing for both parties, potentially oral argument before an appellate
panel, and usually more than twelve months of delay while waiting for an
appellate decision.  All of this happens in place of a trial that (1) could have
finished in less than a week, and (2) will often be conducted anyway after the
interlocutory appeal.157
Given this evidence, there is no basis to conclude that qualified immunity
reduces the costs of Section 1983 litigation, and reason to believe it actually
increases costs in some cases.
Of course, qualified immunity grants may spare defendants not only the
costs of litigation but also the costs of large settlements and jury verdicts.  It is
possible that there would have been significant payouts in the thirty-eight
cases that were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds in my docket
dataset.158  But it is also possible that these cases would have been dismissed
on other grounds at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stages, or
155 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 60.
156 See id. at 61 (observing that most trials in my dataset lasted just a few days); see also
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 100 (1997) (observing that, when considering
the efficiencies of qualified immunity, “the costs eliminated by resolving the case prior to
trial must be compared to the costs of trying the case” and “the pretrial litigation costs
caused by the invoking of the immunity defense may cancel out the trial costs saved by that
defense”).
157 Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL 6031816, at *4 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
158 See Schwartz, supra note 40.
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ended in defense verdicts.159  Indeed, in the two districts in my study with the
most qualified immunity dismissals—the Southern District of Texas and the
Middle District of Florida—juries appear especially inhospitable to plain-
tiffs.160  And even if these thirty-eight cases had resulted in large verdicts or
settlements, those payments would have been spread across thirty-two differ-
ent jurisdictions.161
Qualified immunity might also shift the dynamics of civil rights litigation
in other ways that shield government coffers—the doctrine might discourage
plaintiffs from filing some cases, encourage plaintiffs to settle cases they oth-
erwise would have brought to trial, or reduce cases’ settlement value.162  But
even if eliminating qualified immunity increased filings, caused more cases to
go to trial, and increased settlement amounts to some degree, it does not
follow that these shifts would so imperil government budgets that qualified
immunity is necessary to safeguard robust government policymaking.  Law-
suit payouts are a miniscule portion of most local government budgets and
would remain so even if they increased significantly.163  Of course, local gov-
ernments are perpetually strapped for cash, and every dollar counts.  But
especially given the limited information agencies have about lawsuits brought
against them and the limited impact of lawsuit payouts on most law enforce-
ment agencies’ budgets, the possibility that qualified immunity might shield
local governments from some additional liability costs is insufficient reason
to preserve the doctrine.
159 Seventy-seven cases in my study ended in jury verdicts; sixty-seven were defense ver-
dicts, three were split verdicts, and seven were plaintiffs’ verdicts. See id. at 46.  There were
another five cases that resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts or split verdicts but were settled after
trial: In the Southern District of Texas there were two additional plaintiffs’ verdicts; in the
Middle District of Florida there was one additional plaintiff’s verdict; in the Northern Dis-
trict of California there was one additional plaintiff’s verdict; and in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania there was one additional split verdict.  Accordingly, all in all, there were sixty-
seven defense verdicts, four split verdicts, and eleven plaintiffs’ verdicts.
160 Of the twenty-two cases that went to verdict in these two districts, just three were
plaintiffs’ verdicts.
161 Five qualified immunity dismissals in my dataset were in cases brought against the
Houston Police Department, two were in cases brought against the San Francisco Police
Department, and two were in cases brought against the Brevard Sheriff’s Department.  The
remaining twenty-nine cases were brought against twenty-nine jurisdictions across the five
districts.
162 See Schwartz, supra note 40; see also infra Section IV.C.
163 See Schwartz, supra note 151, at 1224–449 (finding that, among fifty-three of the
largest local governments in the country, payments in lawsuits against law enforcement
amounted to 0.15% of government budgets).  Note, also, that lawsuits against law enforce-
ment typically make up a significant portion of local government liability costs. See id. at
1161 n.58.
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B. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Tool to
Expand Constitutional Rights
Qualified immunity has long been defended on the ground that it
encourages constitutional innovation by courts.164  Qualified immunity doc-
trine allows a court to announce a new constitutional right (or expand the
contours of an existing one), but shield the defendant in the case from dam-
ages liability.  As a result, “[j]udges contemplating an affirmation of constitu-
tional rights need not worry about the financial fallout.”165  In a world
without qualified immunity, John Jeffries argues: “[E]very extension of con-
stitutional rights, whether revolutionary or evolutionary, would trigger
money damages.  In some circumstances, that prospect might not matter.  In
others, it surely would.  The impact of inhibiting constitutional innovation in
this way is impossible to quantify, but I think it would prove deleterious.”166
Jeffries is right—it is impossible to quantify the impact eliminating qualified
immunity would have on the development of constitutional rights.  Even
accepting that qualified immunity could be used by courts to spur constitu-
tional innovation, though, this possible benefit should not save qualified
immunity doctrine from the chopping block.
As a preliminary matter, qualified immunity does not currently appear
to encourage very much in the way of constitutional innovation.  To the
extent courts use qualified immunity to shield government defendants from
liability while expanding constitutional rights moving forward, they need to
decide qualified immunity motions and appeals in a particular way—they
must find a constitutional violation and then grant qualified immunity on the
ground that the right was not clearly established.167  But several studies of
circuit court decisions show that qualified immunity motions are rarely
164 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
99–100 (1999) (“Qualified immunity reduces government’s incentives to avoid constitu-
tional violations.  At the same time, it allows courts to embrace innovation without the
potentially paralyzing cost of full remediation for past practice.”); see also Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480
(2011) (“In the absence of official immunity, even some currently well-established constitu-
tional rights and authorizations to sue to enforce them would likely shrink, and sometimes
appropriately so.”).
165 Jeffries, supra note 142, at 247.
166 Id. at 248. See also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 915 (1999) (If Section 1983 were expanded and qualified immunity
were eliminated, “who could doubt that the effect would be a wholesale rewriting of consti-
tutional rights?  While it is impossible to predict just how various rights would be transfig-
ured, drastically increasing the cost of rights would surely result in some curtailment.”).
167 Although the Supreme Court once required lower courts to take both of these steps
when deciding qualified immunity motions as a means of facilitating the development of
constitutional law, it held in 2009 that lower courts can grant qualified immunity without
ruling on the underlying constitutional claim. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying
text (discussing this shift).
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decided in this manner.168  The Supreme Court also seems uninterested in
constitutional innovation through qualified immunity—since its 2009 deci-
sion in Pearson, it has found a constitutional violation but granted qualified
immunity just two times.169  Indeed, courts are far more likely to grant quali-
fied immunity motions without ruling on the underlying constitutional
claim—a practice that increases constitutional stagnation, not innovation.170
The fact that courts infrequently find constitutional violations but grant
qualified immunity does not foreclose the possibility that they are dramati-
cally innovating on the rare occasions that they do.  But, in fact, these deci-
sions offer little in the way of constitutional innovation.  In their study of 844
circuit court qualified immunity opinions decided over a three-year period—
encompassing 1460 separate claims—Aaron Nielson and Christopher Walker
identified fifty-two claims in which circuit courts found one or more constitu-
tional violations but granted qualified immunity.171  Nielson and Walker
kindly shared with me a list of the forty-three cases in which these claims were
adjudicated.  In an Appendix, I have listed these cases and their holdings.172
I would characterize none as dramatically expanding the law.  Four of the
decisions did not develop the law at all: in these cases, the circuit courts
found that there was clearly established law holding defendants’ conduct was
unconstitutional, but granted defendants qualified immunity because the
opinions clearly establishing the law were published after defendants
engaged in their unconstitutional conduct.173  The rest offer what could be
described as modest or incremental developments of the law, applying well-
established constitutional principles to slightly different factual scenarios.174
168 Nielson & Walker, supra note 117, at 37 (collecting studies that show circuit courts,
post-Pearson found constitutional violations but granted qualified immunity in 2.5–7.9% of
decisions).  Courts during the Saucier period more often found constitutional violations
but granted qualified immunity, although such decisions were still relatively infrequent.
Id. (collecting studies that show circuit courts, post-Saucier, found constitutional violations
but granted qualified immunity in 6.5%–13.9% of decisions).
169 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (finding that a public employee’s firing
violated the First Amendment, but granting qualified immunity because the right was not
clearly established); Safford v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009) (finding that the strip
search of a middle school student violates the Fourth Amendment, but granting qualified
immunity because the right was not clearly established).
170 Nielson & Walker, supra note 117, at 34 (collecting studies that show circuit courts
post-Pearson granted qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional
claim in 18.9%–26.7% of claims).
171 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 43, at 1882–83.
172 See Appendix infra.
173 See Appendix infra (describing the holdings in Rivers v. Fischer, 390 F. App’x 22 (2d
Cir. 2010); Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2010); Schwenk v. County of Alameda, 364 F.
App’x 336 (9th Cir. 2010); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009)).
174 See Appendix infra; see also, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Further Develop-
ments in the Post-Pearson Era, 27 TOURO L. REV. 243, 255–59 (2011) (describing several
additional cases in which courts have found constitutional violations but granted qualified
immunity).
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Moreover, there is no reason to believe that qualified immunity’s shield
from damages liability is what motivates courts’ decisions to announce consti-
tutional violations in these cases.  Available evidence of indemnification and
budgeting practices suggest that courts should not be overly concerned about
damages awards against individual officers and agencies.  Even if judges are
unaware of these budgeting and indemnification dynamics, they are unlikely
to face many cases in which there is such “massive financial liability” that it
would cause a court to “constrain the definition of constitutional rights.”175
And even if an interest in shielding defendants from liability does sometimes
encourage courts to decide constitutional questions while granting qualified
immunity, other times courts issuing these decisions are, likely, simply apply-
ing the law176—concluding that defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights but were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no “control-
ling authority in their jurisdiction”177 or a “consensus of cases of persuasive
authority”178 with facts so closely resembling the instant case that “existing
175 Jeffries, supra note 142, at 248.  In support of the constitutional innovation defense
of qualified immunity, Jeffries imagines that if school desegregation cases from Brown to
Swann and beyond were brought as damages class actions, courts would have been con-
cerned that “imposing additional requirements on segregated school districts would trig-
ger massive financial liability” and would have issued more tentative rulings as a result. Id.
But such a case is unlikely to arise today, given the Court’s stringent certification require-
ments for damages class actions. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013).  And this type of class action would almost certainly be brought against a munici-
pality, which—unlike individual officers—cannot raise a qualified immunity defense.  Jef-
fries’s concern is more apt, though, in a damages class action challenging state action.
Because the state could not be named in such a case, plaintiffs would name individual state
employees, who would be able to raise qualified immunity as a defense.
176 For research offering varying perspectives regarding the extent to which politics,
ideology, and the law influences judicial decisionmaking see, for example, LEE EPSTEIN,
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETI-
CAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (arguing that ideology plays a role
in all judicial decisionmaking and is particularly powerful as one moves up the judicial
hierarchy); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (identifying
differences in the ways that Democrat- and Republican-appointed judges vote when the law
is unclear); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L. REV. 1895, 1898
(2009) (arguing that law, precedent, and deliberation are the primary determinants of
judicial decisions); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New
Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2017) (surveying state and federal judges about
hypothetical cases and finding that “the aggregate effect of political ideology is either non-
existent or amounts to roughly one-quarter of a standard deviation”).  For research sug-
gesting that judges exercise Pearson discretion strategically, see Aaron J. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55 (2016).
177 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
178 Id.
48
The Bridge: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Legal & Social Policy, Vol. 6 [2021], Art. 2
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/thebridge/vol6/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 33 30-JUL-18 14:35
2018] the  case  against  qualified  immunity 1829
precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”179
Perhaps qualified immunity should be understood as encouraging con-
stitutional innovation in a broader sense.  Qualified immunity has been
described as one component in a bundle of substantive laws, remedial doc-
trines, and other rules that courts calibrate to achieve an optimal system of
rights and remedies.180  By this logic, regardless of whether qualified immu-
nity is invoked in a particular case, its existence allows courts to read the
Constitution and other rules more expansively—and its elimination would
cause courts to interpret the Constitution and other rules more narrowly.
Qualified immunity arguably played this equilibrating role in Arizona v. Gant,
a Supreme Court case limiting the circumstances in which an officer can con-
duct a warrantless vehicle search.181  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
addressed concerns that police officers had long relied on the prior legal
rule, which allowed such searches, by observing in a footnote that “qualified
immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasona-
ble reliance on that understanding.”182  We cannot know whether or to what
extent the existence of qualified immunity encouraged the Court to issue this
decision.  It is certainly possible that the Court would not have limited war-
rantless vehicle searches in Arizona v. Gant if qualified immunity did not
exist.
But it is just as easy to find a case in which the Court does not treat
qualified immunity as an equilibrating force.  In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme
Court held Bivens actions cannot be brought regarding policy decisions
made in time of war or national emergency in part out of concern that such
litigation would result in “inquiry and discovery” about “sensitive functions”
of the executive branch and national-security policy.183  Justice Breyer, dis-
senting, observed that these concerns did not necessitate eliminating a Bivens
remedy for this type of claim because there were already a number of other
rules in place that would shield government officials from undue interfer-
ence, including the scope of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity,
plausibility pleading rules, and trial courts’ abilities to limit discovery.  Justice
Breyer concluded:
Given these safeguards against undue interference by the Judiciary in times
of war or national-security emergency, the Court’s abolition, or limitation of,
179 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011)).
180 Fallon, supra note 164, at 480 (explaining his “Equilibration Thesis,” by which quali-
fied immunity, along with other rights, justiciability doctrines, and rules of pleading and
proof combine to achieve “the best overall bundle of rights and correspondingly calibrated
remedies within our constitutional system”); Levinson, supra note 166, at 857–60 (describ-
ing his theory of “remedial equilibration,” by which “rights and remedies are inextricably
intertwined” and courts use restrictions in one area to allow corresponding expansions in
others).
181 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
182 Id. at 349 n.11.
183 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860–61 (2017).
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Bivens actions goes too far.  If you are cold, put on a sweater, perhaps an
overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, but do not set fire to the house.184
Although the equilibration idea makes sense, and the Supreme Court
appeared to use qualified immunity in this manner in Arizona v. Gant, it is far
from clear that the Supreme Court is adept at equilibrating, or that it does so
very often.  Evidence suggests qualified immunity is relatively rarely spurring
innovation in circuit courts as well.185  Qualified immunity doctrine cannot
be justified based on such equivocal evidence of its benefits.
Moreover, to whatever extent qualified immunity spurs constitutional
innovation, it is an unnecessarily blunt tool for this task.  Even John Jeffries,
who believes that “some version of qualified immunity should be the liability
rule for constitutional torts”186 to encourage constitutional innovation, criti-
cizes the current doctrine for being “too technical, too fact-specific, and far
too protective of official misconduct.”187  Specifically, Jeffries believes that
the Court’s requirement that law can only be clearly established with factually
similar cases “has pushed qualified immunity far beyond the reach of any
functional justification for that protection,”188 and that the focus should
instead be on whether an officer’s conduct was “clearly unconstitutional.”189
This is a step in the right direction, but I would go further.
If a goal of qualified immunity is to spur constitutional innovation by
assuring courts that there will be no financial fallout following a finding of
unconstitutionality, there are other ways of achieving this goal.190  The
Supreme Court could limit the circumstances in which constitutional innova-
tions are retroactively enforced.191  Or courts could simply take to heart evi-
dence that individual officers virtually never contribute to settlements and
judgments entered against them.192  Because officers are indemnified, elimi-
nating qualified immunity would not dramatically expand officers’ exposure
to damages liability and should not, therefore, chill constitutional
innovation.
184 Id. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185 See supra note 168 (describing evidence of the frequency with which circuit courts
find constitutional violations but grant qualified immunity); Appendix (illustrating the
modest or incremental nature of circuit courts’ development of the law in these cases).
186 Jeffries, supra note 142, at 249.
187 Id. at 264.
188 Id. at 253.
189 Id. at 264.
190 Accord Fallon, supra note 164, at 480 (recommending reconsideration of the extent
to which qualified immunity doctrine is well-suited or necessary to achieve its intended
goals).
191 See id. at 502–03 (discussing nonretroactivity doctrines as a means of encouraging
expansion of constitutional rights).
192 See supra Section II.A.  Courts can also take note of the fact that law enforcement
agencies infrequently feel the financial consequences of lawsuits, and that lawsuit payouts
are a miniscule part of most jurisdictions’ budgets. See supra Section IV.A.
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C. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Prefiling Filter
When the Supreme Court describes qualified immunity as a shield from
the burdens of litigation in insubstantial cases, it always appears to suggest
that the doctrine will achieve this goal through the quick dismissal of filed
cases.  But some defenders of the doctrine appear to believe that qualified
immunity could achieve this goal by discouraging insubstantial cases from
ever being filed.193  Although my study of 1183 federal dockets makes clear
that qualified immunity ends very few cases, it does not answer what role
qualified immunity plays in case-filing decisions.194  Accordingly, for a future
project exploring the role that qualified immunity plays in the decision to file
suit, I have surveyed attorneys from around the country who entered appear-
ances in these 1183 cases and conducted in-depth interviews with a subset of
these attorneys.195  Based on the docket dataset, the surveys, and the inter-
views, I find three reasons to believe qualified immunity cannot be justified as
a means of filtering out insubstantial cases before filing.196
First, the attorneys I interviewed reported taking into account a number
of different considerations when deciding whether to accept a case, includ-
ing the egregiousness of the facts, the strength of the evidence supporting
the claim, whether a jury would find the plaintiff sympathetic, and the
amount of recoverable damages.  A majority of the attorneys I interviewed
reported that qualified immunity was among their considerations when
selecting a case, but many in this group suggested it did not play a control-
ling role in their decision-making process.  Lawyers did not have the same
views about which factors were the most important to consider, or how they
should be considered together, but my interviews consistently reflected the
multifaceted nature of attorneys’ case-filing decisions.  Accordingly, to the
extent that qualified immunity is playing a role in case selection, it is playing
a role mediated by a number of different concerns.
Second, to the extent that qualified immunity has an impact on case
filing decisions, it is far from clear that the doctrine is filtering out only
insubstantial cases.  The attorneys who reported declining cases because of
qualified immunity reported that the doctrine discourages the filing of cases
concerning constitutional violations that are novel or ill-defined in circuit
and Supreme Court opinions, and cases in which the costs of litigating quali-
fied immunity would be greater than the damages at stake.  One attorney
reported that the challenges associated with litigating qualified immunity dis-
couraged him from bringing Section 1983 cases altogether.  None of these
193 See, e.g., Andrew King, Keep Qualified Immunity . . . For Now, MIMESIS (July 1, 2016),
http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/keep-qualified-immunity-for-now/11010 (“Mostly, but
for qualified immunity, it’s a bonanza for plaintiff’s lawyers.”).
194 See generally Schwartz, supra note 40.
195 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Selection Effects (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
196 Alex Reinert reached similar conclusions when he explored the impact of qualified
immunity doctrine on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions to file Bivens actions. See Alexander
A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477 (2011).
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responses suggest that qualified immunity is doing a good job of screening
out only the “insubstantial” cases.
Third, a majority of the attorneys I interviewed reported that they rarely
or never decline to bring a case because of qualified immunity.  These attor-
neys are no fans of the doctrine—they believe that it increases the costs and
risks of Section 1983 litigation, and several had had cases dismissed on quali-
fied immunity grounds.  Nevertheless, the attorneys offered several reasons
why the doctrine does not discourage them from filing cases they would oth-
erwise take.  Some explained that the challenges posed by qualified immu-
nity are replicated by other case-screening considerations.  For example,
several attorneys reported that concerns about judges’ and juries’ predisposi-
tions against police misconduct suits cause them to select cases with facts so
egregious that they are not vulnerable to dismissal on qualified immunity.
Others explained that they limit the effects of qualified immunity by includ-
ing state law claims or municipal liability claims—that cannot be dismissed
on qualified immunity grounds—in their cases.  Some attorneys reported
that they are not overly influenced by qualified immunity when selecting
cases because the impact of qualified immunity on any given case is difficult
to predict.  And several attorneys made clear that they will accept a case they
view as important to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights or defend the Constitution,
even if the case is vulnerable to attack on qualified immunity grounds.
Based on this limited sample, I cannot know the extent to which these
attorneys’ views are representative of those held by plaintiffs’ attorneys
around the country.  But none of these observations support the hypothesis
that qualified immunity serves its intended function as a shield against the
burdens of litigation by screening out insubstantial cases before they are
filed.
V. MOVING FORWARD
The Supreme Court created qualified immunity based on a misunder-
standing of common-law defenses in place when Section 1983 became law.
The Court has justified its dramatic expansion of qualified immunity in the
name of policy aims that the doctrine does not actually advance.  The Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence hinders government accountability and
inhibits the development of constitutional law.  And alternative justifications
for the doctrine are equally unconvincing.  If the Supreme Court takes this
evidence seriously, they should do away with or dramatically limit qualified
immunity.  And if the Supreme Court refuses to do so, lower courts can
resolve qualified immunity motions in ways that mitigate some of the worst
aspects of the doctrine. 
A. The Supreme Court
If the Supreme Court accepts Justice Thomas’s invitation in Ziglar to
reconsider qualified immunity, takes seriously available evidence demonstrat-
ing that the doctrine neither comports with its historical antecedents nor
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achieves its intended policy goals, and decides to take action, there are sev-
eral possible paths forward.197  The most dramatic course would be to elimi-
nate qualified immunity or conform qualified immunity doctrine to
common-law defenses in existence in 1871, when Section 1983 became law.
If the Court is inclined to take this type of action, stare decisis should not be
an impediment.  Principles of stare decisis counsel against overruling statu-
tory precedent and, instead, leaving modifications of such rules to Con-
gress.198  But Will Baude has observed that the Court does not treat qualified
immunity as a “purely statutory doctrine left to the pleasure of Congress,”
and its perpetual “tinker[ing]” with the doctrine suggests “the Court takes
more ownership of it than more orthodox statutory doctrines.”199  Moreover,
Scott Michelman has argued that even if the Court views qualified immunity
as statutory precedent, evidence that the doctrine has no common-law basis
and fails to meet its policy objectives offer compelling reasons to overrule
that precedent.200
If the Supreme Court is disinclined to overrule qualified immunity, it
could, instead, revisit some of its prior decisions to better align the doctrine
with evidence of its actual role in constitutional litigation.  For example, in
Harlow, the Court eliminated inquiry into officers’ subjective intent so that
qualified immunity could more easily be resolved at summary judgment.201
The Court’s narrow interpretation of “clearly established” law—requiring a
prior finding of unconstitutionality in a very similar case from a circuit or the
Supreme Court—may also be prompted by its interest in facilitating dismissal
at summary judgment.202  But the Court’s subsequent decisions strengthen-
ing summary judgment standards arguably made Harlow unnecessary, as Jus-
tice Kennedy has observed.203  Moreover, evidence that qualified immunity
rarely ends cases at summary judgment confirms that the doctrine is ill-suited
and unnecessary to shield government officials from trial.
The Supreme Court has recognized that its decision in Harlow signifi-
cantly altered qualified immunity doctrine to protect government officials
from the burdens of litigation.  Now, faced with evidence that qualified
197 As things stand, the Justices appear moved by different critiques of qualified immu-
nity, and so it is conceivable that a majority of the Court could vote to eliminate or restrict
qualified immunity on different grounds.  It is premature to consider how an opinion frac-
tured in this way might impact the future of qualified immunity, but for a provocative and
compelling argument about how plurality decisions should be read, see Richard Re, Beyond
the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
198 See Baude, supra note 2, at 80.
199 Id. at 81.
200 See Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2018).
201 See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
202 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851,
866 (2010) (“Much of the problem with ‘clearly established’ law derives from the effort to
devise a substantive standard so narrowly ‘legal’ in character that it can be applied by
courts on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.”).
203 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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immunity does not achieve these intended policy goals, and reasons to
believe that the doctrine jeopardizes interests in government accountability,
it is incumbent on the Court to revisit its standard.  Plaintiffs should be able
to defeat a qualified immunity motion by pointing to evidence of an officer’s
bad faith.204  And the Court should broaden its definition of clearly estab-
lished law—by making clear that courts of appeals can clearly establish the
law, by defining clearly established law at a higher level of factual generality,
and by recognizing obvious constitutional violations, as it did in Hope, with-
out reference to an analogous case.205  These adjustments would better cali-
brate the doctrine’s balance between interests in advancing government
accountability and interests in shielding government officials from litigation
when they have acted reasonably.
Another possibility would be for the Court to keep the framework for
qualified immunity largely intact but allow or encourage lower courts to con-
sider whether qualified immunity would achieve its intended policy goals in
particular cases.  It makes no sense for government officials to receive quali-
fied immunity if they are virtually certain to be indemnified, because those
officials will suffer no financial consequences of a damages award.206  It
makes no sense to ignore evidence of government officials’ subjective intent
if such evidence is available when the qualified immunity motion is being
decided.  And it makes little sense for officials to receive qualified immunity
at or after trial, because the doctrine will do nothing to shield officials in
these cases from burdens associated with litigation.  It should not overtax
lower courts or litigants to take account of this type of evidence when decid-
ing qualified immunity motions.207  Encouraging lower courts to do so would
204 Given her recent concurrence in Wesby, Justice Ginsburg might be sympathetic to
this adjustment to qualified immunity doctrine. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.
Ct. 577, 594 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part).
205 Justice Gorsuch’s opinions on the Tenth Circuit suggest that he might be a vote in
favor of relaxing the Court’s standards for clearly established law. See, e.g., A.M. v. Holmes,
830 F.3d 1123, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (finding that it was clearly
established that an officer could not arrest a seventh grader for burping in class because
prior decisions did not allow arrest for minor distractions in class, and concluding he
“would have thought this authority sufficient to alert any reasonable officer . . . that arrest-
ing a now compliant class clown for burping was going a step too far”).  For further predic-
tions about Justice Gorsuch’s views on qualified immunity, see Shannon M. Grammel,
Judge Gorsuch on Qualified Immunity, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 163 (2017).
206 If it turns out that other types of government officials more regularly contribute to
settlements and judgments, the Court can factor this evidence into their analysis. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
207 The first type of information—regarding a jurisdiction’s indemnification policies
and practices—should be in the possession of the jurisdiction and could be produced in
response to an interrogatory or request for admission.  The second type of information—
evidence of an official’s subjective intent—will presumably be produced by the plaintiff in
opposition to the defendant’s qualified immunity motion, if it is available.  Such informa-
tion may not be available at the motion to dismiss stage, and so may in some cases delay
qualified immunity motion practice until after some discovery, but given the infrequency
with which cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before discovery, and
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be a first step toward more coherence between the application of qualified
immunity and the justifications offered for its existence.
B. Lower Courts
If the Supreme Court continues to issue qualified immunity decisions
that ignore evidence about its fundamental flaws, lower courts may need to
take matters into their own hands.  They have at least two tools at their dispo-
sal.  First, lower courts can do what Richard Re calls “narrowing from
below.”208  Re describes narrowing from below as occurring when a court
interprets Supreme Court precedent “reasonably” but “more narrowly than it
is best read,” and describes narrowing as legitimate when precedent is
“ambiguous.”209  Supreme Court qualified immunity decisions are rife with
ambiguity, and lower courts can decide to read those ambiguous decisions
narrowly.  Indeed, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Ziglar can even be
read as an invitation for lower courts to do so.210
For example, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can defeat a
qualified immunity motion by showing an obvious constitutional violation,211
but has also suggested that plaintiffs seeking to defeat qualified immunity
must point to a case from the Supreme Court so factually similar that every
officer would be on notice that the conduct at issue was unconstitutional.212
The Supreme Court has regularly reversed (and sometimes chastised) lower
courts for relying on cases to clearly establish the law that are insufficiently
similar to the case at hand.213  But perhaps litigants and lower courts should
rely more heavily on Hope v. Pelzer’s admonition that there need not be a case
on point when the constitutional violation is obvious.214  As another exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has never prohibited courts deciding qualified
immunity motions from considering whether the purposes of qualified
immunity would be advanced in a particular case.  When deciding qualified
immunity motions, lower courts should therefore take into account whether
the defendant bringing the motion is at any risk of personal liability or
defendants’ and judges’ apparent views that qualified immunity is more appropriate at the
summary judgment stage, considering evidence of officers’ subjective intent would not cre-
ate much of a hardship.  And the third type of information—regarding the stage of litiga-
tion at which the motion is brought—will be obvious to the court and parties.
208 See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO.
L.J. 921 (2016).
209 Id. at 925–26.
210 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
211 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
212 See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012) (“Assuming arguendo that
controlling Court of Appeals’ authority could be a dispositive source of clearly established
law in the circumstances of this case . . . .”).
213 See supra note 3 (describing some of these cases).
214 See generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); see also supra note 205 (suggesting
Justice Gorsuch might be sympathetic to this argument in some cases).
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whether granting the motion would shield the defendant from discovery or
trial.
Judges additionally have significant discretion to manage qualified
immunity litigation practice in their courts and can do so in ways that address
some of the concerns I have raised.  When defendants file frivolous interlocu-
tory appeals of qualified immunity denials, district courts should certify the
appeals as frivolous and refuse to stay the cases.215  When defendants file
nonfrivolous interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, circuit
courts should make every effort to decide those appeals quickly.  District
court judges can require premotion conferences as part of their individual
rules, and can discourage defendants from filing meritless qualified immu-
nity motions that will increase costs and delay.  District and circuit courts’
rulings on qualified immunity motions can answer whether there was an
underlying constitutional violation to assist in the development and articula-
tion of constitutional principles, or explain why they are declining to do
so.216  None of these adjustments strike qualified immunity to the core, but
are small steps that lower courts can take while waiting for the Supreme
Court to make things right.
CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity doctrine is historically unmoored, ineffective at
achieving its policy ends, and detrimental to the development of constitu-
tional law.  Scholarly defenses of the doctrine are similarly unpersuasive.  The
Court should not feel constrained by stare decisis given the questionable
foundations of the doctrine and the liberty the Court has taken with its scope
and structure over the fifty years of its existence.  And there are many ways,
short of downright repeal, that the Court could adjust the doctrine to better
reflect its role in constitutional litigation.  The key question, thus far unan-
swered, is whether the Court will answer these calls for reform.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Ziglar offered some hope that the
Court might soon take up these fundamental questions about qualified
immunity.  But the Court’s next qualified immunity decision, in Wesby v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, suggests that we should not hold our collective breath for the
Court to take action.  Just six months after Justice Thomas critiqued qualified
immunity in his concurrence in Ziglar, his opinion in Wesby dutifully applied
the doctrine without comment or critique.217  Despite concerns about quali-
fied immunity previously raised in opinions authored or joined by a majority
of the Court—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, as well as
Thomas—the Court was unanimous in its conclusion that the officers were
215 For one such decision relying in part on evidence about qualified immunity’s role in
constitutional litigation, see Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL
6031816 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
216 See Blum, supra note 119, at 1894–96 (offering this same suggestion).
217 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
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entitled to qualified immunity.218  Justice Thomas made no mention of his
concerns that the doctrine looks nothing like the doctrine did in 1871, or
that it is being used to advance the Court’s “freewheeling policy choices.”219
What explains the Court’s continued, vigorous application of qualified
immunity?  It may be simply that the questions that Justice Thomas raised in
Ziglar about qualified immunity were not briefed or argued by the parties in
Wesby,220 and the Court wants a fuller record with which to reassess the doc-
trine.  If so, the Court will not have to wait very long.  The Cato Institute has
begun what it calls a “campaign to challenge and roll back qualified immu-
nity” drawing on “the law and history of the doctrine, its effect on civil rights
litigation, and the implications for police accountability.”221  And plaintiffs’
attorneys have been invoking Justice Thomas’s language in Ziglar in their
petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.222  If
even three Justices agree with Justice Thomas that qualified immunity doc-
trine should be reconsidered, the Court could grant one of these petitions
and could direct the parties to address questions about the doctrine’s com-
mon-law foundations, policy goals, and effects on government accountability
in their briefs.
If the Court continues not to reconsider qualified immunity—despite all
available evidence about the doctrine’s failures, and periodic grumbling by
various Justices about those failures—then something else must be at play.
Perhaps the Court’s continued application of qualified immunity reflects the
218 Id.
219 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012)).
220 Note, however, that the ACLU did raise these arguments in its amicus brief in Wesby.
See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of
the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (No. 15-1485), 2017 WL 3098276.
221 Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and Police
Accountability, CATO INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.cato.org/events/qualified-immu-
nity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability.
222 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Shafer v. Padilla, No. 17-1396, 2018 WL 1705603 (Apr. 3, 2018); Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Apodaca v. Raemisch,
2018 WL 1315085 (Mar. 9, 2018); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Melton v. Phillips, No. 17-1095, 2018 WL 722531 (Feb. 2,
2018); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Noonan v. Cty. of Oakland, No. 17-473, 2017 WL 4386875 (Sept. 27, 2017); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Doe v. Olson, No. 17-
296, 2017 WL 3701814 (Aug. 23, 2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Walker v. Farnan, No. 17-53, 2017 WL 2954392 (July 10,
2017); see also Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, S.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Booker, No. 17-307, 2017 WL
5714616, at 34 (Nov. 21, 2017) (arguing in opposition to a grant of certiorari but stating
that “if the Court decides to grant certiorari it should add a question presented permitting
it to revisit the doctrine of qualified immunity as a potential alternate ground for
affirmance”).
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Court’s hostility to plaintiffs more generally.  Arthur Miller and Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, among others, have argued that the Court’s quali-
fied immunity decisions should be understood as one of many procedural
barriers erected or strengthened by the Roberts Court—including habeas
corpus, civil pleading rules, and class certification requirements—in the
name of protecting government and business defendants from burdens of
litigation.223  Although this theory might explain the votes of some of the
Justices, I do not believe it fully explains the Court’s qualified immunity juris-
prudence.  Several of the Court’s opinions limiting plaintiffs’ access to the
courts through pleading, class certification, and arbitration restrictions have
been hotly contested, resulting in 5–4 decisions with powerful dissents.224
But the four Justices dissenting in Iqbal, Wal-Mart, and Concepcion have joined
many of the Court’s qualified immunity decisions without raising these same
types of concerns.225  I agree that qualified immunity functions much like
these other procedural barriers, that each is justified by interests in protect-
ing defendants from burdensome litigation, that each impedes plaintiffs’
access to the courts, and that each frustrates adjudication of the merits of
plaintiffs’ claims.  But it appears that some or all of the Justices either do not
see qualified immunity doctrine in this way, or believe that qualified immu-
nity properly protects government defendants at plaintiffs’ expense.
My best guess is that members of the Court are reluctant to modify or
eliminate qualified immunity doctrine for fear that doing so might impact
constitutional litigation or policing in some previously unforeseen way that
223 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); Ste-
phen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s
Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1222 n.10 (2015).
224 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
225 See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042
(2015); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015); Carroll v. Carman,
135 S. Ct. 348 (2014); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056
(2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S Ct. 3 (2013); cf.
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court for routinely summarily reversing denials of qualified immunity but rarely interven-
ing when courts erroneously grant officers qualified immunity, and expressing concern
that the Court’s qualified immunity decisions “send[ ] an alarming signal to law enforce-
ment officers and the public”); Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“We have not hesitated to
summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified immunity
in cases involving the use of force.  But we rarely intervene where courts wrongly afford
officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases.  The erroneous grant of
summary judgment in qualified-immunity cases imposes no less harm on ‘society as a
whole,’ than does the erroneous denial of summary judgment in such cases.” (citations
omitted) (quoting Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3)); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 313
(2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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would harm “society as a whole.”226  For reasons that I will explain in future
work, I do not believe such fears to have foundation.227  Instead, I predict
that eliminating qualified immunity would not significantly expand the scope
of constitutional protections, dramatically increase the number of filings or
awards, or otherwise open the floodgates to insubstantial claims.  Moreover,
indemnification and budgeting practices would continue to give government
officials limited incentives to comply with the Constitution.  This is not to say
that eliminating qualified immunity would not impact constitutional litiga-
tion.  To the contrary, I believe eliminating qualified immunity would have
important benefits: it would clarify the law, reduce the costs and complexity
of litigation, and shift the focus of Section 1983 litigation to what should be
the critical question at issue in these cases—whether government officials
exceeded their constitutional authority.  The Court might not find these pre-
dictions to be convincing.  But it cannot justify such a significant defense
based on some sense in the air about how constitutional litigation or policing
might be different in qualified immunity’s absence.
A few years ago, Justice Anthony Kennedy gave a speech in which he
observed: “To re-examine your premise is not a sign of weakness of your judi-
cial philosophy.  It’s a sign of fidelity to your judicial oath.”228  I hope that
Justice Kennedy and his colleagues, taking these words to heart, will agree to
reexamine the premises underlying qualified immunity.  And I hope that,
when they do, they take the dramatic action that is compelled by the record.
226 White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3); accord Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893,
911 (2016) (reviewing SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLIT-
ICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015)) (suggesting that liberal Justices’ sympathy for quali-
fied immunity may be an outgrowth of a “New Democrat” tough-on-crime ideology).
227 See generally Schwartz, supra note 18.
228 Mark Sherman, Justice: Changing Course on the Bench Is Not Weakness, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/justice-
changing-course-on-the-bench-is-not-weakness/.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix sets out the holdings in the cases in Nielson and Walker’s
study229 in which courts of appeals found a constitutional violation but
granted qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established.
Case Holding 
Akrawi v. Remillet, 
504 F. App’x 450 
(6th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that Michigan Parole Board’s decision to put 
plaintiff back on parole without a hearing violated his 
due process rights, and awarding plaintiff injunctive 
relief, but affirming the district court’s decision to 
grant officials qualified immunity.  Although the 
Supreme Court established in 1972 that there is a due 
process right to a hearing before being returned to 
prison for a parole violation, it was not clearly 
established that the return to parole constitutes a 
“grievous loss” deserving of procedural protections. 
Amore v. Novarro, 
610 F.3d 155 (2d. 
Cir. 2010), amended 
and superseded by 624 
F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when officer arrested him under New 
York Penal Law Section 240.35(3) because the statute 
had been ruled unconstitutional by the New York 
Court of Appeals eighteen years before, but reversing 
the district court’s denial of qualified immunity 
because the State of New York had not formally 
repealed section 240.35(3) at the time of plaintiff’s 
arrest. 
Ass’n for Los 
Angeles Deputy 
Sheriffs v. County of 
Los Angeles, 648 
F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
Finding that current and former deputy sheriffs had 
stated a claim that their due process rights were 
violated because the deputies—who had been 
charged with felonies, suspended, reinstated after 
suspension, and then discharged—were not afforded 
postsuspension hearings, but finding the Civil Service 
Commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity 
because, based on a California Court of Appeals 
decision, they “would have believed that denying 
jurisdiction over the appeals of retired deputies was 
lawful.”  (Note that the Ninth Circuit denied 
qualified immunity to the County Supervisors and 
Sheriff, who should have provided an alternative 
hearing for the retired employees.) 
229 Nielson & Walker, supra note 117.
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F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 
2010), withdrawn 
and superseded by 630 
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that, taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, an officer violated the 
Fourth Amendment when he used a Taser against a 
plaintiff who “was obviously and noticeably unarmed, 
made no threatening statements or gestures, did not 
resist or attempt to flee, but was standing inert twenty 
to twenty-five feet away from the officer,” yet holding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because the Ninth Circuit had not previously 
established that Tasers constitute an “intermediate, 
significant level of force that must be justified by the 
government interest involved.”  
Burke v. County of 
Alameda, 586 F.3d 
725 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that, taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, defendants violated 
plaintiff’s constitutional right of familial association 
by putting his daughter into protective custody 
without first contacting him to see whether she could 
be put in his care, but holding defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not 
clearly established that noncustodial parents had a 
protected interest in the custody and management of 
their children.   
Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corrections, 642 
F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
Finding that plaintiff’s due process rights were 
violated when his inmate account was assessed—but 
not deducted—without considering available 
evidence “to determine its relevance and suitability 
for use at a disciplinary hearing,” but finding that 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 
Although it was established at the time of the action 
that procedural due process rights protected an 
inmate’s account from being debited, it was not 
clearly established that these rights attached before 
an inmate’s account was assessed.  
Castle v. 
Appalachian Tech. 
Coll., 627 F.3d 1366 
(11th Cir. 2010), 
vacated and 
superseded by 631 
F.3d 1994 (11th Cir. 
2011).  
Finding that plaintiff’s due process rights were 
violated when she was not offered a predeprivation 
hearing before being suspended from a nursing 
program, but affirming the lower court’s grant of 
qualified immunity because of “the complicated 
factual issues surrounding the investigation of 
[plaintiff’s] conduct” and because “the 
administrators made known to [plaintiff] that she 
could immediately appeal their determination, which 
[plaintiff] did within a few days.” 
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F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, his constitutional rights were violated when 
a police officer “kicked him several times on both 
sides of his body, although he was restrained on the 
ground and offering no resistance,” another officer 
“repeatedly choked and kicked him during the trip to 
the hospital,” and a third officer “extended the 
journey by taking a roundabout route and 
intentionally driving so erratically that [plaintiff] was 
jerked roughly back and forth in his car seat while his 
head was positioned adjacent to the dashboard,” but 
finding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because it was not clearly established in the 
Eighth Circuit that plaintiffs could recover under the 
Fourth Amendment for de minimus injuries. 
Coates v. Powell, 639 
F.3d 471 (8th Cir. 
2011).  
Finding that defendant officer violated plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by remaining in the 
plaintiff’s house for ten to fifteen minutes after 
consent was revoked, but finding defendant was 
entitled to qualified immunity because “it was not 
clearly established at the time of this incident that an 
officer was required to leave a private home in the 




F.3d 261 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
Affirming district court decision that former 
employees, whose employment was terminated five 
months shy of the expiration of their one-year 
contracts with the municipality, had a reasonable 
expectation of continued employment with the 
municipality, but finding that officers who fired them 
were entitled to qualified immunity because Puerto 
Rico law was unclear as to whether employees had 
any rights to continued employment once funding 
for their positions ended.  
Cordova v. Aragon, 
569 F.3d 1183 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
Taking facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, officer violated decedent’s constitutional 
rights by shooting him in the back of the head as he 
was driving away—the decedent was driving recklessly 
and was attempting to ram police cars, but no other 
motorists were in the vicinity and the officer was not 
in danger—but finding the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because “[t]he law in our circuit 
and elsewhere has been vague on whether the 
potential risk to unknown third parties is sufficient to 
justify the use of force nearly certain to cause death.”  
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Case Holding 
Costanich v. Dep’t 
of Soc. & Health 
Servs., 627 F.3d 
1101 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff “had a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process right to be free from deliberately 
fabricated evidence in a civil child abuse proceeding” 
but finding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because that right was not clearly 
established in the civil context (though it had been 




F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 
2011). 
“Allegations that speech therapist was speaking as a 
citizen, rather than in her capacity as a speech and 
language therapist when providing information to 
clients’ parents about advocacy groups and urging 
them to contact the groups” was sufficient to state a 
First Amendment retaliation claim, but finding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because, at the time of the alleged retaliatory action, 
“[t]here was no decision in this circuit explaining the 
scope of a public employee’s employment duties and 
what it means to speak pursuant to those duties, nor 
was there a body of decisions from other circuits that 
could be said to have put [defendant] on clear 
notice. Even though the broad constitutional rule . . . 
may have been clearly established, the contours of 
the right were still cloudy.” 
Delia v. City of 
Rialto, 621 F.3d 
1069 (9th Cir. 
2010), rev’d on other 
grounds Filarsky v. 
Delia, 566 U.S. 377 
(2012).  
Finding that plaintiff’s participation in “internal 
affairs investigation into his off-duty activities was 
coerced by direct threat of sanctions and not 
voluntary, and therefore, violated the Fourth 
Amendment,” but finding the defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because “[t]his case 
does not fit neatly into any previous category of 
Fourth Amendment law.” 
Doe ex rel. Johnson 
v. South Carolina 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
597 F.3d 163 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
Finding that the state violated a child’s substantive 
due process rights when it involuntarily removed her 
from her home and put her a “known, dangerous” 
foster care placement “in deliberate indifference to 
her right to personal safety and security” but finding 
the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity 
because “[i]t would not have been apparent to a 
reasonable social worker in [defendant’s] position 
that her actions violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” 
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Case Holding 
Doe ex rel. Magee v. 
Covington Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 649 F.3d 335 
(5th Cir. 2011), reh’g 
en banc 675 F.3d 849 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that public elementary school had violated 
nine-year-old child’s substantive due process rights by 
allowing an adult male claiming to be her father to 
take her off school grounds without verifying the 
adult’s identity, but finding that defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because the Fifth 
Circuit “ha[s] not expressly held that a very young 
child in the custody of a compulsory-attendance 
public elementary school is necessarily in a special 
relationship with that school when it places her in the 
absolute custody of an unauthorized private actor.” 
(Note that, on rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit 
found that plaintiff had not alleged a constitutional 
violation).  
Elkins v. District of 
Columbia, 690 F.3d 
554 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that defendant’s seizure of a notebook in the 
search of a home violated the Fourth Amendment 
when the warrant only authorized visual inspection, 
but finding that the defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity because she was a junior member 
of the search team and relied on her supervisor’s 
judgment that it was appropriate to seize the 
notebook. 
Elwell v. Byers, 699 
F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that preadoptive foster parents’ rights to due 
process were violated when a state agency removed 
foster child from their home without any advance 
notice, where there were no immediate concerns or 
emergency justifying lack of process, but finding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because it was not clearly established that preadoptive 
parents possess a liberty interest in maintaining their 
family structure. 
Escobar v. Mora, 
496 F. App’x 806 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that plaintiff stated a claim for an Eighth 
Amendment violation regarding state corrections 
officers’ allegedly spitting into his food, an event that 
caused him to suffer “mental and psychological 
distress and anguish” and lose thirty pounds, but 
finding that defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because “there are no controlling decisions 
on point” and prior decisions did not put defendants 
on “fair notice that their conduct rose to the level of 
a constitutional violation.”  
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Case Holding 
García-Rubiera v. 
Calderón, 570 F.3d 
442 (1st Cir. 2009). 
Finding that plaintiffs stated a claim that the 
Governor and Secretary of Treasury violated Takings 
and Due Process Clauses by permanent retention of 
accrued interest from duplicate payments of 
premiums under Commonwealth’s compulsory 
motor vehicle liability insurance law, but affirming 
district court’s grant of qualified immunity because 
“the law did not clearly establish that . . . withholding 
any of the designed Reserve . . . [and the interest it 
generates] was an unconstitutional taking” and “the 
law was not clearly established that . . . the custodial 
transfer of funds pursuant to a Commonwealth 
statute and the provision of a compensation 
procedure did not comport with due process 
requirements.” 
Greene v. Camreta, 
588 F.3d 1011 (9th 
Cir 2009), vacated in 
part by 661 F.3d 1201 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
Fourth Amendment rights of a child were violated 
when child protective services caseworker and deputy 
sheriff “seized and interrogated [her] in a private 
office at her school for two hours without a warrant, 
probable cause, or parental consent,” but finding the 
right was not clearly established because prior 
decisions concerned children searched or seized at 
home, among other reasons.  (Note that the decision 
was appealed, the Supreme Court vacated as moot 
the portion of the opinion addressing the Fourth 
Amendment issue, and so the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 
opinion vacated the court’s decision about the 
Fourth Amendment.) 
Harman v. Pollock, 
586 F.3d 1254 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
Finding that officers’ search of plaintiffs’ apartment 
could not be justified by exigent circumstances, but 
concluding that officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity because “we cannot say the Officers’ 
actions were plainly incompetent or knowing 
violations of the law.” 
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Case Holding 
Henry v. Purnell, 
619 F.3d 323 (4th 
Cir. 2010), reh’g en 
banc 652 F.3d 524 
(4th Cir. 2011). 
Finding that material disputes exist about the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions who fired his 
Glock instead of a Taser and failed to warn the victim 
before doing so, failed to utilize the laser sight, and 
failed to distinguish the different safety locks, but 
concluding that officer was entitled to qualified 
immunity because he would not know that “an act of 
weapon confusion of the firearm for the taser was 
‘clearly established’ as an excessive use of force under 
the Fourth Amendment.”  (Note that on rehearing 
en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed and found no 
qualified immunity.) 
Hopkins v. 
Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 
752 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that the defendant officers violated the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights when they 
arrested him following a citizen’s arrest without 
“independent probable cause,” but granting officers 
qualified immunity.  The Ninth Circuit had 
previously held police officers must have 
independent probable cause when effectuating a 
municipal bus driver’s citizen arrest, but it was 
unclear whether the same rules would apply for 
arrests made by a person who is not “acting as an 
agent of the state.” 
Hunt v. County of 
Orange, 672 F.3d 
606 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was placed on administrative leave 
and then demoted for campaign speech, and finding 
that this right was clearly established, but concluding 
that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity 
because a reasonable official in defendant’s position 
would not have known that the plaintiff was not a 
policymaker whose political loyalty was important to 
the effective performance of his job. 
Koch v. Lockyer, 
340 F. App’x 372 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that defendants violated plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights when they forcibly collected his 
DNA without a warrant because he was not convicted 
of an offense that required DNA collection, but 
concluding that the defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity; given “the complexity and 
novelty of the issues presented” in the case, 
“reasonable officials could not have understood that 
their actions violated Koch’s constitutional rights.” 
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Case Holding 
Kozel v. Duncan, 
421 F. App’x 843 
(10th Cir. 2011). 
Finding that the sheriff violated plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment rights when his deputies seized patrons 
of a dance club “for over an hour and lined them up 
for sobriety checks,” but concluding that the sheriff is 
entitled to qualified immunity.  “While the 
proscription against warrantless ‘wholesale searches 
and seizures’ of a business open to the public is well 
established, it is too general to provide notice that 
officers violate a bar owner’s constitutional rights by 
detaining patrons for sobriety checks after receiving 
reports of underage drinking in a bar with a cup 
policy that may facilitate underage drinking.” 
Melgar v. Greene, 
593 F.3d 348 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
Finding that officer may have violated the plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by using a patrol dog 
without a muzzle and with a long lead to find a 
missing boy, but concluding that the defendant was 
entitled to qualified immunity; although there were 
other cases finding constitutional violations for the 
use of police dogs who were released from their 
leashes when searching for criminals, in this case the 
dog was kept on a leash to locate a missing person. 
“Cases addressing the former simply do not provide 
sufficient guidance to officers in the latter situation.”  
Moss v. Martin, 614 
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was fired on the basis of his political 
beliefs, but concluding that the defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Although the 
government cannot take most employees’ political 
beliefs into account, there is an exception for 
positions involving “confidential or policymaking 
responsibilities.”  “Given the uncertainty that litigants 
encounter in this somewhat murky area of the law, it 
is difficult for a plaintiff to avoid a qualified immunity 
defense in a case of first impression unless she 
occupies a low rung on the bureaucratic ladder.” 
Randall v. Scott, 610 
F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was fired for running for political 
office but concluding that defendants were entitled 
to qualified immunity; although there is an 
established “constitutional right to run for office,” the 
court was “aware of no precedential case with similar 
facts.” 
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Case Holding 
Reher v. Vivo, 66 
F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
Finding that officer did not have probable cause to 
arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct based only on 
information that plaintiff had been accused of going 
go a park to look at and videotape children and that 
a crowd at the park was upset, but concluding the 
officer was entitled to qualified immunity because, 
under the circumstances, the officer “could have 
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed” that probable 
cause existed. 
Rivers v. Fischer, 
390 F. App’x 22 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were 
violated when the “Department of Corrections 
administratively imposed a 5-year term of supervised 
release that was not orally pronounced by the 
sentencing judge,” and that right was established in a 
2010 case from the Second Circuit, but finding 
qualified immunity was appropriate because the case 
had not yet been decided when the sentence in this 
case was imposed. 
Rock for Life—
UMBC v. 
Hrabowski, 411 F. 
App’x 541 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that defendants may have violated plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment rights by relocating their Genocide 
Awareness Project display, but concluding defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity because it was a 
reasonable mistake.  “If the defendants secured 
campus safety at too high a cost to the plaintiffs’ right 
to free expression, we do not believe they should be 
made to pay for this mistake from their own pockets.” 
Saavedra v. 
Scribner, 482 F. 
App’x 268 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that a state prisoner’s due process rights were 
violated because he got inadequate notice of the 
charges against him before being put into 
administrative segregation, and inadequate notice of 
subsequent disciplinary proceedings, but finding that 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
“[b]ecause our cases do not give adequate guidance 
both regarding the level of specificity required in 
a . . . notice and on ensuring timely delivery” of 
notice of charges, and because “[i]t would not be 
apparent to a prison official that he needed to 
disclose more than [the charge and some factual 
basis for the charge] in a notice to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings, especially where a portion 
of the evidence used to support the disciplinary 
action was legitimately confidential.” 
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Case Holding 
San Geronimo 
Caribe Project v. 
Acevedo-Vila, 650 
F.3d 826 (1st Cir. 
2011), reh’g en banc, 
687 F.3d 465 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
Finding that developer stated a claim that his due 
process rights were violated when construction 
permits were held in abeyance for sixty days despite 
the fact that construction was under way, but 
concluding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because prior precedent “could have led 
the defendants to believe that they were not required 
to provide a meaningful predeprivation hearing and 
that . . . providing postdeprivation remedies was all 
the process that was due.”  (Note that, at rehearing 
en banc, the First Circuit found no procedural due 
process violation.) 
Schmidt v. Creedon, 
639 F.3d 587 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
Finding that, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, his due process rights were 
violated because he had a right to a hearing before 
being suspended from his job, but concluding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The 
Supreme Court had established that, “absent 
extraordinary circumstances, certain state employees 
were entitled to a hearing prior to termination,” but 
“it was not clearly established in 2006 whether this 
rule applied when appropriate post-suspension union 
grievance procedures were available to suspended 
employees.” 
Schwenk v. County 
of Alameda, 364 F. 
App’x 336 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
Finding that mother had a legal basis to challenge 
the seizure of her son, based on a Ninth Circuit case 
decided in 2009 holding that “parents with legal 
custody, regardless of whether they also possess 
physical custody of their children have a liberty 
interest in the care, custody, and management of 
their children,” but affirming the district court’s 
dismissal of the case on qualified immunity grounds 
because “[a]t the time of the alleged conduct, we had 
not yet decided” that case. 
Scott v. Fischer, 616 
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2010).  
Finding that the administrative imposition of 
mandatory postrelease supervision without a judicial 
sentence violated the plaintiff’s due process rights, 
but concluding that qualified immunity was 
appropriate because the Second Circuit decision 
clearly establishing this right had not yet been 
decided when the plaintiff’s sentence was imposed.  
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Case Holding 
Solis v. Oules, 378 F. 
App’x 642 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
Finding that defendant officer “violated [plaintiff’s] 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures when he stopped 
her vehicle and apparently removed her from it 
under a law that did not criminalize her behavior,” 
but concluding that defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the officer’s mistake 
“would not have been necessarily clear to a 
reasonable officer under the circumstances” given 
“uncertainty on the face of the statute.”  
Stoot v. City of 
Everett, 582 F.3d 
910 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that defendant officer violated juvenile’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him and 
interviewing him regarding suspected child 
molestation but finding the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because plaintiffs “have not cited 
a single case squarely holding that an officer cannot 
rely solely on the statements of a child sexual assault 
victim obtained during a personal interview to 
establish probable cause.” 
Taravella v. Town of 
Wolcott, 599 F.3d 
129 (2d Cir. 2010). 
Finding that plaintiff alleged a violation of her due 
process rights when she was fired from her 
government job, but finding defendant was entitled 
to qualified immunity because her employment 
agreement was ambiguous and “it cannot be said that 
the defendant acted unreasonably when he 
interpreted the ambiguous contract one way instead 
of another.”  
Thompson v. 
Williams, 320 F. 
App’x 678 (9th Cir. 
2009).  
Finding that there were triable issues about whether a 
prison’s policy not to provide the plaintiff with a 
Halal or Kosher diet violated his First Amendment 
rights or RLUIPA, but concluding that “it was not 
clearly established at the time of the violation” that 
the defendants were required to do so.  
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Toevs v. Reid, 646 
F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 
2011), amended and 
superseded, 685 F.3d 
903 (10th Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that plaintiff’s due process rights were 
violated because he was not informed of the reasons 
he was recommended for or denied progression in a 
stratified incentive program in a prison, but 
concluding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  Although the Supreme Court “clearly 
established that prisoners cannot be placed 
indefinitely in administrative segregation without 
receiving meaningful periodic reviews,” “it was not 
clearly established in 2005 through 2009 that the 
review process was inadequate” and “this court has 
never considered the due-process implications of a 
stratified incentive program.” 
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JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ
How Qualified Immunity Fails
AB S TRACT. This Article reports the findings of the largest and most comprehensive study to
date of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation. Qualified immunity shields
government officials from constitutional claims for money damages so long as the officials did
not violate clearly established law. The Supreme Court has described the doctrine as incredibly
strong -protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Le-
gal scholars and commentators describe qualified immunity in equally stark terms, often criticiz-
ing the doctrine for closing the courthouse doors to plaintiffs whose rights have been violated.
The Court has repeatedly explained that qualified immunity must be as powerful as it is to pro-
tect government officials from burdens associated with participating in discovery and trial. Yet
the Supreme Court has relied on no empirical evidence to support its assertion that qualified
immunity doctrine shields government officials from these assumed burdens.
This Article is the first to test this foundational assumption underlying the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity decisions. I reviewed the dockets of 1,183 Section 1983 cases filed against state
and local law enforcement defendants in five federal court districts over a two-year period and
measured the frequency with which qualified immunity motions were brought by defendants,
granted by courts, and dispositive before discovery and trial. I found that qualified immunity
rarely served its intended role as a shield from discovery and trial in these cases. Across the five
districts in my study, just thirty-eight (3.9%) of the 979 cases in which qualified immunity could
be raised were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. And when one considers all the Section
1983 cases brought against law enforcement defendants-each of which could expose law en-
forcement officials to burdens associated with discovery and trial-just seven (0.6%) were dis-
missed at the motion to dismiss stage and thirty-one (2.6%) were dismissed at summary judg-
ment on qualified immunity grounds. My findings enrich our understanding of qualified
immunity's role in constitutional litigation, belie expectations about the policy interests served
by qualified immunity, and show that qualified immunity doctrine should be modified to reflect
its actual role in constitutional litigation.
2
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court appears to be on a mission to curb civil
rights lawsuits against law enforcement officers, and appears to believe quali-
fied immunity is the means of achieving its goal. The Supreme Court has long
described qualified immunity doctrine as robust-protecting "all but the plain-
ly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' And the Court's most
recent qualified immunity decisions have broadened the scope of the doctrine
even further.2 The Court has also granted a rash of petitions for certiorari in
cases in which lower courts denied qualified immunity to law enforcement
officers, reversing or vacating every one.' In these decisions, the Supreme
Court has scolded lower courts for applying qualified immunity doctrine in a
manner that is too favorable to plaintiffs and thus ignores the "importance of
qualified immunity 'to society as a whole."'" As Noah Feldman has observed,
the Supreme Court's recent qualified immunity decisions have sent a clear mes-
sage to lower courts: "The Supreme Court wants fewer lawsuits against police
to go forward."' And the Court believes that qualified immunity doctrine is the
way to keep the doors to the courthouse closed.
Among legal scholars and other commentators, there is a widespread belief
that the Supreme Court is succeeding in its efforts. Scholars report that quali-
fied immunity motions are raised frequently by defendants, are granted fre-
1. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
2. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTEs 62, 64-65 (2016); see also infra note 183 and accompanying text.
3. See Scott Michelman, Taylor v. Barkes: Summary Reversal Is Part of a Qualified Immunity
Trend, SCOTUSBLOG (June 2, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2o15/o6
/taylor-v-barkes-summary-reversal-is-part-of-a-qualified-immunity-trend [http://perma.cc
/86EN-KSLT]; see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 1o6 CALIF. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 45), http://ssm.com/abstract=2896508 [http://perma.cc
/ZF4C-N3DR] (observing that the Supreme Court found officers violated clearly estab-
lished law in just two of the twenty-nine qualified immunity cases decided by the Supreme
Court since 1982). In one of its most recent qualified immunity decisions, White v. Pauly, the
Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.
But, in so doing, the Court explained that the defendant "did not violate clearly established
law ... [o]n the record described by the Court of Appeals." 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
4. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 1-3 (2015) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
5. Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Has Had Enough with Police Suits, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 9,
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quently by courts, and often result in the dismissal of cases.6 As Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen Reinhardt has written, the Supreme Court's recent qualified
immunity decisions have "created such powerful shields for law enforcement
that people whose rights are violated, even in egregious ways, often lack any
means of enforcing those rights."' Three of the foremost experts on Section
1983 litigation-Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Martin Schwartz-have
concluded that recent developments in qualified immunity doctrine leave "not
much Hope left for plaintiffs."8
The widespread assumption that qualified immunity provides powerful
protection for government officials belies how little we know about the role
qualified immunity plays in the litigation of constitutional claims.9 The scant
evidence available on this topic points in opposite directions. Studies of quali-
6. See Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR. 143 (2014), http://www.fjc
.gov/sites/default/files/2o4/Section-1983-Litigation-3D-FJC-Schwartz-2o14.pdf [http://
perma.cc/JMQ9-92XN] (describing qualified immunity as "the most important defense" in
Section 1983 litigation, and stating that "courts decide a high percentage of Section 1983 per-
sonal-capacity claims for damages in favor of the defendant on the basis of qualified immun-
ity" (footnote omitted)); see also SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION 1983 § 8.5, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2017) ("Un-
der Harlow, defendants on summary judgment motion frequently will be dismissed without
a consideration of the merits."); Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting 'All but the
Plainly Incompetent" (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1023
(2012) ("Public officials can be more certain than ever before that qualified immunity will
shield them from suits for money damages even if their actions violate the constitutional
rights of another."); John C. Jeffries, What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV.
851, 852 (2010) ("The Supreme Court's effort to have more immunity determinations re-
solved on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss -in other words, to create immunity
from trial as well as from liability -has been largely successful." (footnote omitted)).
7. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The
Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights
and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1245 (2015); see also
Caryn J. Ackerman, Comment, Fairness or Fiction: Striking a Balance Between the Goals of
§1983 and the Policy Concerns Motivating Qualified Immunity, 85 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1028
(20o6) (describing qualified immunity doctrine as "arguably one of the most significant ob-
stacles for § 1983 plaintiffs").
8. Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments:
Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TouRo L. REv. 633 (2013). Hope refers to Hope v. Pelzer,
a 2002 Supreme Court decision denying qualified immunity to prison guards who had
handcuffed the plaintiff to a hitching post. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The decision is viewed as
more "plaintiff friendly" than the Court's subsequent qualified immunity decisions. Blum,
Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra, at 654.
9. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the lack of empirical research concern-
ing qualified immunity litigation practice and the justifications underlying the doctrine). For
research regarding other aspects of qualified immunity doctrine, see infra notes lo, 18o.
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fied immunity decisions have found that qualified immunity motions are infre-
quently denied, suggesting that the doctrine plays a controlling role in the
resolution of many Section 1983 cases.o But when Alexander Reinert studied
the dockets in Bivens actions -constitutional cases brought against federal ac-
tors -he found that grants of qualified immunity led to just 2% of case dismis-
sals over a three-year period." If qualified immunity protects all but the "plain-
ly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,"12 and qualified
immunity motions are infrequently denied, how can qualified immunity be the
basis for dismissal of such a small percentage of cases?
More than descriptive accuracy is at stake in answering this question-it
goes to a core justification for qualified immunity's existence. Although the
concept of qualified immunity was drawn from defenses existing in the com-
mon law at the time 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, the Court has made clear
that the contours of qualified immunity's protections are shaped not by the
common law but instead by policy considerations." In particular, the Court
seeks to balance "two important interests - the need to hold public officials ac-
countable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield offi-
cials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably."14 Since the doctrine's inception, the Court has repeatedly stated
that financial liability is one of the burdens qualified immunity is intended to
protect against." Yet, as I showed in a prior study, law enforcement defendants
are almost always indemnified and thus rarely pay anything towards settle-
10. See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 145 n.1o6
(1999) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in 20% of federal cases over a two-year
period); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis,
36 PEPP. L. REv. 667, 691 (2009) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in 14% to 32%
of district court decisions); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 545 (2010) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in approximately 32% of
appellate decisions).
n1. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REv. 809, 845 (2010).
12. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
13. Justice Thomas has recently criticized this approach, arguing that qualified immunity doc-
trine should mirror historical common law defenses. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1870-72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For a dis-
cussion of this argument, and the relevance of my findings to this argument, see infra note
203 and accompanying text.
14. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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ments and judgments entered against them.16 Near certain and universal in-
demnification drastically reduces the value of qualified immunity as a protec-
tion against the burden of financial liability.
In recent years, the Court has focused increasingly on a different justifica-
tion for qualified immunity: the need to protect government officials from
nonfinancial burdens associated with discovery and trial." This desire has ar-
guably shaped qualified immunity more than any other policy justification for
the doctrine. " Yet we do not know to what extent discovery and trial burden
government officials, or the extent to which qualified immunity doctrine pro-
tects against those assumed burdens. Although both questions demand critical
investigation, this Article focuses on the latter. Assuming that discovery and
trial do impose substantial burdens on government officials, and that shielding
officials from discovery and trial is a legitimate aim of qualified immunity doc-
trine, to what extent does qualified immunity actually achieve its intended
goal?
To answer these questions, I undertook the largest and most comprehen-
sive study to date of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litiga-
tion. I reviewed the dockets of 1,183 lawsuits filed against state and local law
enforcement defendants over a two-year period in five federal district courts -
the Southern District of Texas, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern
District of Ohio, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern Dis-
trict of California.19 I tracked several characteristics of these cases including the
frequency with which qualified immunity was raised, the stage of the litigation
at which qualified immunity was raised, the courts' assessments of defendants'
qualified immunity motions, the frequency and outcome of interlocutory and
final appeals of qualified immunity decisions, and the cases' dispositions.
I found that, contrary to judicial and scholarly assumptions, qualified im-
munity is rarely the formal reason that civil rights damages actions against law
enforcement end. Qualified immunity is raised infrequently before discovery
begins: across the districts in my study, defendants raised qualified immunity
in motions to dismiss in 13.9% of the cases in which they could raise the de-
fense.20 These motions were less frequently granted than one might expect:
courts granted motions to dismiss in whole or part on qualified immunity
16. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
17. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Section I.B.
ig. See infra Part II for a description of my study design and methodology.
20. See infra Tables 2 & 3 and infra note ill and accompanying text.
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grounds 13.6% of the time.2 1 Qualified immunity was raised more often by de-
fendants at summary judgment and was more often granted by courts at that
stage. But even when courts granted motions to dismiss and summary judg-
ment motions on qualified immunity grounds, those grants did not always re-
sult in the dismissal of the cases -additional claims or defendants regularly re-
mained and continued to expose government officials to the possibility of
discovery and trial. Across the five districts in my study, just 3.9% of the cases
in which qualified immunity could be raised were dismissed on qualified im-
munity grounds.2 2 And when one considers all the Section 1983 cases brought
against law enforcement defendants -each of which could expose law enforce-
ment officials to whatever burdens are associated with discovery and trial-just
o.6% of cases were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage and 2.6% were
dismissed at summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.2 3
Although courts rarely dismiss Section 1983 suits against law enforcement
on qualified immunity grounds, there is every reason to believe that qualified
immunity doctrine influences the litigation of Section 1983 claims in other
ways. The threat of a qualified immunity motion may cause a person never to
file suit, or to settle or withdraw her claims before discovery or trial.24 Qualified
immunity motion practice and interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity de-
nials may increase the costs and delays associated with Section 1983 litigation.
The challenges of qualified immunity doctrine may cause plaintiffs' attorneys
to include claims in their cases that cannot be dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds - claims against municipalities, claims seeking injunctive relief, and
state law claims. Qualified immunity likely influences the litigation of cases
against law enforcement in each of these ways. But, as my study makes clear,
qualified immunity does not affect constitutional litigation against law en-
forcement in the way the Court expects and intends.
One should not conclude based on my findings that the Supreme Court
simply needs to make qualified immunity stronger. As a preliminary matter,
qualified immunity may not be well suited to weed out only insubstantial cas-
es.2 Moreover, my data suggest hat qualified immunity is often fundamentally
21. See infra Table 7 (showing that qualified immunity was granted in whole in 9.1% of cases in
which a qualified immunity motion was raised at the motion to dismiss stage, and was
granted in part in 4.5% of such cases).
22. See infra Table 11 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Table 12 and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of these possibilities, see infra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
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ill suited to dismiss filed cases, regardless of their underlying merits.2 6 Alt-
hough district courts recognize that they should dispose of cases as early as
possible on qualified immunity grounds, plaintiffs can often plausibly plead
clearly established constitutional violations and thus defeat motions to dismiss.
Factual disputes regularly prevent dismissal at summary judgment. And even
when courts grant qualified immunity motions, additional defendants or
claims often remain that continue to expose government officials to the bur-
dens of litigation. My data also suggest that qualified immunity is less essential
than has been assumed to serve its intended protective function. The Supreme
Court suggests in its opinions that qualified immunity is the only barrier
standing between government officials and the burdens of discovery and trial.
Instead, my study shows that litigants and courts have a wide range of tools at
their disposal to resolve Section 1983 cases.
One also should not conclude based on my findings that qualified immuni-
ty is more benign than has been assumed. My findings do show that Section
1983 claims against the police are infrequently dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds. But qualified immunity doctrine has been roundly criticized as inco-
herent, illogical, and overly protective of government officials who act uncon-
stitutionally and in bad faith.2 7 The fact that few cases are dismissed on quali-
fied immunity grounds does not fundamentally undermine these critiques.
Qualified immunity doctrine is intended by the Court to balance "the need
to hold government officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsi-
bly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties responsibly."2 8 Were qualified immunity relia-
bly insulating government officials from the burdens of litigation in insubstan-
tial cases, one could argue that the doctrine's incoherence, illogic, and overpro-
tection of government officials were unfortunate but necessary to further
government interests. Yet available evidence suggests that qualified immunity
is not achieving its policy objectives; the doctrine is unnecessary to protect gov-
ernment officials from financial liability and ill suited to shield government
officials from discovery and trial in most filed cases. Qualified immunity may,
in fact, increase the costs and delays associated with constitutional litigation.
Qualified immunity might benefit the government in other ways, and further
11
26. See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of these critiques, see infra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
28. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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research is necessary to explore this possibility.29 But the evidence now availa-
ble weakens the Court's current justifications for the doctrine's structure and
highly restrictive standards. The Supreme Court has written that evidence un-
dermining its assumptions about the realities of constitutional litigation might
"justify reconsideration of the balance struck" in its qualified immunity deci-
sions.o Given my findings, it is high time for the Supreme Court to reconsider
that balance.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Su-
preme Court's assumptions about the burdens of discovery and trial for gov-
ernment officials, and the ways in which these assumptions have shaped quali-
fied immunity doctrine. In Part II, I describe the methodology of my study. In
Part III, I set forth my findings about the frequency with which law enforce-
ment defendants raise qualified immunity, the frequency with which courts
grant qualified immunity, the frequency and outcome of qualified immunity
interlocutory and final appeals, and the frequency with which qualified im-
munity disposes of plaintiffs' cases. In Part IV, I consider the implications of
my findings for descriptive accounts of qualified immunity's role in constitu-
tional litigation and expectations about the policy interests served by qualified
immunity doctrine. I also suggest adjustments to qualified immunity that
would create more consistency between the doctrine and its actual role in con-
stitutional litigation.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY'S EXPECTED ROLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
The Supreme Court has long viewed qualified immunity as a means of pro-
tecting government officials from burdens associated with participating in dis-
covery and trial in insubstantial cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court has justified
several major developments in qualified immunity doctrine over the past thir-
ty-five years as means of protecting government officials from these assumed
burdens. In this Part, I describe the Court's stated assumptions about the pur-
poses served by qualified immunity, the ways in which those assumptions have
shaped qualified immunity doctrine, and the lack of evidence supporting the
Court's concerns and interventions.
29. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text for a description of remaining questions
about the way qualified immunity doctrine functions and the extent to which it achieves its
intended goals.
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A. The Court's Concerns About the Burdens of Litigation
The Supreme Court has made clear that its qualified immunity jurispru-
dence reflects the Court's view about how best to balance "the importance of a
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens" against "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public in-
terest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.3 1 Yet the
Court's descriptions of the ways in which qualified immunity protects govern-
ment officials have shifted over time.
The Supreme Court's original rationale for qualified immunity was to
shield officials from financial liability. The Court first announced that law en-
forcement officials were entitled to a qualified immunity from suits in the 1967
case of Pierson v. Ray.32 That decision justified qualified immunity as a means
of protecting government defendants from financial burdens when acting in
good faith in legally murky areas.33 Qualified immunity was necessary, accord-
ing to the Court, because " [a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he had probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does."34 The
scope of the qualified immunity defense is in many ways consistent with an in-
terest in protecting government officials from financial liability. For example,
qualified immunity does not attach in claims against municipalities, claims
against some private actors, and claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.35 In-
deed, the Court has been clear that municipalities and private prison guards are
not entitled to qualified immunity in part because neither type of defendant is
threatened by personal financial liability. 3 6
31. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
32. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
33. Id. at 555; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) ("Liability for damages for
every action which is found subsequently to have been violative of a student's constitutional
rights and to have caused compensable injury would unfairly impose upon the school deci-
sionmaker the burden of mistakes made in good faith in the course of exercising his discre-
tion within the scope of his official duties.").
34. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555-
35. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (observing that qualified immunity is
not available in "criminal cases and § 1983 cases against a municipality, as well as § 1983 cas-
es against individuals where injunctive relief is sought instead of or in addition to damag-
es"); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (holding that private prison guards
are not entitled to qualified immunity); Wood, 420 U.S. at 315 n.6 (" [I]mmunity from dam-
ages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well.").
36. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411 (finding that private actors' insurance "increases the likelihood
of employee indemnification and to that extent reduces the employment-discouraging fear
13
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The Supreme Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, fifteen years after
Pierson, expanded the policy goals animating qualified immunity. The Court
explained in Harlow that qualified immunity was necessary not only to protect
government officials from financial liability, but also to protect against "the di-
version of official energy from pressing public issues," "the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office," and "the danger that fear of being
sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irrespon-
sible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.'""
In subsequent cases, the Court has focused increasingly on the need to pro-
tect government officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial,
with the expectation that qualified immunity can protect government officials
from those burdens. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Court reaffirmed the Harlow
Court's conclusion that qualified immunity was necessary to protect against the
burdens associated with both trial and pretrial matters, like discovery, because
'[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective govern-
ment.""' In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court again emphasized the value of qualified
immunity in curtailing the time-intensive discovery process. As the Court ex-
plained:
The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including "avoidance of disruptive dis-
covery." There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Govern-
ment official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formula-
tion of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation
and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation,
though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts
heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
of unwarranted liability potential applicants face"); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 653 (1980) (concluding that municipalities should not be protected by qualified im-
munity in part because concerns about overdeterrence are "less compelling, if not wholly in-
applicable, when the liability of the municipal entity is at stake"). The Court has offered lit-
te explanation why the qualified immunity defense is not available in claims for
nonmonetary relief.
37. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cit. 1949)).
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resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of
the work of the Government."
In recent years, the interest in shielding government officials from the bur-
dens of discovery and trial has taken center stage in the Court's qualified im-
munity calculations. In 1997, the Supreme Court made clear that "the risk of
'distraction' alone cannot be sufficient grounds for an immunity."40 Twelve
years later, in 2009, the Court described protecting government officials from
burdens associated with discovery and trial as the "'driving force' behind [the]
creation of the qualified immunity doctrine."4 1
The Court's interest in protecting government officers from burdens asso-
ciated with discovery and trial extends not only to defendants but to other gov-
ernment officials who may be required to testify, respond to discovery, or oth-
erwise participate in litigation. In Filarsky v. Delia, the Court held that a private
actor retained by the government to carry out its work was entitled to qualified
immunity in part because the "distraction of lawsuits . . . will also often affect
any public employees with whom they work by embroiling those employees in
litigation."4 2
B. Doctrinal Impact of the Court's Desire To Protect Defendants from Discovery
and Trial
Over the past thirty-five years, the Court's interest in protecting govern-
ment officials from discovery and trial has shaped qualified immunity in several
important ways. Granted, some aspects of qualified immunity doctrine are in-
consistent with the Court's interest in protecting government officials from dis-
covery and trial. After all, government officials must participate in discovery
and trial in claims against municipalities - as witnesses, if not as defendants. In
addition, government officials must participate in discovery and trial in claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Yet, in the years since Pierson, the Court's
concerns about the burdens of discovery and trial have led the Court to remove
the subjective prong of the qualified immunity defense, adjust the process by
which lower courts assess qualified immunity motions, and allow interlocutory
appeals of qualified immunity denials.
39. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (citation omitted).
40. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411.
41. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
64o n.2 (1987)).
42. 566 U.S. 377, 391 (2012).
15
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1. Defendants' State of Mind
The Court's interest in shielding government defendants from discovery
and trial underlay its decision to eliminate the subjective prong of the qualified
immunity defense. From 1967, when qualified immunity was first announced
by the Supreme Court, until 1982, when Harlow was decided, a defendant seek-
ing qualified immunity had to show both that his conduct was objectively rea-
sonable and that he had a "good-faith" belief that his conduct was proper.43 In
Harlow, the Supreme Court concluded that the subjective prong of the defense
was "incompatible" with the goals of qualified immunity because an official's
subjective intent often could not be resolved before trial.44 Moreover, during
discovery, gathering evidence of an official's subjective motivation "may entail
broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an
official's professional colleagues."4 5 By eliminating the subjective prong of the
qualified immunity analysis, the Court believed it could "avoid 'subject[ing]
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-
reaching discovery' in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to
have violated were not clearly established at the time."4 6
2. The Order of Battle
The Court's concerns about burdens associated with litigation also influ-
enced its decisions regarding the manner in which courts should analyze quali-
fied immunity. The Supreme Court believes that lower courts deciding quali-
fied immunity motions are faced with two questions -whether a constitutional
right was violated, and whether that right was clearly established. But the
Court has wavered in its view regarding the order in which these questions
must be answered-what is often referred to as "the order of battle." In 2001,
the Supreme Court held in Saucier v. Katz that a court engaging in a qualified
immunity analysis must first decide whether the defendant violated the plain-
tiff's constitutional rights and then decide whether the constitutional right was
clearly established.4 7 The Court insisted on this sequence because it would al-
low "the law's elaboration from case to case.. . . The law might be deprived of
43. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 817.
46. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow, 457
U.S. at 817-18).
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this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the
law clearly established that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the circum-
stances of the case."4 8
Eight years later, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reversed itself and con-
cluded that Saucier's two-step process was not mandatory.49 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Alito, writing for the Court, relied heavily on the fact that
courts considered the process mandated by Saucier to be unduly burdensome.so
Justice Alito also explained that the process wasted the parties' resources, writ-
ing that "Saucier's two-step protocol 'disserve[s] the purpose of qualified im-
munity' when it 'forces the parties to endure additional burdens of suit -such
as the costs of litigating constitutional questions and delays attributable to re-
solving them-when the suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily."'
Concerns about the burdens of litigation therefore led the Court to allow lower
courts not to decide the first question -whether the conduct was unconstitu-
tional-if they could grant the motion on the ground that the right was not
clearly established.
3. Interlocutory Appeals
The Court's interest in protecting government officials from the burdens of
discovery and trial also motivated its decision to allow interlocutory appeals of
qualified immunity denials.52 Generally speaking, litigants in federal court can
only appeal final judgments; interlocutory appeals are not allowed unless a
right "cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred."" The ques-
tion decided by the Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth was whether qualified immunity
should be understood as an entitlement not to stand trial that cannot be reme-
died by an appeal at the end of the case. In concluding that a denial of qualified
immunity could be appealed immediately, the Court relied on its assertion in
Harlow that qualified immunity was "an entitlement not to stand trial or face
48. Id.
49. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
50. Id. at 236-37.
51. Id. at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Law-
yers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, Pearson, 555 U.S. 223 (No. 07-751)).
52. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985). Note that a defendant can immediately ap-
peal a decision that the law was clearly established, but cannot immediately appeal a denial
of qualified immunity made on the grounds that there exists a genuine issue of fact for trial.
See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
53. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525.
17
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the other burdens of litigation."54 If qualified immunity protected only against
the financial burdens of liability, there would be no need for interlocutory ap-
peal; defendants denied qualified immunity could appeal after a final judgment
and before the payment of any award to a plaintiff Instead, the Court conclud-
ed, qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability; and . .. it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial."" Only an interest in protecting officials from discovery and trial can jus-
tify this holding.
C. The Lack ofEmpirical Support for the Court's Concerns and Interventions
The Supreme Court's qualified immunity decisions over the past thirty-five
years have relied on the assumptions that discovery and trial impose substantial
burdens on government officials, and that qualified immunity can shield gov-
ernment officials from these burdens. Four years after it decided Harlow, the
Court asserted that the decision had achieved the Court's goal of facilitating
dismissal at summary judgment.56 in subsequent years, the Court's repeated
invocation of the burdens of discovery and trial, and repeated reliance on qual-
ified immunity doctrine to protect defendants from those assumed burdens,
suggest the Court's continued faith in these positions. Yet the Court has relied
on no empirical evidence to support its views.
Scholars have decried the lack of empirical evidence about the realities of
civil rights litigation relevant to questions about the proper scope of qualified
immunity doctrine and the extent to which the doctrine achieves its intended
purposes. Twenty years ago, Alan Chen complained that the Court and its crit-
ics make assertions about the role of qualified immunity in constitutional liti-
gation without evidence to support their claims.17 Although scholars have em-
54. Id. at 526.
ss. Id.
56. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("The Harlow standard is specifically designed
to 'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstan-
tial claims on summary judgment, and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal." (emphasis
added)). Scholars appear to agree. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57. Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 102 (1997) ("Presently, there is no empirical
foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity doctrine or its critics. While
the Court has consistently hypothesized that significant social costs are engendered by
§ 1983 and Bivens litigation against individual government officials, it has never relied on
empirical data concerning the impact of constitutional tort litigation on officials' actual be-
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pirically examined some questions about qualified immunity -paying particu-
lar attention to the impact of Pearson on the development of constitutional
law - the same is largely true today." As Richard Fallon has observed, "[W] e
could make far better judgments of how well qualified immunity serves the
function of getting the right balance between deterrence of constitutional viola-
tions and chill of conscientious official action if we had better empirical infor-
mation."" This Article, and my research more generally, aims to fill that gap.
II. STUDY METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the role that qualified immunity plays in the litigation of Sec-
tion 1983 suits, I reviewed the dockets of cases filed from January 1, 2011 to De-
cember 31, 2012 in five districts: the Southern District of Texas, Middle District
of Florida, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
Northern District of California. Several considerations led me to study these
five districts.
I chose to look at decisions from district courts in the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits because I expected that judges from these circuits
might differ in their approach to qualified immunity and to Section 1983 litiga-
tion more generally. This expectation was based on my review of district court
qualified immunity decisions from each of the circuits, as well as a view, shared
by others, that judges in these circuits range from conservative to more liber-
al.60 Moreover, commentators believe that courts in these circuits vary in their
approach to qualified immunity, with judges in the Third and Ninth Circuits
favoring plaintiffs, and judges in the Eleventh Circuit so hostile to Section 1983
cases that they are described as applying "unqualified immunity."6 1
gation may generate substantial social costs, they have offered no supporting empirical data
either." (footnotes omitted)).
58. See supra notes 10-12 and infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
59. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, So FORDHAM L.
REV. 479, 500 (2011).
6o. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 11, at 832 n.126 (citing Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common
Space, 23 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 303, 312 fig.4 (2007)).
61. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 250 n.151
(2013) (quoting Elizabeth J. Normal & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L.
REV. 1499, 1556 (2002)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) ("We have re-
peatedly told courts - and the Ninth Circuit in particular - not to define clearly established
law at a high level of generality" (citation omitted)); Charles R. Wilson, "Location, Location,
Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 445, 447-48 (2000) (describing the Eleventh Circuit as having a very restrictive view and
19
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I chose these five districts within these five circuits for two reasons. First, I
expected that these five districts would have a large number of cases to review:
from 2011 to 2012, these districts were among the busiest in the country, as
measured by case filings.62 Second, these five districts have a range of small,
medium, and large law enforcement agencies and agencies of comparable siz-
es.
63
I chose to review dockets instead of relying on the most obvious alterna-
tive -decisions available on Westlaw.64 Although Westlaw can quicldy sort out
decisions in which qualified immunity is addressed by district courts, Westlaw
could not capture information essential to my analysis about the frequency
with which qualified immunity protects government officials from discovery
and trial. First, a Westlaw search could capture no information about the num-
ber of cases in which qualified immunity was never raised. In addition, a
Westlaw search could not capture information about the number of cases in
which qualified immunity was raised by the defendant in his motion but was
not addressed by the court in its decision. Even when a defendant raises a qual-
ified immunity defense and the district court addresses qualified immunity in
its decision, the decision may not appear on Westlaw-Westlaw does not cap-
ture motions resolved without a written opinion, and includes only those opin-
ions that are selected to appear on the service.65 in other words, opinions on
other circuits, including the Third Circuit, as having a broader view of what constitutes
"clearly established" law).
62. See Judicial Facts and Figures, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. tbl.4 .2 (Sept. 30, 2012), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics-import dir/Table4o2_6.pdf [http://perma
.cc/697A-JWVH].
63. For example, the Philadelphia and Houston Police Departments are both large, with be-
tween 5,000 and 7,000 officers; the Cleveland Police Department, San Francisco Police De-
partment, and Jacksonville Sheriff's Office are midsized, with between 1,600 and 2,000
officers; the Orlando Police Department and Oakland Police Department each have between
750 and 800 officers; and all five districts have smaller agencies. See Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA), NAT'L ARCHIVE CRIM.
JUST. DATA (2008) [hereinafter BJS Law Enforcement Census Data], http://www.icpsr
.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/27681 [http://perma.cc/MLQ3-W2AH].
64. Most empirical studies examining qualified immunity have relied on decisions available on
Westlaw. See sources cited supra note io and infra note 180. One notable exception is Alex-
ander Reinert's study of Bivens dockets. See Reinert, supra note II, at 834.
65. Relying on Westlaw would have significantly reduced the number of qualified immunity
opinions in my dataset. There are a total of 365 district court decisions on motions raising
qualified immunity in my dataset. See infra Table 6. I searched on Westlaw for each of the
365 qualified immunity decisions I found on Bloomberg Law, and 178 (48.8%) of those deci-
sions were available on Westlaw. Nineteen of fifty-six decisions (33.9%) on qualified im-
munity motions from the Southern District of Texas were available on Westlaw; forty-one
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Westlaw can offer insights about the ways in which district courts assess quali-
fied immunity when they choose to address the issue in a written opinion and
the opinion is accessible on Westlaw, but can say little about the frequency with
which qualified immunity is raised, the manner in which all motions raising
qualified immunity are decided, and the impact of qualified immunity on case
dispositions.
I reviewed the dockets of cases filed in 2011 and 2012 in the five districts in
my study.66 I searched case filings in the five districts in my study through
Bloomberg Law, an online service that has dockets otherwise available through
PACER and additionally provides access to documents submitted to the
court-complaints, motions, orders, and other papers.6 7 Within Bloomberg
Law, I limited my search to those cases that plaintiffs had designated under the
broad term "Other Civil Rights," nature-of-suit code 440.68 This search gener-
ated 462 dockets in the Southern District of Texas, 465 dockets in the Northern
District of Ohio, 674 dockets in the Middle District of Florida, 712 dockets in
Florida were available on Westlaw; thirty-seven of sixty-one (60.7%) decisions on qualified
immunity motions from the Northern District of Ohio; forty-six of seventy-six (60.5%) de-
cisions on qualified immunity motions from the Northern District of California; and thirty-
five of eighty-one (43.2%) decisions on qualified immunity motions from the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Cf David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine,
85 WASH. U. L. REv. 681, 710 (2007) (finding that only 3% of all district court orders appear
on Westlaw).
66. I chose this two-year period because it is a recent period in which most (if not all) cases have
been resolved by the time of this Article's publication.
67. See E-mail from Tania Wilson, Bloomberg BNA Law Sch. Relationship Manager, W. Coast,
to Kelly Leong, Reference Librarian, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 8, 2016, 12:18 PM) (on file
with author) (" [Bloomberg Law] ha[s] everything on PACER. We are also able to obtain
docket sheets and documents via courier retrieval (which would fill in the gap of some cases
not available electronically).").
68. Every complainant in federal court must choose from various "Nature of Suit" codes on the
"Civil Cover Sheet," also known as Form JS 44. See Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for
Sealed Settlement Agreements, 81 CHI-ICENT L. REV. 439, 452 & n-71 (20o6). Code 440 desig-
nates "Other Civil Rights" actions, excluding specific categories related to voting, employ-
ment, housing, disabilities, and education. The official description for Code 44o offers, as an
example, an "[a]ction alleging excessive force by police incident to an arrest." Civil Nature of
Suit Code Descriptions, U.S. CTs. (Aug. 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default
/files/js-o44_code-descriptions.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8A2-7H7T]. It is possible that some
plaintiffs in Section 1983 cases against state and local law enforcement did not choose Code
440. Code 550, for example, is titled "Prisoner Petitions-Civil Rights," but its proper use is
limited to suits "alleging a civil rights violation by corrections officials." Id. Bloomberg Law
separately allows users to filter using the "Cause of Action" field on the Civil Cover Sheet.
But that field does not impose a limited set of options on complainants, and I found that
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the Northern District of California, and 1,435 dockets in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. I reviewed the complaints associated with these 3,748 dockets
and included in my dataset those cases, brought by civilians, alleging constitu-
tional violations by state and local law enforcement agencies and their employ-
ees.69
I limited my study to cases brought by civilians against law enforcement
defendants for several reasons. First, many of the Supreme Court's qualified
immunity decisions have involved cases brought against law enforcement. Of
the twenty-nine qualified immunity cases that the Supreme Court has decided
since 1982, almost half have involved constitutional claims against state and lo-
cal law enforcement.70 Because the Court has developed qualified immunity
doctrine (and articulated its underlying purposes) primarily in cases involving
law enforcement, it makes sense to examine whether the doctrine is meeting its
express goals in these types of cases.
Limiting my study to Section 1983 cases against state and local law en-
forcement also creates some substantive consistency across the cases in my da-
taset. Most Section 1983 cases against state and local law enforcement allege
Fourth Amendment violations- excessive force, false arrest, and wrongful
searches - and, less frequently, First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Restricting my study to suits by civilians against state and local law enforce-
ment facilitates direct comparison of outcomes in similar cases across the five
districts in my study. Finally, much of my own prior research has focused on
lawsuits against state and local law enforcement, and maintaining this focus
here allows for future synthesis of my findings."
69. I limited my study to state and local law enforcement agencies identified in the Bureau of
Justice Statistics' Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. See BJS Law Enforcement
Census Data, supra note 63. I excluded decisions involving other types of government offi-
cials, including some government officials that perform law enforcement functions, like law
enforcement employed by school districts, state correctional officers, and federal law en-
forcement. I have additionally excluded Section 1983 actions brought by law enforcement
officials as plaintiffs. Finally, I removed duplicate filings, cases that were consolidated, and
cases that were improperly brought against law enforcement agencies located outside of the
five districts.
70. See Baude, supra note 3, at 45. In the remaining fifteen cases, two alleged constitutional vio-
lations by state corrections officials, nine alleged constitutional violations by federal law en-
forcement, and four asserted constitutional claims against government officials not involved
in the criminal justice system. See id.
71. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63
UCLA L. REv. 1144 (2016); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role
of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1023 (2010); Schwartz, su-
pra note 16; Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOzO L. REv. 841
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The resulting dataset includes a total of 1,183 cases from these five districts:
131 cases from the Southern District of Texas, 225 cases from the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida, 172 cases from the Northern District of Ohio, 248 cases from
the Northern District of California, and 407 cases from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. For each of these dockets, I tracked multiple pieces of infor-
mation relevant to this study, including whether the plaintiff(s) sued individual
officers and/or the municipality, the relief sought by the plaintiff(s), whether
the law enforcement defendant(s) filed one or more motions to dismiss on the
pleadings or for summary judgment, whether and when the defendant(s)
raised qualified immunity, how the court decided the motions raised by the de-
fendant(s), whether there was an interlocutory or final appeal of a qualified
immunity decision, and how the case was ultimately resolved.72 Although some
of this information was available from the docket sheet, I obtained much of the
information by reading motions and opinions linked to the dockets on Bloom-
berg Law.
Although some of my coding decisions were straightforward, others in-
volved less obvious choices. Because my coding decisions may make most sense
when reviewed in context, I have described those decisions in detail in the
footnotes accompanying the data.73 Throughout, my coding decisions were
guided by my focus on the role that qualified immunity played in the resolu-
tion of cases and the frequency with which the doctrine meets its goal of shield-
ing government officials from discovery and trial.
My dataset is comprehensive in the five chosen districts. It includes most-
if not all- Section 1983 cases filed by civilians against state and local law en-
forcement in these federal districts over a two-year period, and it offers insights
about how frequently qualified immunity is raised in these cases, how courts
decide these motions, and how the cases are resolved. There are, however, sev-
eral limitations of the data. First, although I selected these five districts in part
to capture regional variation, they may not represent the full range of court and
litigant behavior nationwide. The marked differences in my data across dis-
tricts do, however, suggest a considerable degree of regional variation. Second,
the data offer no information about the role of qualified immunity in state
72. I tracked additional information as well, including whether the plaintiff was represented, the
attorneys involved in the cases, and the law enforcement agencies implicated in the cases.
These data are relevant to subsequent related projects I intend to undertake and are not re-
ported in this Article.
73. For descriptions of my coding decisions, see, for example, infra notes 82, 87, 88, 91, 93, 98.
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court litigation. This is in part because Bloomberg Law does not offer much in-
formation about the litigation of constitutional cases in state courts.74
Third, although this study sheds light on the litigation of constitutional
claims against state and local law enforcement officers, it does not necessarily
describe the role qualified immunity plays in the litigation of constitutional
claims against other types of government employees. It may be that the types
of constitutional claims often raised in cases against law enforcement -Fourth
Amendment claims alleging excessive force, unlawful arrests, and improper
searches - are particularly difficult to resolve on qualified immunity grounds in
advance of trial. Fourth Amendment claims may be comparatively easy to plead
in a plausible manner (and so could survive a motion to dismiss), and such
claims may be particularly prone to factual disputes (making resolution at
summary judgment difficult). If so, perhaps qualified immunity motions in
cases raising other types of claims would be more successful. On the other
hand, John Jeffries has argued that it may be particularly difficult to clearly es-
tablish that a use of force violates the Fourth Amendment because Fourth
Amendment analysis requires a fact-specific inquiry about the nature of the
force used and the threat posed by the person against whom force was used,
viewed from the perspective of an officer on the scene.7 ' Further research
should explore whether qualified immunity plays a different role in cases
brought against other government actors, or cases alleging different types of
constitutional violations.
Fourth, qualified immunity may be influencing the litigation of constitu-
tional claims in ways that cannot be measured through the examination of case
74. I looked at state court dockets available on Bloomberg Law for counties in the Northern Dis-
trict of California and found that very few had any information about motions filed (in the
instances that they were not removed to federal court). In addition, federal constitutional
cases filed in state court are at least sometimes removed to federal court. In the Northern
District of California, fifty-five of the 248 cases filed during the study period-22.2%-were
initially filed in state court and removed to federal court. In the Northern District of Ohio,
fifty-nine of the cases were removed from state court, which constitutes 34.3% of the 172 cas-
es filed in federal district court over those two years. In the Southern District of Texas, twen-
ty-seven cases were removed from state court, amounting to 20.6% of the 131 total filings in
federal district court. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sixty-three of the cases were
removed from state court, which constitutes 15.5% of the 407 cases filed in federal court over
these two years. In the Middle District of Florida, sixty of the cases were removed from state
court, which constitutes 26.7% of the 225 cases filed in federal court over these two years. Of
course, these figures do not capture how many cases were filed in state court but were not
removed.
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dockets.76 For example, my study does not measure how frequently qualified
immunity causes people not to file lawsuits. It also does not capture infor-
mation about the frequency with which plaintiffs' decisions to settle or with-
draw their claims are influenced by the threat of a qualified immunity motion
or decision. Exploration of these issues is critical to a complete understanding
of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation. I discuss these
issues in more depth in Part IV, and future research should explore these ques-
tions.7 7 Yet this Article illuminates several important aspects of qualified im-
munity's role in Section 1983 cases. Moreover, by measuring the frequency with
which qualified immunity motions are raised, granted, and dispositive, this Ar-
ticle reveals the extent to which the doctrine functions as the Supreme Court
expects and critics fear.
III. FINDINGS
The Supreme Court has explained that a goal of qualified immunity is to
"avoid 'subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the
burdens of broad-reaching discovery' in cases where the legal norms the offi-
cials are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time."78 Log-
ically, qualified immunity will only achieve this goal in a case if four conditions
are met.
First, the case must be brought against an individual officer and must seek
monetary damages. Qualified immunity is not available for claims against mu-
nicipalities or claims for noneconomic relief. Second, the defendant must raise
the qualified immunity defense early enough in the litigation that it can protect
him from discovery or trial. If the defendant seeks to protect himself from dis-
covery, he must raise qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss or a motion for
judgment on the pleadings; if a defendant seeks to protect himself from trial,
he can raise qualified immunity at the pleadings or at summary judgment.
76. For further discussion of these remaining questions about the role of qualified immunity in
constitutional litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 118-122.
77. See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
78. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)).
79. In some instances, motions for summary judgment may be made before the parties have en-
gaged in full-fledged discovery, either because the parties will attach documentary evidence
to their Rule 12 motion and the court will convert the motion to one for summary judgment,
or because the parties will engage in partial discovery sufficient only to address the qualified
immunity question. For further discussion of the frequency with which defendants in my
25
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Third, for a qualified immunity motion to protect government officials against
burdens associated with discovery or trial, the court must grant the motion on
qualified immunity grounds.so Finally, the grant of qualified immunity must
completely resolve the case. If qualified immunity is granted for an officer on
one claim but not another, that officer will continue to have to participate in the
litigation of the case. Even when a grant of qualified immunity results in the
dismissal of all claims against a defendant, that defendant may still have to par-
ticipate in the litigation of claims against other defendants. To be sure, the gov-
ernment official who has been dismissed from the case may no longer feel the
same psychological burdens associated with the litigation and may have lesser
discovery burdens than he would have had as a defendant. But the grant of
qualified immunity will not necessarily shield him from the burdens of partici-
pating in discovery and trial.
This Part describes my findings regarding the frequency with which each of
these conditions is met. I empirically examine six topics: (1) the number of cas-
es in which qualified immunity can be raised by defendants; (2) the number of
cases in which defendants choose to raise qualified immunity; (3) the stage(s)
of litigation at which defendants raise qualified immunity; (4) the ways in
which district courts decide qualified immunity motions; (5) the frequency and
outcome of qualified immunity appeals; and (6) the frequency with which
qualified immunity is the reason that a case ends before discovery or trial.
My findings regarding these six topics show that, at least in filed cases,
qualified immunity rarely functions as expected. Qualified immunity could not
be raised in more than 17% of the cases in my dataset, either because the cases
did not name individual defendants or seek monetary damages, or because the
cases were dismissed sua sponte by the court before the defendants had an op-
portunity to answer or otherwise respond. Defendants raised qualified immun-
ity in 37.6% of the cases in my dataset in which the defense could be raised. De-
fendants were particularly disinclined to raise qualified immunity in motions to
dismiss: they did so in only 13.9% of the cases in which they could raise the de-
fense at that stage. Courts granted (in whole or part) less than 18% of the mo-
tions that raised a qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity was the
reason for dismissal in just 3.9% of the cases in my dataset in which the defense
dataset moved for summary judgment without discovery, see infra note 86 and accompany-
ing text.
so. It is possible that a court could deny a qualified immunity motion in part or whole, but the
motion could nevertheless influence the courts' other rulings regarding discovery or other
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could be raised, and just 3.2% of all cases in my dataset. The remainder of this
Part describes each of these findings in more detail.
A. Cases in Which Qualified Immunity Cannot Play a Role
There are certain types of cases in which qualified immunity cannot play a
role. The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity does not apply to
claims against municipalities and claims for injunctive or declaratory relief."
Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot protect government officials from dis-
covery or trial in cases asserting only these types of claims. In my docket da-
taset of 1,183 cases, ninety-nine cases (8.4%) were brought solely against mu-
nicipalities and/or sought only injunctive or declaratory relief.82
TABLE 1.
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CAN BE RAISED, IN FIVE DISTRICTS
S.D. M.D. N.D. N.D. E.D.
TX FL OH CA PA Total




Cases brought against 11 44 20 7 23 105
individual defendants, (8.9%)
seeking damages, but
dismissed by court before
defendants respond
Section 1983 cases in which 106 155 139 219 360 979
QI can be raised by (82.8%)
defendants
Total Section 1983 cases 131 225 172 248 407 1,183
filed
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
In some of these instances, plaintiffs apparently intended to sue individual officers (indicat-
ed by the fact that they named Doe defendants) but were ultimately unable to identify the
officers. When Doe defendants are identified in the complaint and subsequently named, I
count these as cases against individual defendants; when Doe defendants are named but
their true identities are never identified, I count these as cases only against the municipality,
as the Doe defendants could not raise a qualified immunity defense unless they were identi-
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Even when cases are brought against individual officers and seek monetary
relief, there are some cases in which defendants have no need to raise qualified
immunity as a defense -cases dismissed sua sponte by the court before the de-
fendants respond to the complaint. In these cases, qualified immunity is un-
necessary to protect defendants from discovery and trial. In the five districts in
my docket dataset, 105 (8.9%) complaints naming individual law enforcement
officers and seeking damages were dismissed sua sponte by district courts be-
fore defendants answered or responded. Most often, district courts dismissed
these cases pursuant to their statutory power to review pro se plaintiffs' com-
plaints and dismiss actions they conclude are frivolous or meritless." Other
cases were dismissed by the court at this preliminary stage because the plain-
tiffs never served the defendants or failed to prosecute the case, or because the
court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be-
fore the defendants were served or responded.
Qualified immunity can only protect government officials from discovery
and trial in cases in which government defendants can raise the defense. De-
fendants could not raise qualified immunity in 8.4% of cases in my docket da-
taset because those cases did not name individual defendants and/or seek dam-
ages. Qualified immunity was unnecessary to shield government officials from
discovery or trial in another 8.9% of cases in my dataset because these cases
were dismissed by the district courts before defendants could raise the defense.
Accordingly, defendants could raise a qualified immunity defense in a total of
979 (82.8%) of the 1,183 complaints filed in the five districts during my two-
year study period.
B. Defendants' Choices: The Frequency and Timing of Qualified Immunity
Motions
Qualified immunity can only protect a defendant from the burdens of dis-
covery and trial if she raises the defense in a dispositive motion. Accordingly,
this Section examines the frequency with which defendants raise qualified im-
munity and the stage of litigation at which they raise the defense.84
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012). A total of seventy-one cases were dismissed on these
grounds. Note that district courts could exercise this power based on a belief that the de-
fendants were entitled to qualified immunity. However, none of these § 1915(e) dismissals
referenced or appeared to rely on qualified immunity as a basis for the decision.
84. Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, government defendants may also raise
qualified immunity in their answers. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c) (1). I did not track the frequency
with which government defendants raised qualified immunity in their answers because my
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TABLE 2.
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IS RAISED
District Total cases in which QI could be raised Total cases raising QI
S.D. TX 106 58 (54.7%)
M.D. FL 155 84(54.2%)
N.D. OH 139 66 (47.5%)
N.D. CA 219 74(33.8%)
E.D. PA 360 86 (23.9%)
Total 979 368 (37.6%)
Defendants raised qualified immunity one or more times in 368 (37.6%) of
the 979 cases in which defendants could raise the defense. The frequency with
which defendants raised qualified immunity varied substantially by district.
Defendants in the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida
were most likely to raise the qualified immunity defense; in these districts, de-
fendants brought one or more motions raising qualified immunity in approxi-
mately 54% of the cases in which the defense could be raised. Defendants in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania were least likely to raise the qualified immuni-
ty defense; defendants brought one or more motions raising qualified immuni-
ty in approximately 24% of cases in which the defense could be raised. Defend-
ants in the Northern District of California brought qualified immunity motions
in 33.8% of possible cases, and in the Northern District of Ohio defendants
raised qualified immunity in 47.5% of possible cases.
I also explored the stage(s) of litigation at which qualified immunity was
raised. Of the 368 cases in which qualified immunity was raised at least once,
defendants in ninety-five (25.8%) cases raised qualified immunity only in a
motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants in 229
(62.2%) cases raised qualified immunity only in a motion for summary judg-
ment, and defendants in forty-one (11.1%) cases raised qualified immunity at
both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. Based on my re-
view of motions and opinions available on Bloomberg Law, I can confirm only
three cases in which defendants included qualified immunity in a motion at or
after trial for judgment as a matter of law. My data almost certainly underrepre-
sent the role qualified immunity plays at or after trial, however, as Bloomberg
no instances in which a defense raised in an answer led to dismissal without a separate mo-
tion raising the defense.
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Law does not include oral motions or court decisions issued without a written
opinion."
TABLE 3.
TIMING OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MOTIONS
QI raised QI raised QI raised
QI raised only QI raised only at both at both
at MTD/ only at at/after MTD & SJ & at/
District pleadings SJ trial SJ after trial Total
S.D. TX 15 37 0 6 0 58
(25.9%) (63.8%) (10.3%)
M.D. FL 33 32 0 18 1 84
(39.3%) (38.1%) (21.4%) (1.2%)
N.D. OH 14 49 0 3 0 66
(21.2%) (74.2%) (4.5%)
N.D. CA 11 56 0 6 1 74
(14.9%) (75.7%) (8.1%) (1.4%)
E.D. PA 22 55 1 8 0 86
(25.6%) (64.0%) (1.2%) (9.3%)
Total 95 229 1 41 2 368
(25.8%) (62.2%) (0.3%) (11.1%) (0.5%)
Across the five districts in my study, defendants raised qualified immunity
at summary judgment approximately twice as often as they did at the motion
to dismiss stage. In cases where defendants brought one or more qualified im-
munity motions, defendants in 73.9% of the cases raised qualified immunity at
summary judgment, whereas defendants in 37.0% of the cases raised qualified
immunity in a motion to dismiss. There is, however, regional variation in this
85. Even more difficult to decipher is the role qualified immunity might play in jury delibera-
tions. Although qualified immunity is a question of law, juries may be called upon to resolve
factual disputes relevant to qualified immunity and have been allowed to decide qualified
immunity in some instances. See, e.g., Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2008)
("The issue of qualified immunity is a question of law, but in certain circumstances where
'there remain disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the jury, properly in-
structed, may decide the question."' (citation omitted)); Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 728 (6th
Cir. 2005) (" [A] court can submit to the jury the factual dispute with an appropriate instruc-
tion to find probable cause and qualified immunity if the factual inquiry is answered one
way and to find probable cause and qualified immunity lacking if the inquiry is answered in
another way."). This study does not attempt to measure the frequency with which qualified
immunity is invoked in jury instructions, or the frequency with which juries' decisions are




Henderson et al.: The Criminal Justice System: "George Floyd Bill" & Qualified Immunity
Produced by The Earl Carl Institute for Legal and Social Policy, Inc., Spring 2011
HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FAILS
regard. Defendants in the Middle District of Florida were equally likely to raise
qualified immunity at the pleadings stage and at summary judgment, whereas
in the Northern District of Ohio and the Northern District of California de-
fendants were more than three times more likely to raise qualified immunity at
summary judgment than they were to raise the defense in a motion to dismiss.
Defendants in the Middle District of Florida were also more likely to raise
qualified immunity at more than one stage of litigation -they raised qualified
immunity at multiple stages of litigation in nineteen (22.6%) of the cases in
which they raised the defense. Defendants in the other districts less frequently
raised qualified immunity at multiple stages of litigation; they did so in six
(10.3%) of the cases in which the defense was raised in the Southern District of
Texas, in seven (9.5%) of the cases in which the defense was raised in the
Northern District of California, in eight (9.3%) of the cases in which the de-
fense was raised in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and in three (4.5%) of
the cases in which the defense was raised in the Northern District of Ohio.
I additionally sought to calculate how frequently defendants chose to raise
qualified immunity motions in all the cases in which such motions could be
brought. This calculation is relatively straightforward regarding motions to
dismiss. Defendants could have brought motions to dismiss on qualified im-
munity grounds in any of the 979 cases in which the defense could be raised
and did so in 136 (13.9%) of these cases.
Calculating the number of possible summary judgment motions on quali-
fied immunity grounds is more complicated. Although defendants could bring
a summary judgment motion in any case in which they could offer some evi-
dence in support, defendants generally do not move for summary judgment
without first engaging in at least some formal discovery.8 6 It is difficult to dis-
cern from case dockets to what extent parties have engaged in discovery, but
the dockets do reflect whether a case management order has been issued, which
generally sets the discovery schedule and is the first step of the discovery pro-
cess. If entry of a case management order can serve as an indication that a case
86. I located five cases in my dataset -two from the Southern District of Texas and one each
from the Northern District of California, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Middle Dis-
trict of Florida-in which defendants appear to have moved for summary judgment without
first conducting discovery. See Egan v. Cry. of Del Norte, No. 1:12-cV-o53oo (N.D. Cal. Oct.
11, 2012); Goodarzi v. Hartzog, No. 4:12-cV-02870 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012); Rollerson v.
City of Freeport, No. 4:12-cV-01790 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2012); Kline v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 2:11-cv-04334 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2011); Hill v. Lee Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 2:11-cV-00242
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2011). In two of these cases, Rollerson and Hill, the defendants brought a
motion to dismiss and simultaneously moved for summary judgment in the alternative; the
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has entered discovery, and if one accepts that defendants in cases that have
conducted some discovery could move for summary judgment, then there are
577 cases in my dataset in which defendants could have moved for summary
judgment. Defendants brought summary judgment motions on qualified im-
munity grounds in 272 (47. 1%) of these cases.
I also calculated the total number of qualified immunity motions brought
by defendants. Defendants sometimes raised qualified immunity in multiple
motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions that were resolved by the
court in separate opinions: if, for example, defendants moved to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds, the court granted the motion with leave to
amend, and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendants might
again move to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds." Defendants filed a to-
tal of 440 qualified immunity motions in the 368 cases in which they raised the
defense. Table 4 reflects the stage of litigation at which these 440 motions were
brought and, again, reflects that defendants file significantly more qualified
immunity motions at summary judgment than at the motion to dismiss stage.
Of the 440 qualified immunity motions filed, 154 (35.0%) were filed in a mo-
tion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 283 (64.3%) were
filed at summary judgment.
87. There were a handful of instances in which different defendants contemporaneously filed
separate motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions raising qualified immunity. If
the motions were filed at approximately the same time and were resolved by a single district
court opinion, I coded them as a single motion because I believe it more accurately reflects
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TABLE 4.
TOTAL QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MOTIONS FILED, BY STAGE OF LITIGATION
Total Total QI
MTDs/pleadings Total SJ motions motions Total QI
District raising QI raising QI at/after trial motions
S.D. TX 23 46 0 69
(33.3%) (66.7%)
M.D. FL 59 51 1 111
(53.2%) (45.9%) (0.9%)
N.D. OH 17 54 0 71
(23.9%) (76.1%)
N.D. CA 23 67 1 91
(25.3%) (73.6%) (1.1%)
E.D. PA 32 65 1 98
(32.7%) (66.3%) (1.0%)
Total 154 283 3 440
(35.0%) (64.3%) (0.7%)
TABLE 5.
NUMBER OF OUALIFIED IMMUNITY MOTIONS PER CASE
District Number of motions in which QI was raised Total cases in
which QI could
Zero One Two Three Four Five be raised
S.D. TX 48 48 9 1 0 0 106
(45.3%) (45.3%) (8.5%) (0.9%)
M.D. FL 71 63 17 4 0 0 155
(45.8%) (40.6%) (11.0%) (2.6%)
N.D. OH 73 61 5 0 0 0 139
(52.5%) (43.9%) (3.6%)
N.D. CA 145 61 11 1 0 1 219
(66.2%) (27.9%) (5.0%) (0.5%) (0.5%)
E.D. PA 273 76 11 0 0 0 360
(75.8%) (21.1%) (3.1%)
Total 610 309 53 6 0 1 979
(62.3%) (31.6%) (5.4%) (0.6%) (0.1%)
Table 5 reflects the distribution of these 440 motions among the 368 cases
in which the defense was raised. Table 5 shows that when defendants raise
qualified immunity they usually do so in only one motion, but that defendants
in the Southern District of Texas and Middle District of Florida are more likely
33
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than defendants in the other three districts to file multiple motions raising
qualified immunity.
Finally, I explored how frequently defendants raise other types of defenses
in motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and in summary judg-
ment motions. Qualified immunity is usually one of several arguments defend-
ants make in their motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Indeed, de-
fendants sometimes move to dismiss or for summary judgment without raising
qualified immunity at all.
Of the 979 cases in my docket dataset in which defendants could raise qual-
ified immunity, defendants filed a total of 462 motions to dismiss, and 154
(33.3%) included a qualified immunity argument." Defendants in the Middle
District of Florida were the most likely to raise qualified immunity in motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings -defendants included a qualified
immunity argument in 45.4% of their motions, compared with 39.0% of the
motions filed by defendants in the Southern District of Texas, 32.1% of the mo-
tions filed by defendants in the Northern District of Ohio, 26.2% of the mo-
tions filed by defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 23.5% of
the motions filed by defendants in the Northern District of California. Motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings that did not raise qualified im-
munity argued instead that the complaint did not satisfy plausibility pleading
requirements, concerned a claim that was barred by a criminal conviction, or
otherwise did not state a legally cognizable claim. 9
88. See infra Figure 1. I have included in my count of motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment instances in which the municipality moved to dismiss but the individual defend-
ant(s) did not. One could take issue with this choice, as municipalities are not protected by
qualified immunity. Yet I included these motions in my calculation because they reflect op-
portunities in which the law enforcement defendants moved to dismiss but failed to raise
qualified immunity in the motion.
89. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (setting out the plausibility
pleading standard); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff
seeking damages for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence must have that conviction or
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FIGURE 1.
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Defendants in all five districts were far more likely to include a qualified
immunity argument in their summary judgment motions. Defendants filed 374
motions for summary judgment, and 283 (75.7%) of those motions included an
argument based on qualified immunity. There was some variation among the
districts in this area as well, although the regional variation was less pro-
nounced here than in other aspects of qualified immunity litigation practice.o
go. Qualified immunity was raised in 64.4% of summary judgment motions filed in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, 76.7% of summary judgment motions filed in the Southern District
of Texas, 79.8% of summary judgment motions filed in the Northern District of California,
81.0% of summary judgment motions filed in the Middle District of Florida, and 81.8% of
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C. District Courts' Decisions: The Success Rate of Qualified Immunity Motions
This Section examines how frequently district courts grant motions to dis-
miss and for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. As I have
shown, qualified immunity is almost always raised in conjunction with other
arguments in motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. My focus here is
on the way the district court evaluates the qualified immunity argument.
TABLE 6.
SUCCESS OF MOTIONS RAISING OUALIFIED IMMUNITY
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
QI denied 15 33 27 30 34 139
(21.7%) (29.7%) (38.0%) (33.0%) (34.7%) (31.6%)
QI granted 7 7 6 5 1 26
in part (10.1%) (6.3%) (8.5%) (5.5%) (1.0%) (5.9%)
QI granted 16 18 3 11 5 53
in full (23.2%) (16.2%) (4.2%) (12.1%) (5.1%) (12.0%)
QI in the alterna- 5 12 11 9 13 50
tive/fails 1st step (7.2%) (10.8%) (15.5%) (9.9%) (13.3%) (11.4%)
Grant (not on QI) 7 13 12 13 17 62
(10.1%) (11.7%) (16.9%) (14.3%) (17.3%) (14.1%)
Grant (reasoning 2 2 0 0 5 9
unclear) (2.9%) (1.8%) (5.1%) (2.0%)
GiP (not on QI or 4 6 2 8 6 26
QI in alt.) (5.8%) (5.4%) (2.8%) (8.8%) (6.1%) (5.9%)
Not decided 13 20 10 15 17 75
(18.8%) (18.0%) (14.1%) (16.5%) (17.3%) (17.0%)
Total motions 69 111 71 91 98 440
In the five districts in my docket dataset, defendants raised qualified im-
munity in a total of 440 motions. Table 6 reflects the way in which district
courts resolved those motions.91 Across the five districts in my study, qualified
91. I have coded decisions in a way that focuses on the role of qualified immunity in the deci-
sion. If a defendant's motion raises multiple arguments and qualified immunity is granted
but all other bases for the motion are denied, I coded that decision as granted on qualified
immunity grounds. Conversely, if a defendant's motion raises multiple arguments and qual-
ified immunity is denied and all other bases for the motion are granted, I coded that decision
as denied on qualified immunity. Included in the "QI granted in part" row are decisions in
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immunity motions were denied 31.6% of the time.92 Qualified immunity mo-
tions in these five districts were granted in part-on some claims or defendants
but not others-5.9% of the time and granted in full on qualified immunity
grounds 12.0% of the time. In another 11.4% of the decisions, courts concluded
that the plaintiff had not met her burden of establishing a constitutional viola-
tion and either declined to reach the second step of the qualified immunity
analysis (whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the law was
clearly established) or granted qualified immunity in the alternative.9' Courts
in 14.1% of the decisions granted defendants' motions on other grounds with-
out addressing qualified immunity, and in another 2.0% of the decisions the
courts offered little or no rationale. Courts in 5.9% of the decisions granted the
motion in part without mentioning qualified immunity, or on qualified im-
munity in the alternative. And district courts in my study did not decide 17.0%
of the motions raising qualified immunity, usually because the cases settled or
were voluntarily dismissed while the motions were pending.
There was substantial variation in courts' decisions across the districts in
my study. The Southern District of Texas had the lowest rate of qualified im-
munity denials (21.7%). In the remaining four districts, judges denied 30-38%
of defendants' qualified immunity motions. The Southern District of Texas al-
so had the highest rate of qualified immunity grants: courts in the Southern
District of Texas granted 33.3% of defendants' qualified immunity motions in
part or full on qualified immunity grounds. In contrast, courts in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted only 6.1% of the qualified immunity motions
in whole or part on qualified immunity grounds.9 4
were awarded qualified immunity but qualified immunity was denied for some defendants
or claims.
92. This finding is consistent with findings in other qualified immunity studies described supra
note lo, even though there are significant differences in our datasets and the manner in
which we coded decisions.
93. If a court did not specify which step of the qualified immunity analysis was dispositive, or
concluded that the law was not clearly established without resolving whether a constitution-
al violation occurred, I coded these decisions as grants or partial grants on qualified im-
munity grounds. These decisions are reflected in rows two and three of Tables 6-8.
94. The differences in the frequency with which motions are granted or granted in part on qual-
ified immunity grounds (rows two and three in Table 6) across the five districts are statisti-
cally significant (X2 = 23.32, p<.ooi). But the differences in the frequency with which quali-
fied immunity is denied (row one in Table 6) across the five districts are not statistically
significant (X2 = 5.15, p=.27). The differences in the frequency with which motions are
granted in the alternative or granted in part on grounds other than qualified immunity
(rows four, five, six, and seven in Table 6) across the five districts are also not statistically
significant (X2 = 5-58, p=.23).
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TABLE 7.
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TABLE 8.
RULINGS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS THAT RAISED QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
QI denied 9 15 23 23 21 91
(19.6%) (29.4%) (42.6%) (34.3%) (32.3%) (32.2%)
QI granted 5 5 5 3 1 19
in part (10.9%) (9.8%) (9.3%) (4.5%) (1.5%) (6.7%)
QI granted 12 13 3 9 2 39
(26.1%) (25.5%) (5.6%) (13.4%) (3.1%) (13.8%)
QI in the alterna- 4 9 7 8 11 39
tive/fails 1st step (8.7%) (17.6%) (13.0%) (11.9%) (16.9%) (13.8%)
Grant (not on QI) 4 2 10 7 13 36
(8.7%) (3.9%) (18.5%) (10.4%) (20.0%) (12.7%)
Grant (reasoning 2 0 0 0 1 3
unclear) (4.3%) (1.5%) (1.1%)
GiP (not on QI or 2 0 0 5 3 10
QI in alt.) (4.3%) (7.5%) (4.6%) (3.5%)
Not decided 8 7 6 12 13 46
(17.4%) (13.7%) (11.1%) (17.9%) (20.0%) (16.3%)
Total motions 46 51 54 67 65 283
I additionally evaluated differences in courts' decisions at the motion to
dismiss and summary judgment stages." Of the 154 motions to dismiss and
motions for judgment on the pleadings raising qualified immunity, courts
granted seventy-nine (51.3%) of the motions in whole or part. Twenty-one
(26.6%) of those seventy-nine full or partial grants were decided on qualified
immunity grounds. Of the 283 summary judgment motions raising qualified
immunity, courts granted 146 (51.6%) in whole or part. Fifty-eight (39.7%) of
those 146 full or partial grants were decided on qualified immunity grounds. In
other words, although courts were equally likely to grant summary judgment
motions and motions to dismiss, courts were more likely to grant summary
judgment motions on qualified immunity grounds than they were to grant mo-
tions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. But courts more often than
not granted both types of motions on grounds other than qualified immunity.
39
95. See supra Tables 7 & 8. Because the three qualified immunity motions raised at or after trial
are not included in these tables, there are a total of 437 motions included in these two ta-
bles - three fewer than the 440 motions included in Table 6.
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D. Circuit Courts' Decisions: The Frequency and Success of Qualified Immunity
Appeals
A complete examination of the role qualified immunity plays in constitu-
tional litigation must examine the frequency and outcome of qualified immuni-
ty appeals. Defendants can appeal denials of qualified immunity immediately,
and any qualified immunity decision can be appealed after a final judgment in
the case.96
TABLE 9.
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DENIALS
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
Affirmed 3 3 7 2 0 15 (36.6%)
Reversed 0 3 1 0 1 5 (12.2%)
Reversed in part 0 0 2 1 0 3 (7.3%)
Dismissed for lack 0 1 0 0 1(2.4%)
of jurisdiction
Withdrawn 2 3 6 5 0 16 (39.0%)
Pending 0 0 0 1 0 1 (2.4%)
Total interlocu- 5 9 17 9 1 41
tory appeals
Defendants immediately appealed 41 of the 189 qualified immunity deci-
sions in my docket dataset that were denied or granted in part and thus could
have been appealed at this stage of the litigation -an interlocutory appeal rate
of 21.7%. Across the five districts in my dataset, more than one-third of the
lower courts' decisions were affirmed on interlocutory appeal, 12.2% were re-
versed in whole, 7.3% were reversed in part, and 39.0% were withdrawn by the
parties without a decision by the court of appeals.
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TABLE 10.
FINAL APPEALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GRANTS
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
Affirmed 7 5 3 1 1 17
(65.4%)
Reversed 0 0 1 1 0 2
(7.7%)
Affirmed in part 0 0 0 0 0 0
Withdrawn/ 3 4 0 0 0 7
dismissed (26.9%)
without decision
Pending 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total appeals by 10 9 4 2 1 26
plaintiff(s)
I also tracked the frequency with which plaintiffs appealed qualified im-
munity grants after a final judgment in the case.7 Plaintiffs appealed twenty-
six (32.9%) of the seventy-nine decisions granting defendants' motions on
qualified immunity grounds in whole or part.98 Lower court decisions granting
qualified immunity were affirmed 65.4% of the time and reversed 7.7% of the
time. Almost 27% of the appeals were withdrawn without a decision.
E. The Impact of Qualified Immunity on Case Dispositions
A final question concerns the frequency with which a grant of qualified
immunity results in the dismissal of Section 1983 cases. There are multiple
ways to frame this inquiry. First, there is the question of which cases should be
counted in the numerator - cases dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. I
have included qualified immunity grants in this category unless the court end-
ed its qualified immunity analysis after concluding that the plaintiff could not
establish a constitutional violation, or granted the motion on qualified im-
munity in the alternative. Although the question of whether a constitutional
violation occurred is the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, the court
97. There was one case in the docket dataset in which a defendant appealed a qualified immuni-
ty decision at the end of the case. The jury verdict in the case was affirmed with no mention
of qualified immunity. See Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.3d 161 (6th Cit. 2014).
98. I have not tracked appeals of motions granted on qualified immunity in the alternative,
granted in whole or in part on other grounds, or granted based on unclear reasoning.
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would also need to resolve this question in the absence of qualified immunity.
And although a court's decision to grant qualified immunity in the alternative
may influence its dispositive holding in some manner, the qualified immunity
decision was not necessary to resolve the case."
In addition, I have counted a case as dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds only if the entire case has been dismissed as a result of the motion.
One might assume that a grant of qualified immunity will always end a case.
Yet there are multiple scenarios in which a case can continue after a grant of
qualified immunity. At the pleadings stage, a court may grant a motion to dis-
miss on qualified immunity but also grant the plaintiff an opportunity to
amend her complaint.00 Not all defendants in a case will necessarily move to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds,10 1 or a defendant may seek qualified
immunity regarding some but not all claims against him.102 State law claims
may also remain for which qualified immunity is not available, and these claims
may proceed in federal court or be remanded to and pursued in state court.o
99. If I included these cases in my count, the total number of cases dismissed on qualified im-
munity grounds would increase from thirty-eight to seventy-one: a total of fifteen cases in
the Southern District of Texas, twenty-three cases in the Middle District of Florida, twelve
cases in the Northern District of Ohio, eight cases in the Northern District of California, and
thirteen cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. This amounts to 7.3% of all cases in
which qualified immunity could be raised, and 6.o% of all the cases in my dataset.
ioo. See, e.g., Daleo v. Polk Cty. Sheriff, No. 8:11-cV-2521 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7,2011).
101. See, e.g., Tarantino v. Canfield, No. 5:12-cV-0434 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2012); Roberts v. Inight,
No. 4:12-cV-1174 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2012); Brivik v. Law, No. 8:11-cV-21o1 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
15, 2011); Terrell v. City of La Marque, No. 3:11-cV-0229 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2011).
102. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lake City, No. 3:11-cV-1210 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011); Snowden v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 2:11-cv-5041 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2011); Castillo v. City of Corpus
Christi, No. 2:11-cv-oo93 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2011); Kelley v. Papanos, No. 4:11-cv-o626 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 22, 2011).
103. See, e.g., McKay v. City of Hayward, No. 3:12-cV-1613 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012); Stephenson
v. McClelland, No. 4:11-cV-2243 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2011). There are eight cases in my da-
taset-six in the Middle District of Florida, one in the Northern District of Ohio, and one in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania -in which the federal claims were dismissed on quali-
fied immunity grounds and the state law claims were remanded to state court. I have sought
information about whether plaintiffs continued to litigate these claims in state court by con-
tacting the plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases. Attorneys in two cases confirmed that they
pursued the state claims in state court, and both cases resulted in settlements in state court.
See E-mail from Nicholas Noel, attorney for plaintiffs in O'Neill v. Kerrigan, No. 5:11-cv-3437
(E.D. Pa. June 5, 2011), to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:18 PM) (on file with author) (confirming
that the case was refiled in state court and settled after the federal claims were dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds); E-mail from Jerry Theophilopoulos, attorney for plaintiffs in
Merricks v. Adkisson, No. 8:12-cV-1805 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2012), to author (Mar. 13, 2017,
6:5o AM) (on file with author) (confirming that plaintiff refiled the case in state court after




Henderson et al.: The Criminal Justice System: "George Floyd Bill" & Qualified Immunity
Produced by The Earl Carl Institute for Legal and Social Policy, Inc., Spring 2011
HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FAILS
In addition, municipalities cannot assert qualified immunity; accordingly, if
there is a municipality named in the case at the time qualified immunity is
granted, the case will continue.104 Under each of these circumstances, govern-
ment officials still face the possibility that they will be required to participate in
discovery and trial as defendants, representatives of the defendants' agency,
and/or witnesses to the events in question."as
TABLE 11.
IMPACT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, BY STAGE OF LITIGATION
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA Total
Motions raising QI 23 59 17 23 32 154
on the pleadings
Total QI grants on 4 5 0 2 3 14
the pleadings
Case dismissals on
QI at the pleadings 3 3 0 0 1 7
Motions raisil Q
at Summary,1-N 46 51 54 67 65 283
Total Qlgratsat 0 3 3 2 3
Case dismissalsoi 3 3 2 27
QI at SJ
Total Q1appeals by 5 9 17 9 1 41
Ds
Total reversals 0 3 1 0 1 5
Case dismissals 0 2 1 0 1 4
from appeal
at mediation for $30,000). Attorneys in two cases confirmed that the cases were not refiled
in state court. See E-mail from Cynthia Conlin, attorney for plaintiffs in Olin v. Orange Cty.
Sheriff No. 6:12-cV-1455 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2012), to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:31 AM) (on
file with author) (reporting that plaintiff did not pursue state law claims in state court after
federal claims were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds); E-mail from W Cort
Frohlich, attorney for plaintiffs in Spann v. Verdoni, No. 8:11-cv-o707 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4,
2011), to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:15 AM) (on file with author) (reporting that the state
claims were not refiled in state court after summary judgment was granted on the federal
claims). I sought but did not receive information about the other four cases.
104. See, e.g., McKay, No. 3:12-cv-1613; Porter v. City of Santa Rosa, No. 3:11-cv-4886 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2011); Terrell, No. 3:11-cv-0229.
105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing the Court's concerns about burdens on
government officials who are not named defendants).
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As Table 11 shows, there are fifty-three motions in my dataset that district
courts granted in full on qualified immunity grounds -fourteen at the plead-
ings stage and thirty-nine at summary judgment. Of those fifty-three motions,
thirty-four (64.2%) were dispositive, meaning that the cases were dismissed as
a result of the qualified immunity decision. Half of qualified immunity grants
at the pleadings stage led to case dismissals, and 69.2% of qualified immunity
grants at summary judgment led to case dismissals. Defendants brought forty-
one interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, and courts of appeals
reversed five (12.2%) of those decisions. All five reversals were of summary
judgment decisions, and four of the five resulted in case dismissals. In total,
qualified immunity led to dismissal of thirty-eight cases in my dataset.
The next question, when thinking about the impact of qualified immunity
on case disposition, is how to frame the denominator - the universe of cases
against which to measure the cases dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
It is my view that the broadest definition of the denominator - all 1,183 Section
1983 cases filed against law enforcement-offers the most accurate picture of
the role qualified immunity plays in Section 1983 litigation. Yet, as I will show,
there are at least three ways to frame the denominator, and each answers a
different question about the extent to which qualified immunity achieves its in-
tended goals.
One way to think about the impact of qualified immunity is to consider the
frequency with which a defendant's motion to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings, for summary judgment, or for judgment as a matter of law on qual-
ified immunity grounds actually leads to the dismissal of a case -whether be-
cause the motion is granted or because the motion is denied by the district
court but reversed on appeal. Presumably, a defendant will only bring a quali-
fied immunity motion when two conditions are met: he has a non-frivolous
basis for the motion, and he believes that the costs of bringing the motion are
justified by the likelihood of success or some other benefit associated with the
motion. Accordingly, this framework assesses the frequency with which quali-
fied immunity results in the dismissal of cases in which both these things are
true.
Defendants brought 440 qualified immunity motions in a total of 368 cases
in the five districts in my study: defendants raised qualified immunity in 154
motions to dismiss and raised qualified immunity in 283 summary judgment
motions. Courts granted 9.1% of the motions to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds, and 4.5% of the motions resulted in case dismissals. Courts granted
13.8% of the summary judgment motions on qualified immunity grounds, and
9.5% of the motions resulted in case dismissals. Defendants brought forty-one
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five (12.2%) of those decisions, and four of the five were dismissed as a result.
In total, thirty-eight (8.6%) of the 440 qualified immunity motions raised by
defendants in my dataset resulted in case dismissals, and 10.3% of the 368 cases
in which qualified immunity was raised were dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds.
Another way to assess the impact of qualified immunity on case outcomes is
to examine what percentage of the 979 cases in my dataset in which qualified
immunity could be raised were in fact dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds. One objection to this framing might be that it includes cases that de-
fendants declined to challenge on qualified immunity grounds. But qualified
immunity motions would not necessarily have failed in these cases; rather, de-
fendants in these cases concluded that the costs of raising the defense were not
justified by the likelihood of success or other benefits of bringing the motions.
Moreover, this broader framework illustrates the frequency with which quali-
fied immunity doctrine serves its intended and expected role of shielding gov-
ernment officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial. Evaluated
in this manner, qualified immunity is less frequently successful. Qualified im-
munity was the basis for dismissal in 3.9% of the 979 cases in which the de-
fense could be raised: just seven (0.7%) of cases were dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, and thirty-one (3.2%) of
cases were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at summary judgment -
either by the district court or on appeal.
Indeed, to evaluate fully the role that qualified immunity plays in the reso-
lution of constitutional claims against law enforcement, the most appropriate
denominator is the complete universe of 1,183 cases in my dataset. This ap-
proach includes cases that could not be resolved on qualified immunity
grounds -because the cases were either brought only against municipalities or
sought only equitable relief. But to the extent that the Court views qualified
immunity doctrine as a shield for all government officials - not only defend-
ants -from burdens associated with discovery and trial, a thorough assessment
of qualified immunity's role should take account of all the cases in which gov-
ernment officials must participate. Qualified immunity was the basis for dis-
missal in 3.2% of the 1,183 cases in my dataset: o.6% of cases were dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, and 2.6% of cases
were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at summary judgment -either
by the district court or on appeal. 106
io6. These findings are consistent with another study that used dockets to track case outcomes in
Bivens actions. See Reinert, supra note II, at 843 (finding qualified immunity to be "the basis
for a dismissal in only 5 out of the 244 complaints studied").
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My data show that qualified immunity is rarely the formal reason that Sec-
tion 1983 cases are dismissed. How, then, are Section 1983 suits against law en-
forcement resolved? Table 12 reports case outcomes for the 1,183 cases in the
five districts in my study.
TABLE 12.
CASE DISPOSITIONS
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Motion to dismiss granted
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If one adopts the standard definition of plaintiff "success" to include jury
verdicts, settlements, and voluntary or stipulated dismissals, the plaintiffs in
my dataset succeeded in 682 (57.7%) cases.107 This success rate is similar to the
results of Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab's studies of non-prisoner
Section 1983 cases.10 s The remaining 42.3% of cases resolved in various ways:
256 (21.6%) were dismissed on motions to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings, at summary judgment, or at or after trial on grounds other than
qualified immunity; 173 (14.6%) were dismissed sua sponte before defendants
answered, dismissed as a sanction, or dismissed for failure to prosecute; and
thirty-seven (3.1%) were dismissed for other reasons or remain open. Thirty-
eight (3.2%) were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
My data do not capture how frequently qualified immunity influences
plaintiffs' decisions to settle, or how frequently cases are decided on qualified
immunity grounds even though other defenses are available. Instead, my data
reflect the frequency with which a grant of qualified immunity formally ends a
case. There is, once again, marked regional variation in the frequency with
which qualified immunity leads to the dismissal of Section 1983 actions.109 But
despite this regional variation, grants of qualified immunity motions infre-
quently end Section 1983 suits before discovery, and are infrequently the reason
suits are dismissed before trial.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
My findings undermine prevailing assumptions about the role qualified
immunity plays in the litigation of Section 1983 claims. Accordingly, in this
Part I consider the implications of my findings for ongoing discussions about
the proper scope of qualified immunity in relation to its underlying purposes.
First, I revisit empirical claims implicit in the Supreme Court's qualified im-
107. See id. at 812-13 n.13 (describing the common definition of plaintiff "success" in similar stud-
ies). Even those who adopt this standard definition recognize that it is likely over-
inclusive -at least some of these cases are settled or withdrawn on terms unfavorable to the
plaintiff See id. Note that I am including the three split verdicts in my count of plaintiff suc-
cesses.
108. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influ-
ence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 730
(1988) (finding that "[n]onprisoner constitutional tort cases succeed[ed] about half the
time" in their study of filings in three districts); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 682 (1987) (finding that
" [t] he success rate for counseled cases (which eliminates nearly all prisoner cases) is about
one-half" in their study of the Central District of California).
iog. See supra Table 12; see also infra text accompanying note 115 (describing this variation).
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munity decisions in light of my findings. Next, I consider why qualified im-
munity disposes of so few cases before trial. Armed with this more realistic ap-
praisal of qualified immunity's role, I argue that the Court has struck the
wrong balance between fairness and accountability for law enforcement offic-
ers. Finally, I suggest that qualified immunity doctrine should be adjusted to
comport with available evidence about the role the doctrine plays in constitu-
tional litigation.
A. Toward a More Accurate Description of Qualified Immunity's Role in
Constitutional Litigation
The Court's qualified immunity decisions paint a clear picture of the ways
in which the Court believes the doctrine should operate: it should be raised and
decided at the earliest possible stage of the litigation (at the motion to dismiss
stage if possible), it should be strong (protecting all but the plainly incompe-
tent or those who knowingly violate the law), and it should, therefore, protect
defendants from the time and distractions associated with discovery and trial in
insubstantial cases. Commentators similarly believe that qualified immunity is
often raised by defendants, usually granted by courts, and causes many cases to
be dismissed.10
My study shows that, at least in filed cases, qualified immunity rarely func-
tions as expected. Defendants could not or did not need to raise qualified im-
munity in 17.3% of the 1,183 cases in my docket dataset, either because the cases
did not name individual defendants or seek monetary damages, or because the
cases were dismissed sua sponte by the court before the defendants had an op-
portunity to answer. Defendants raised qualified immunity in motions to dis-
miss and motions for judgment on the pleadings in only 13.9% of the cases in
which the defense could be raised."' Courts granted those motions on quali-
fied immunity grounds 9.1% of the time, but those grants were not always dis-
positive because additional claims or defendants remained, or because plaintiffs
were given the opportunity to amend. As a result, just seven of the 1,183 cases
in my docket dataset were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage on qualified
immunity grounds.
Qualified immunity more often prevented cases from proceeding past
summary judgment. Defendants were more likely to include qualified immuni-
11o. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
iii. There was a total of 979 cases in which qualified immunity could be raised, and defendants
raised motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings on qualified immunity grounds
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ty in motions for summary judgment than in motions to dismiss, and courts
were more likely to grant summary judgment motions than motions to dismiss
on qualified immunity grounds.112 Moreover, courts of appeals reversed five
denials of summary judgment motions on interlocutory appeal and granted
qualified immunity in these cases. Yet qualified immunity motions at the sum-
mary judgment stage rarely shield government officials from discovery because
most summary judgment motions require at least some depositions or docu-
ment exchange." And grants of qualified immunity at summary judgment rel-
atively rarely achieved their goal of protecting government officials from trial -
such decisions by the district courts or courts of appeals disposed of plaintiffs'
cases just thirty-one times across the five districts in my study, amounting to
just 2.6% of the 1,183 cases in my dataset.
Qualified immunity is likely raised more often at or after trial than my data
suggest. But even if many more qualified immunity motions are made during
or after trial, and even if qualified immunity regularly convinces judges and ju-
ries to enter defense verdicts, qualified immunity would still fail to serve its ex-
pected role. Qualified immunity doctrine is intended to shield government offi-
cials from burdens associated with litigation and trial. A grant of qualified
immunity entered during or after trial has come too late to shield government
officials from these assumed burdens.
My data demonstrate considerable regional differences in the litigation and
adjudication of qualified immunity across the country. Scholars have observed
that the federal circuits interpret qualified immunity standards differently.114
112. See supra Table 4 (showing that 64.3% of qualified immunity motions were made at sum-
mary judgment); supra Table 8 (showing that 13.8% of qualified immunity motions made at
summary judgment were granted).
113. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
114. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 913, 925 (2015) ("One has to look hard to find some doctrinal consistency or
predictability in the case law and the circuits are hopelessly conflicted both within and
among themselves." (footnotes omitted)); Jeffries, supra note 6, at 852 ("[D]etermining
whether an officer violated 'clearly established' law has proved to be a mare's nest of com-
plexity and confusion. The circuits vary widely in approach, which is not surprising given
the conflicting signals from the Supreme Court"); Jeffries, supra note 61, at 250 n.151
("There is considerable variation among the circuits. The Ninth Circuit often construes
qualified immunity to favor plaintiffs and is often reversed for that reason. The Eleventh
Circuit leans so far in the other direction that it has been called the land of 'unqualified im-
munity."' (citations omitted)); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified
Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2015) (finding circuit variation in the frequency with
which the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits courts exercise their discretion under Pearson to
decide whether a constitutional violation occurred); Wilson, supra note 61, at 447-48 (de-
scribing variation in the ways circuit courts analyze whether the law is clearly established).
49
120
The Bridge: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Legal & Social Policy, Vol. 6 [2021], Art. 2
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/thebridge/vol6/iss1/2
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
My findings suggest that regional differences in qualified immunity doctrine
affect the decisions of courts and litigants. Defendants in the Southern District
of Texas and the Middle District of Florida were more likely to raise qualified
immunity than defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
Northern District of California; courts in the Southern District of Texas and
the Middle District of Florida were more likely to grant defendants' qualified
immunity motions than were judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Northern District of California; and grants of qualified immunity end-
ed more cases in the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Flor-
ida than in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of
California. But even in the Southern District of Texas-the district in my da-
taset most likely to dismiss cases on qualified immunity grounds-just 2.3% of
all suits were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the motion to dis-
miss stage, and 6.9% of all suits were dismissed at summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds." Unless the vast majority of law enforcement
officer defendants in the Southern District of Texas are "plainly incompetent"
or have "knowingly violate [d] the law,"'1 16 qualified immunity is not playing its
expected role even in the district in my dataset most sympathetic to the de-
fense.
Although qualified immunity is rarely the reason that Section 1983 cases
end, there are other ways in which qualified immunity doctrine might influ-
ence the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforcement. For exam-
ple, qualified immunity may discourage people from ever filing suit. Available
evidence suggests that just 1% of people who believe they have been harmed by
the police file lawsuits against law enforcement."' We do not know how fre-
quently qualified immunity doctrine plays a role in the decision not to sue. But
available evidence suggests that qualified immunity often factors into plaintiffs'
attorneys' decisions about whether to accept potential clients. When Alexander
Reinert interviewed plaintiffs' attorneys about qualified immunity in Bivens
cases, attorneys reported that "the qualified immunity defense play[s] a sub-
stantial role at the screening stage."" Attorneys described being discouraged
from accepting civil rights cases both because qualified immunity motions can
be difficult to defeat and because the costs and delays associated with litigating
qualified immunity can make the cases too burdensome to pursue."9 But at-
115. See supra Table 12.
uS. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
117. See Schwartz, What Police Learn, supra note 71, at 863.
11s. Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAs L.J. 477, 492 (2011).
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torneys also described qualified immunity as one of many factors they consid-
ered when deciding whether to accept a case, and we do not know how attor-
neys weigh these different considerations.12 0
Even when cases are filed, qualified immunity may influence litigation deci-
sions in ways that are not easily observable through docket review. For exam-
ple, it may be that a pending qualified immunity motion will cause a plaintiff to
settle her claims. Consistent with this theory, seventy-five (17.0%) of the qual-
ified immunity motions in my dataset were never decided, presumably because
the parties settled while the motions were pending.121 Of the sixty-seven quali-
fied immunity interlocutory and final appeals in my dataset, twenty-three
(34.3%) were withdrawn or dismissed without decision, which suggests that
many of those cases settled while on appeal.122 When the Supreme Court has
described the ways in which it expects qualified immunity to shield govern-
ment officials from discovery and trial, it has never suggested that the doctrine
might serve this function by discouraging people from filing lawsuits or pursu-
ing their claims. But these are certainly ways in which qualified immunity
could achieve this goal.
A complete understanding of the frequency with which qualified immunity
protects government officials from discovery and trial would measure these
other potential litigation effects. For the time being, available evidence suggests
that qualified immunity may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to secure rep-
resentation and may encourage plaintiffs to settle, but it is infrequently the
formal reason that cases end.
B. Why Qualified Immunity Disposes of So Few Cases
The Supreme Court designed qualified immunity to protect "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."123 Why, then,
does it lead to the dismissal of so few cases? One possibility is that qualified
immunity doctrine discourages people from filing cases that are unlikely to
meet qualified immunity's exacting standard.124 But even if qualified immunity
120. Id.
121. See supra Table 6.
122. See supra Tables 9 & lo.
123. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
124. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text. For further discussion of selection effects, see
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1965 (2009);
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has this selection effect, plaintiffs would continue to file cases in which quali-
fied immunity motions might be successful. Consistent with this theory, de-
fendants raised qualified immunity in more than one-third of the Section 1983
cases in which the defense could be asserted, and courts granted 51.4% of mo-
tions raising qualified immunity in full or part.125 Yet most of these motions to
dismiss and summary judgment motions raised multiple arguments, and
courts only granted 17.9% of these motions in part or whole on qualified im-
munity grounds. Ultimately, qualified immunity resulted in the dismissal of
only 3.9% of the cases in which the defense could be raised. Although the
threat of qualified immunity may cause some people not to sue, this selection
effect does not explain why qualified immunity plays such a limited role in the
resolution of motions raising qualified immunity and in the disposition of cases
that are filed.
The Supreme Court's decisions suggest another theory that could partially
explain why qualified immunity disposes of few cases: because courts improp-
erly deny defendants' qualified immunity motions. For this reason, and be-
cause of the "importance of qualified immunity 'to society as a whole,"' the Su-
preme Court has taken the unusual step of "often correct[ing] lower courts
when they wrongly subject individual officers to liability."126 Yet qualified im-
munity grant rates are lower than expected even in the circuits generally be-
lieved to be the most amenable to qualified immunity: 33.3% of motions raising
qualified immunity were granted in whole or part on qualified immunity
grounds in the Southern District of Texas, and 22.5% of motions raising quali-
fied immunity were granted in whole or part on qualified immunity grounds in
the Middle District of Florida.127 Moreover, only 9.2% of cases from the South-
ern District of Texas and 6.7% of cases from the Middle District of Florida were
actually dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Unless one believes that the
Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida, as well as the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, are regularly flouting the letter and spirit of the
Supreme Court's qualified immunity doctrine, error in the lower courts is an
unconvincing - or at least incomplete - explanation for these findings.
My data suggest two additional explanations for why qualified immunity
disposes of so few cases: the doctrine is not well suited to dismiss many claims
before trial, and qualified immunity is often unnecessary to serve its intended
role.
125. See supra Table 6.
126. City & Cry. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n-3 (2015) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
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1. Qualified Immunity Is Ill Suited To Dispose of Cases
Qualified immunity motions are infrequently dispositive in part because
the doctrine is ill suited to dispose of many cases before trial. Although quali-
fied immunity doctrine creates a seemingly insurmountable barrier for plain-
tiffs, the standards for review at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment
stages may prevent courts from granting defendants' motions. At the motion to
dismiss stage, a defendant's qualified immunity motion should be denied so
long as the plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of a clearly established
right. As one district judge from the Middle District of Tennessee observed,
The rationale for the existence of qualified immunity is to avoid impos-
ing needless discovery costs upon government officials, so determining
whether the immunity applies must be made at an early stage in the lit-
igation. At the same time, the determination of qualified immunity is
usually dependent on the facts of the case, and, at the pleadings stage of
the litigation, there is scant factual record available to the court. Since
plaintiffs are not required to anticipate a qualified immunity defense in
their pleadings, and since at this stage of the litigation the exact con-
tours of the right at issue - and thus the degree to which it is clearly es-
tablished-are unclear, the Sixth Circuit advises that qualified immuni-
ty should usually be determined pursuant to a summary judgment
motion rather than a motion to dismiss.12 8
This is a common refrain in circuit courts across the country1 29 and decisions in
my dataset. ̀0
128. Turner v. Weikal, No. 3:12-cV-0915, 2013 WL 3272481, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. June 27, 2013) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2015); Owens v. Balt. City State's
Attorneys' Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396 ( 4th Cir. 2014); Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App'x 788,
791 n-3 (3d Cir. 2009); Field Day, LLC v. Cry. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191-92 (2d Cir. 20o6);
St. George v. Pinellas Cry., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002); Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d
648, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2001); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1976).
130. See, e.g., Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Dudley v. Borough of Upland, No. 2:12-
cv-5651 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2013), ECF No. 33 ("Without discovery, I cannot determine
whether the Officers acted reasonably. For instance, it is unclear what the Officers knew
about the warrant when they arrested Plaintiff and whether the warrant bore an expiration
date. Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it may have been
objectively unreasonable that the Officers failed to look into the validity of a 2 12-year-old
warrant. Accordingly, I cannot yet determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified
immunity." (citation omitted)); Report and Recommendation at is, Coldwater v. City of
Clute, No. 3:12-cV-0028 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 41 ("Accepting the allegations in
53
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District courts also find that factual disputes prevent resolution on qualified
immunity grounds at summary judgment. Alan Chen has argued that the Su-
preme Court's qualified immunity decisions "have embedded a central paradox
into the doctrine": although the Court repeatedly writes that "qualified im-
munity claims can and should be resolved at the earliest stages of litigation," it
ignores the fact that these determinations "inherently entail nuanced, fact-
sensitive, case-by-case determinations involving the application of general legal
principles to a particular context.""' My data offer anecdotal evidence to sup-
port Chen's observation. In the five districts in my study, courts repeatedly
found that factual disputes prevented summary judgment on qualified immun-
ity grounds.13 2 In these decisions, courts duly recited the benefits of resolving
her Amended Complaint as true, the Court cannot conclude, at least at this juncture in the
litigation, that the conduct of these Defendants was objectively reasonable in the light of
then clearly established law."); Pippin v. Kirkland, No. 8:12-cv-0776, 2012 WL 12903175, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2012) ("[A]ccepting all factual allegations in the Complaint as true, it is
not possible to determine whether Defendant Kirkland is entitled to qualified immunity.");
Mantell v. Health Prof'ls Ltd., 5:11-cV-1034, 2012 WL 28469, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2012)
(" [T]he Court takes no stance on whether discovery will ultimately support these allega-
tions against any of the moving defendants and the issues may appropriately be revisited
during summary judgment practice in this matter. However, for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss, the complaint properly pleads deliberate indifference and precludes a finding of
qualified immunity at this time."); Nishi v. Cty. of Marin, No. 4:11-cv-0438, 2011 WL
1807043, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (" [R]esolution of the qualified immunity defense
frequently raises issues of fact that are more appropriately determined at a later stage. While
such a defense may thus very well prove viable at a future stage of these proceedings, it does
not present an adequate basis for dismissal here.").
131. Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 230 (20o6); see also
Jeffries, supra note 61, at 252-53.
132. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Reading, 118 F. Supp. 3d 751, 765-67 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ("[A]s the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently observed in a case involving a claim of exces-
sive force that arose out of the use of a Taser, 'if there are facts material to the determination
of reasonableness in dispute, then that issue of fact should be decided by the jury.' . . . Thus,
affording Defendant Errington qualified immunity at this time is inappropriate in light of
the genuine dispute between the parties of the facts bearing on his entitlement to immuni-
ty." (quoting Geist v. Ammary, 617 F. App'x 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2015))); Hayes v. City of Tam-
pa, No. 8:12-cv-2o38, 2014 WL 4954695, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2014) ("[C]onstruing the
record as a whole in favor of Hayes, whether Hayes's 'stance, demeanor and facial expres-
sion' justified Miller's use of a taser is a genuine issue of material fact."); McKissic v. Miller,
37 F. Supp. 3d 907, 918 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (" [W]hen the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff and
supported by some evidentiary materials, are taken to be true, there remains a question of
fact as to whether Officer Miller's actions constituted excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution."); Bui v. City of San Francisco, 61 F. Supp. 3d
877, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (" [B]ased on the evidence presented by both sides ... the court
cannot decide as a matter of law whether it would have been 'clear to a reasonable officer
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qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage and qualified immunity's in-
tended role as protection from discovery and trial. Yet the same courts found
that factual disputes made summary judgment inappropriate.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in White v. Pauly provides additional
anecdotal evidence of this underappreciated phenomenon. In White v. Pauly,
the Supreme Court held that it would be appropriate to grant summary judg-
ment on qualified immunity grounds to an officer who shot and killed a sus-
pect without first identifying himself and ordering the suspect o drop his gun,
because " [n]o settled Fourth Amendment principle requires that officer to sec-
ond-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instanc-
es like the one [the defendant] confronted here."' The decision has been de-
scribed as evidence that the Supreme Court "wants fewer lawsuits against
police to go forward."134 This may well be true. Yet the decision in White v.
Pauly did not end Daniel Pauly's lawsuit; as Justice Ginsburg notes in her con-
currence, the Court's decision "leaves open the propriety of denying summary
judgment" based on various factual disputes about the officer's conduct."'
Plaintiffs' decisions about how to frame their cases also make qualified im-
munity ill suited to dispose of many cases. Defendants could not raise a quali-
fied immunity defense in 8.4% of the cases in my study because the plaintiffs
did not sue an individual officer for money damages.13 6 Even in cases in which
defendants could raise qualified immunity, plaintiffs' other pleading decisions
sometimes diminished the impact of qualified immunity. In the vast majority
of cases asserting claims against individual officers for money damages, plain-
tiffs also included claims against municipalities, claims for injunctive relief,
and/or state law claims that could not be dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds."' Even when a plaintiff brings a claim for damages against an indi-
court denies Defendants' motion insofar as it asks the court conclude that the officers are en-
titled to qualified immunity." (citation omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202
(2001))); Nunez v. City of Corpus Christi, No. 2:12-cV-0092, 2013 WE 4040373, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 7, 2013) (denying qualified immunity because "there is considerable dispute re-
garding the timing of Hobbs' shots, the position of the vehicle at the time the shots were
fired, and the immediacy of the threat posed to Officer Hobbs").
133. 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
134. Feldman, supra note 5.
135. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
136. See supra Table 1.
137. In the Southern District of Texas, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 1o6 cases in
my dataset; in ninety-nine of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants.
In the Middle District of Florida, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 155 cases in
my dataset; in 149 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants. In the
Northern District of Ohio, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 139 cases in my da-
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vidual defendant (for which qualified immunity is available), the defendant
raises a qualified immunity defense, and the court grants the motion, claims
against the municipality, claims for injunctive relief, and state law claims may
remain.
2. Qualified Immunity Is Unnecessary To Dispose of Cases
My data also suggest that qualified immunity may lead to the dismissal of
few cases because cases are so often resolved on other grounds. Qualified im-
munity could not be raised in 126 (10.7%) of the cases in my study because the
judges dismissed the cases sua sponte before the defendants could answer or
otherwise respond."' In these cases, qualified immunity doctrine was unneces-
sary to shield defendants from discovery and trial.
Qualified immunity was also often unnecessary to dispose of cases at the
motion to dismiss stage. Defendants in the cases in my dataset clearly held this
view: even when defendants could raise qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage, they often chose not to do so. 140 More often than not, when de-
fendants moved to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, they did not in-
clude a qualified immunity argument. Instead, defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to plead plausible claims for relief or failure to assert a constitutional
violation, among other grounds. Even when defendants raised qualified im-
munity at the motion to dismiss stage, and courts concluded that the cases
should be dismissed, courts often resolved the motions on other grounds.
Courts granted, in whole or part, seventy-nine (51.3%) out of the 154 motions
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings that raised qualified immunity. Of
taset; in 129 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants. In the North-
ern District of California, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 219 cases in my da-
taset; in 209 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants. In the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, defendants could raise qualified immunity in 360 cases in my
dataset; in 357 of those cases, plaintiffs also named municipalities as defendants.
138. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (providing examples of these cases from my
dataset).
139. See supra Table 12. In addition to the 1o5 cases dismissed sua sponte that were brought
against individual defendants, see supra Table 1, twenty-one cases brought against munici-
palities or seeking injunctive relief were also dismissed before defendants answered or oth-
erwise responded. These dismissals were most often based on the court's power to dismiss
frivolous pro se claims sua sponte, but others were dismissed at this early stage for failure to
prosecute or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cases dismissed for failure to prosecute or
remanded to state court after defendants responded to the complaints are counted separately
in Table 12.
140. See supra Figure 1; supra note 88 and accompanying text.
127:2 2017
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those seventy-nine grants, twenty-one (26.6%) were granted on qualified im-
munity grounds, and fifty-eight (73.4%) were granted on grounds other than
qualified immunity.14 1
Qualified immunity played a more substantial role at summary judgment.
Defendants raised qualified immunity arguments in most of their summary
judgment motions.142 And when courts granted defendants' summary judg-
ment motions in whole or part, they relied on qualified immunity 39.7% of the
time.143 Still, courts decided a clear majority of the motions on other grounds.
Most often, these summary judgment motions were granted in whole or part
because the plaintiff could not establish a genuine dispute about a material
question of fact. This finding should not come as a surprise to at least one
member of the Court-Justice Kennedy noted in Wyatt v. Cole that the Court's
summary judgment decisions reduced the need for qualified immunity to
shield government officials from trial. As Justice Kennedy explained:
Harlow was decided at a time when the standards applicable to sum-
mary judgment made it difficult for a defendant to secure summary
judgment regarding a factual question such as subjective intent, even
when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the question; and in
Harlow we relied on that fact in adopting an objective standard for
qualified immunity. However, subsequent clarifications to summary-
judgment law have alleviated that problem .... Under the principles
set forth in Celotex and related cases, the strength of factual allegations
such as subjective bad faith can be tested at the summary-judgment
stage.144
When the Supreme Court discusses qualified immunity, it appears to pre-
sume that qualified immunity is the only barrier standing between government
officials and discovery and trial. Instead, my study illustrates that there are oth-
er tools that parties can- and often do - use to resolve Section 1983 cases before
trial.145
141. See supra Table 7. I include in the latter category cases where qualified immunity was the al-
ternate ground for decision and cases where the court's reasoning was unclear.
142. See supra Figure 2.
143. See supra Table 8. Summary judgment was granted in whole or in part 146 times. Of those
cases, the court relied on qualified immunity fifty-eight times.
144. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
145. Accord Fallon, supra note 59, at 504-05 (observing that other mechanisms can be used to
achieve the goals of qualified immunity).
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In this Section, I have offered some possible explanations for why cases are
infrequently dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. This phenomenon is
not solely attributable to plaintiffs' decisions not to file cases in which qualified
immunity motions might be successful. Nor can lower courts be shouldered
with all the blame for the low rate of qualified immunity dispositions. Instead,
my data suggest that qualified immunity doctrine is ill suited in some cases and
unnecessary in others to serve its intended role.
My data also make clear that qualified immunity's role in Section 1983 liti-
gation is the product of decisions made by multiple actors -judges, defendants,
plaintiffs, and the litigants' attorneys. Moreover, there is at least some evidence
to suggest that district judges' varying inclinations to grant qualified immunity
motions may influence defendants' and plaintiffs' litigation decisions. In juris-
dictions with judges who most often granted defendants' qualified immunity
motions -the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida -
defendants brought qualified immunity motions more frequently, and plaintiffs
more frequently crafted their cases in ways that prevented defendants from
raising the defense. Conversely, in jurisdictions with judges who less frequently
granted defendants' qualified immunity motions-the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Northern District of California- defendants less fre-
quently brought qualified immunity motions, and plaintiffs less frequently
crafted their cases to avoid the defense. A complete understanding of the role of
qualified immunity in constitutional litigation against law enforcement must
attend to regional differences in the dynamic interactions between judges, de-
fendants, and plaintiffs. I plan to explore these interactions in future work.
C. Implications for the Balance Struck by Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court has explained that qualified immunity is intended to
balance "the need to hold government officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distrac-
tion, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.""6 Many have ar-
gued, and I agree, that the Court's qualified immunity doctrine puts a heavy
thumb on the scale in favor of government interests, and disregards the inter-
ests of individuals whose rights have been violated.147 My research offers an
additional reason to believe that the Supreme Court has gotten the balance
wrong: qualified immunity doctrine does not appear to be necessary or well
146. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
147. See, e.g., Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 8 (criticizing the Court's qualified im-
munity jurisprudence along these lines); Reinhardt, supra note 7 (same).
127:2 2017
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suited to protect government officials "from harassment, distraction, and liabil-
ity when they perform their duties reasonably."148 This observation makes it
even more difficult to justify the burdens the doctrine appears to place on
plaintiffs.
1. Interests in Protecting Government Officials
The Supreme Court explained in Harlow that qualified immunity was nec-
essary to protect government officials from four harms: 1) "the expenses of liti-
gation"; 2) "the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues"; 3)
"the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties"'; and 4) "the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance
of public office."149 The Court has relied on no empirical evidence to support its
conclusions that these threats exist, or that qualified immunity can protect
against them. Although questions remain about the government interests
served by qualified immunity, this study and my prior research suggest that
qualified immunity doctrine is often unfit to protect against some of these
harms, and often unnecessary to protect against others.
The first -and frequently repeated-justification for qualified immunity is
that it protects government officials from the burdens of financial liability. But
my prior research has shown that qualified immunity is unnecessary to serve
this role-virtually all law enforcement defendants are provided with counsel
free of charge, and are indemnified for settlements and judgments entered
against them. In the six-year period from 20o6 to 2011, law enforcement offic-
ers in forty-four of the seventy largest law enforcement agencies paid just
0.02% of the dollars awarded to plaintiffs in police misconduct suits.0̀ In thir-
ty-seven small and midsized agencies, no officer contributed to settlements or
judgments to plaintiffs awarded during this period. Officers were indemnified
even when they were disciplined, fired, and criminally prosecuted for their mis-
conduct. And no officer paid a penny of the punitive damages awarded to
plaintiffs in these jurisdictions. I could confirm only two jurisdictions in which
officers contributed to settlements and judgments during the study period-
New York City and Cleveland."' In these jurisdictions, the median contribu-
148. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
149. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
150. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 890.
151. See id. at 926-29. An officer was not indemnified for a $300 punitive damages judgment in
Los Angeles, but the officer never paid the award. And officials believed - but could not con-
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tion was $2,250, and no officer contributed more than $25,000.152 Given this
evidence, qualified immunity cannot be justified as a means of protecting offic-
ers from personal financial liability.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has described "the 'driving force' be-
hind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine" to be resolving "'insubstan-
tial claims' against government officials . .. prior to discovery."s3 But qualified
immunity resulted in the dismissal of just o.6% of the cases in my dataset be-
fore discovery, and resulted in the dismissal of just 3.2% of the 1,183 cases in my
dataset before trial.
Indeed, qualified immunity may actually increase the costs and delays asso-
ciated with Section 1983 litigation. Although qualified immunity terminated
only 3.9% of the 979 cases in my dataset in which qualified immunity could be
raised, the defense was in fact raised by defendants in more than 37% of these
cases-and was sometimes raised multiple times, at the motion to dismiss
stage, at summary judgment, and through interlocutory appeals.1 5 4 Each time
qualified immunity is raised, it must be researched, briefed, and argued by the
parties and decided by the judge. And litigating qualified immunity is no small
feat. John Jeffries describes qualified immunity doctrine as "a mare's nest of
complexity and confusion.""5 Lower courts are "hopelessly conflicted both
within and among themselves" as a result.15 6 One circuit court judge reported
that " [w] ading through the doctrine of qualified immunity is one of the most
morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges rou-
tinely face."1 7
The time and effort necessary to resolve qualified immunity motions could
nevertheless further the goals of qualified immunity doctrine if it effectively
protected defendants from discovery and trial. But in the five districts in my
study, just 8.6% of qualified immunity motions brought by defendants in my
docket dataset resulted in case dismissals.58 The remaining 91.4% of qualified
immunity motions brought by defendants required the parties and judges to
firm-that employees of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and the Illinois State Police may
each have been required to contribute to one settlement during the study period.
152. Id. at 939.
153. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 64o n.2 (1987)).
154. See supra Tables 4 & 5.
155. Jeffries, supra note 6, at 852.
156. Blum, supra note 114, at 925 (footnotes omitted).
157. Wilson, supra note 61, at 447; see also Blum, supra note 114, at 945-46 (quoting two judges'
descriptions of the complexities of determining whether a law is clearly established).
is8. See supra Table 11 (thirty-eight of the 440 qualified immunity motions raised by defendants
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dedicate time and resources to briefing, arguing, and deciding the motions
without shielding defendants from discovery and trial.
Even in the cases in which qualified immunity motions resulted in case
dismissals, it is far from certain that qualified immunity saved the parties and
the courts time. As Alan Chen has observed, when considering the efficiencies
of qualified immunity, "the costs eliminated by resolving the case prior to trial
must be compared to the costs of trying the case . . . . [T]he pretrial litigation
costs caused by the invoking of the immunity defense may cancel out the trial
costs saved by that defense.""' In this study, I have not calculated how much
time was spent litigating qualified immunity motions, or compared that time
with the amount of time spent preparing for and conducting a trial. Yet- given
the complexity of qualified immunity doctrine, the use of interlocutory appeals
of qualified immunity denials, the fact that most trials in my docket dataset
lasted just a few days, and the possibility that a case will settle instead of going
to trial even when qualified immunity is denied-the aggregate benefits of
qualified immunity do not necessarily outweigh its costs for government offi-
cials.
In Pearson, the Supreme Court wrote that the Saucier two-step qualified
immunity analysis "'disserve [s] the purpose of qualified immunity' when it
'forces the parties to endure additional burdens of suit -such as the costs of lit-
igating constitutional questions and delays attributable to resolving them-
when the suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily."'16 0 Given the costs
and delays associated with qualified immunity motion practice and the infre-
quency with which qualified immunity motions terminate Section 1983 cases,
the doctrine arguably disserves its own purposes.
Although qualified immunity doctrine appears to do little to shield defend-
ants from burdens associated with litigation in filed cases - and may in fact in-
crease the amount of time spent on a substantial number of those cases -my
data leave open the possibility that qualified immunity doctrine shields gov-
ernment officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial in other
ways, namely by causing people never to file insubstantial claims or to settle
them quicldy.16 1 The possibility that qualified immunity doctrine serves its in-
tended purpose in these ways, however, does not mean that it actually does. At
159. Chen, supra note 57, at loo.
16o. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Na-
tional Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pear-
son, 555 U.S. 223 (No. 07-751)).
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least two pressing questions would have to be answered before qualified im-
munity doctrine could be justified on these grounds.
First, what are the merits of cases that are never filed or settled quicldy be-
cause of qualified immunity? If qualified immunity doctrine discourages people
from filing or pursuing insubstantial cases, the doctrine is meeting its express
goals.162 But if the doctrine discourages people from filing or pursuing merito-
rious cases because the briefing and interlocutory appeals associated with qual-
ified immunity would be too expensive, the doctrine is not sorting cases in the
way anticipated by the Court. Although more research is necessary to answer
this question, available evidence offers reason for concern. Alexander Reinert's
interviews with attorneys who bring Bivens actions suggest that people with
strong claims may sometimes be unable to find a lawyer because the cost of lit-
igating qualified immunity is too high or because the conduct at issue has not
been clearly established by prior cases.163 Some people who do file their cases
may settle at a discount, not because their cases are weak but because they can-
not afford to litigate qualified immunity in the district court or on interlocutory
appeal.
Second, how frequently does qualified immunity cause plaintiffs not to file
or to settle insubstantial cases? The costs associated with litigating qualified
immunity and the difficulty of overcoming a qualified immunity motion may
cause plaintiffs not to file some insubstantial cases. But other, independent
considerations may cause plaintiffs not to file such cases, including rigorous
pleading requirements, stringent standards for proving underlying constitu-
tional violations, and minimal potential damages awards. Without further
study, it is not possible to conclude that qualified immunity, rather than these
alternative considerations, is responsible for plaintiffs' decisions to settle or
never file insubstantial cases.
In short, there is limited evidence to support the hypothesis that qualified
immunity serves its purpose through screening cases or coercing settlement.
Indeed, some evidence suggests that the doctrine may be discouraging plain-
tiffs from filing or pursuing meritorious cases because qualified immunity
would take too long or cost too much to litigate. Our existing knowledge about
qualified immunity's effects on filing and settlement decisions cannot justify
the doctrine on these grounds.
The Supreme Court has mentioned, but dwelled little upon, two other pos-
sible benefits of qualified immunity doctrine-that it lessens "the danger that
162. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (discussing qualified immunity's goal
of preventing "insubstantial claims" from proceeding to trial).
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fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their du-
ties"' and that it mitigates "the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office."164 The available evidence casts doubt on these rationales as well.
The Court has written that dangers of overdeterrence should dissipate for offi-
cials who are not financially responsible for settlements and judgments.165
Consistent with this observation, studies have found that "the prospect of civil
liability has a deterrent effect in the abstract survey environment but that it
does not have a major impact on field practices."166 Further, civil liability does
not appear to play a sizable role in people's decisions to apply to become police
officers. Police departments around the country report difficulties finding re-
cruits, but the long list of reasons police officials believe people are not apply-
ing does not include the threat of being sued.16 7 These speculative benefits
cannot justify qualified immunity's highly restrictive standards.
Perhaps the Court believes that qualified immunity doctrine serves other
interests that it has failed to mention. Even if officers are almost always indem-
nified, and cases are rarely dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, qualified
164. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949)).
165. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1980) (explaining that the overdeter-
rence rationale for qualified immunity "loses its force" when "the threat of personal liability
is removed").
166. VICTORE. IPPELER, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 7 (4 th ed. 20o6) (citing sev-
eral studies); see also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 942-43 (discussing studies of civil liability as
a deterrent to aggressive police behaviors).
167. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Nick Penzenstadler, Police Redouble Efforts To Recruit Diverse
Officers, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/o1
/21/police-redoubling-efforts-to-recruit-diverse-officers/21574081 [http://perma.cc/4MFX
-3ZE9]; Edmund DeMarche, 'Who Needs This?' Police Recruits Abandon Dream Amid Anti-
Cop Climate, Fox NEws (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2o15/o9/o2/who
-needs-this-police-recruits-abandon-dream-amid-anti-cop-climate.html [http://perma.cc
/DAC4-EQR3]; Daniel Denvir, Who Wants To Be a Police Officer?, CITYLAB (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/04/who-wants-to-be-a-police-officer/391017 [http://
perma.cc/RB27-LEUZ]; Mori Kessler, Thinning Blue Line: Police See Declines in Applicants,
ST. GEORGE NEws (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.stgeorgeutah.com/news/archive/2015/12/13
/mgk-thinning-blue-line-police-decline [http://perma.cc/L2ENVRE2]; Oliver Yates Libaw,
Police Face Severe Shortage of Recruits, ABC NEws (July 10, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com
/US/story?id=96570 [http://perma.cc/NJ27-866M]; John Vibes, Surprised? Some Police De-
partments Experiencing Sharp Decline in New Applicants, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Feb.
20, 2015), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/good-news-areas-find-people-police [http://
perma.cc/7KFB-RABB]; William J. Woska, Police Officer Recruitment: A Public-Sector Crisis,
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immunity doctrine may somehow reduce the costs of litigation for the munici-
palities that end up paying the settlements and judgments on behalf of their
officers.168 Qualified immunity doctrine may encourage the development of
constitutional law because it allows courts to announce new constitutional
rules without fear of subjecting defendants to financial liability.169 In this Arti-
cle, I do not evaluate the sensibility of-or empirical support for-these alter-
native justifications for qualified immunity. Neither has been relied upon by
the Court. If these or other policy interests motivate the Supreme Court's qual-
ified immunity jurisprudence, the Court should be explicit about those motiva-
tions so that courts, practitioners, and scholars can evaluate the sensibility of
these interests and measure the extent to which qualified immunity advances
them. Until then, we are left with the justifications for qualified immunity doc-
trine that the Court has offered. Available evidence suggests that the doctrine is
unnecessary to serve some of qualified immunity's key goals and ill suited for
others.
2. Interests in Government Accountability
My research indicates that filed lawsuits are rarely dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds. As I have argued, this finding suggests that qualified im-
munity doctrine rarely achieves its intended function as a shield for govern-
ment officials against discovery and trial in filed cases. What are the implica-
tions of this finding for the other side of qualified immunity's balance,
described by the Court both as "the importance of a damages remedy to protect
the rights of citizens"170 and as "the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly"?"' Commentators have long criticized
qualified immunity doctrine for protecting government officials at the expense
of Section 1983's accountability goals. If qualified immunity is not doing much
to protect government officials, does that allay concerns that the doctrine com-
promises government accountability? In other words, do my data suggest that
qualified immunity does little of great significance, either to defendants' benefit
or to plaintiffs' detriment?
168. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 856 (2007).
169. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 61, at 247 ("Limitations on money damages facilitate constitu-
tional evolution and growth by reducing the cost of innovation. Judges contemplating an
affirmation of constitutional rights need not worry about the financial fallout.").
170. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
504-05 (1978)).
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Evidence that few cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds sug-
gests that the direst descriptions of qualified immunity's impact on plaintiffs
perhaps go too far. Critics assert that qualified immunity closes the courthouse
door for plaintiffs.172 And there is no shortage of decisions by the Supreme
Court and lower courts dismissing cases on qualified immunity grounds.7
Yet, my study suggests that qualified immunity doctrine appears to close the
courthouse door far less frequently than critics have assumed- at least once a
case is filed. My findings do not, however, undermine other concerns raised
about the impact of qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claims. Qualified immun-
ity could significantly damage law enforcement accountability without protect-
ing officials from the burdens of discovery and trial.
First, qualified immunity doctrine may discourage people from filing their
cases or may cause them to settle or withdraw their claims.174 If qualified im-
munity had this effect only on insubstantial cases, the doctrine would be
achieving its intended role, albeit in a manner unexpected by the Court. But if
qualified immunity is causing people not to file or to settle meritorious cases, as
available anecdotal evidence suggests, then the doctrine is preventing people
from vindicating their rights and holding government accountable.1 75
Moreover, my findings do not undermine other common critiques of the
doctrine. Qualified immunity doctrine has been criticized by courts and schol-
ars alike for being confusing and difficult to apply, and leading to inconsistent
adjudications.176 These characteristics of qualified immunity doctrine may well
increase the time it takes courts to decide qualified immunity motions, even as
the decisions are infrequently dispositive.177
In addition, many are critical of the Court's decision in Pearson to allow
lower courts to grant qualified immunity without first assessing whether a de-
fendant violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiff. 17 Their
fear is that if courts regularly find that the law is not clearly established without
first ruling on the scope of the underlying constitutional right, the constitu-
172. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
177. See Chen, supra note 57, at 99 ("Plaintiffs, defendants, and trial courts are likely to expend
substantial resources simply litigating the qualified immunity defense -an elaborate side-
show, independent of the merits, that in many cases will do little to advance or accelerate
resolution of the legal claims.").
178. See supra Section I.B.2 (describing Pearson).
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tional right at issue will never become clearly established. This catch-22 may
lead to constitutional uncertainty and stagnation, making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail on constitutional claims and offering little guidance to gov-
ernment officials about the scope of constitutional rights."' Scholars who have
studied the impact of Pearson have found some evidence to support these con-
cerns.0̀ The fact that few cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds
is immaterial to this critique. The Supreme Court's decision in Pearson to allow
lower courts to grant qualified immunity without deciding whether a right has
been violated may still lead to constitutional uncertainty, particularly in cases
involving new technologies or practices."'
Finally, many have argued that the Supreme Court's qualified immunity de-
cisions protect bad actors. The Court's disregard of subjective intent protects
officers who act in bad faith, so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established law.182 In addition, a government official who has acted in a clearly
unconstitutional manner can be shielded from liability simply because no prior
case has held similar conduct to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's re-
179. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIo ST. J.
ClM. L. 463, 502-o6 (2009); Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional
Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 139, 149; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order ofBattle in
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120; James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified
Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1601, 1605-o6 (2011).
18o. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 114; see also Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wil-
son-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, So U. COLO. L. REV. 401,
428 & n.121 (2009) (predicting that Pearson will lead to constitutional stagnation); Colin
Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468 (2011) (finding
that after Pearson district courts often answered both steps of the qualified immunity analy-
sis, but circuit courts more often decided qualified immunity motions without ruling on the
underlying constitutional right); cf Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson
in the Circuits, So FORDHAM L. REv. 623, 629 (2011) (finding that circuit courts followed the
Saucier two-step process "most of the time").
181. See, e.g., Matthew Slaughter, First Amendment Right To Record Police: When Clearly Estab-
lished Law Is Not Clear Enough, 49 J. MARsHAIL L. REv. 101 (2015) (describing circuit varia-
tion in analysis of the right to record the police); Bailey Jennifer Woolfstead, Don't Tase Me
Bro: A Lack of Jurisdictional Consensus Across Circuit Lines, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 285 (2012)
(describing circuit variation in analysis of qualified immunity for claims involving electronic
control devices).
182. For example, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Supreme Court held that the then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity, even though he authorized federal prose-
cutors to use the material-witness statute pretextually, because qualified immunity doctrine
"demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the mo-
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cent decisions have made it increasingly difficult to meet this standard.' It is,
as John Jeffries has written, "as if the one-bite rule for bad dogs started over
with every change in weather conditions."84 Even this critique of qualified
immunity is left largely intact by my findings. Qualified immunity's disregard
for officials' subjective intent, and the need for precedent that "place [s] the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,"' may insulate bad actors
from financial liability, but still expose them to discovery and trial if other
claims or defendants remain.
McKay v. City of Hayward,18 6 a case from the Northern District of California
in my docket dataset, illustrates how qualified immunity can impair govern-
ment accountability in these ways without shielding defendants from discovery
or trial. On May 29, 2011, officers from the Hayward Police Department used a
police dog to track an armed suspect who had robbed a restaurant.1 7 The dog
guided the officers to an eight-foot wall. Without any warning, the officers lift-
ed the dog over the wall. On the other side of the wall was the backyard of a
mobile home belonging to Jesse Porter, an 89-year-old who had no connection
to the robbery. The dog bit Porter on the leg, leaving a wound so severe that
Porter's leg had to be amputated. Mr. Porter was then moved into a residential
183. Despite the confusion in the doctrine, the Supreme Court's most recent decisions suggest
that it is very difficult to show that conduct violates "clearly established law." Although the
Court once held that the obviousness of a constitutional violation can defeat qualified im-
munity even without a case on point, see Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), in recent years
the Court's primary focus has been whether a prior court has held the right to be clearly es-
tablished, see Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 652-53. The Court's recent
decisions have made it difficult to clearly establish the law in other ways as well. In 1999, the
Court explained that a plaintiff could show the law was clearly established by pointing to
"controlling authority in their jurisdiction" or a "consensus of cases of persuasive authority."
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). Yet in more recent decisions, the Court has
backed away from this position; it now only assumes for the sake of argument hat controlling
circuit authority or a consensus of cases of persuasive authority can clearly establish the law.
See Kinports, supra note 2, at 70-71 (describing this shift in the law). The Court's most re-
cent decisions also suggest hat the facts of the prior decision must closely resemble those of
the instant case. The Court has repeatedly assured plaintiffs that it "do[es] not require a case
directly on point," but requires that "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate'" Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per cu-
riam) (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). In recent years, the Court has reversed several lower
court decisions for relying on prior precedent that established constitutional principles at
too-general a level. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017); Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. 305.
184. Jeffries, supra note 61, at 256.
185. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
186. No. 3:12-cV-1613 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012).
187. The facts of the case are taken from the district court's summary judgment decision. See
McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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care facility, where he died two months later. Mr. Porter's children sued the in-
volved officers and the City of Hayward under federal and state law.
At summary judgment, the district court in McKay granted the officers
qualified immunity.' The court found that, to survive summary judgment,
the plaintiffs had to be able to show that the failure to warn before seizure by a
police dog constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. The court surveyed
Ninth Circuit cases involving police dogs and found that " [n] o Ninth Circuit
case holds explicitly that failure to warn before seizure by a police dog consti-
tutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment."" The court surveyed other cir-
cuits and found some variation: the Fourth and Eighth Circuits had held that
the failure to give a warning before using a police dog violates the Fourth
Amendment, but the Eleventh, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had held that fail-
ure to warn before deploying a police dog was "not dispositive of the reasona-
bleness of seizing an individual with a police dog."o90 Because of this variation
among circuits, the court in the Northern District of California concluded that
that the unconstitutionality of the officers' conduct had not been clearly estab-
lished.
The decision granting qualified immunity in McKay did not shield gov-
ernment officials from burdens associated with either discovery or trial. In
McKay's case, qualified immunity was raised at summary judgment, after the
officers had already participated in discovery. The motion was granted less than
two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin.'9 Moreover, even after the
court granted qualified immunity to the individual officers, the officers still
faced the prospect of trial. In addition to the Section 1983 claims against the
two individual officers, the plaintiffs brought state law claims against the indi-
vidual officers and state and federal claims against the City -the qualified im-
munity defense did not apply to any of these claims.1 92 In the days following
the court's summary judgment decision, the parties drafted and submitted voir
dire questions, multiple motions in limine, and briefs regarding whether the
188. Id. at 985.
189. Id. at 983.
190. Id. at 984.
191. See Case Management Minutes, McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971 (No. 3:12-cV-1613), ECF No.
67.
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trial should be separated into three stages." The case settled and the court en-
tered a conditional dismissal the day trial was scheduled to begin.194
Although the district court's qualified immunity decision in McKay did not
shield officials from discovery and was not formally the reason the case did not
go to trial, it did negatively affect interests in government accountability. The
qualified immunity motion likely increased the amount of time spent by the at-
torneys for the plaintiffs and defendants." The grant of qualified immunity in
McKay may also have ripple effects that extend far beyond the parties to the lit-
igation. The district court found that it was not clearly established in the Ninth
Circuit that deploying police dogs without a prior warning violates the Consti-
tution. This decision may cause lawyers to decline to represent people with
similar claims. One could argue that qualified immunity is serving its intended
role by discouraging people from bringing Section 1983 cases when the under-
lying constitutional rights have not been clearly established. But this position
goes further than the Court's own justification for qualified immunity doctrine:
to protect government officials from insubstantial claims.1 96 That no prior
court has decided a given constitutional issue does not imply that a case raising
it lacks merit.
Uncertainty about the constitutionality of deploying a police dog without a
prior warning may also influence police departments' policy and training deci-
sions. Although the Supreme Court appears confident that police departments
can regulate themselves," police officials look to court decisions to guide their
policies and trainings.98 Were, for example, the Ninth Circuit to hold that
193. See McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971 (No. 3:12-Cv-1613), ECF Nos. 76-79.
194. See Order of Conditional Dismissal, McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971 (No. 3:12-Cv-1613), ECF
No. 81.
195. In some cases, the grant of qualified immunity might cause plaintiffs to settle instead of go-
ing to trial or cause plaintiffs to settle for an amount smaller than they would have otherwise
accepted. In this case, the plaintiffs' attorney reported that the qualified immunity grant had
a "negligible" impact on the value of the case because the Monell claim remained and,
" [u]nlike many civil rights cases, [the plaintiffs] had good evidence to support the Monell
claim'" E-mail from Matthew D. Davis, Attorney for Plaintiffs in McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d
971, to author (Nov. 28, 2016, 9:17 AM) (on file with author).
196. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. Soo, 815-16 (1982) (discussing qualified immunity's goal
of preventing "insubstantial claims" from proceeding to trial).
197. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (20o6) (asserting that the rise of police
professionalism and internal discipline reduces the need for the exclusionary rule to deter
police misbehavior).
198. For examples of instances in which court decisions have influenced police department poli-
cies and trainings, see POLICE EXEc. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
USE OF FORCE 18 (Mar. 2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/3o%2oguiding
69
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officers should give prior warnings before using police dogs, departments in
the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit would likely train their officers to issue
warnings under these circumstances. Without such a decision, and with the
McKay court's conclusion that there is no clearly established constitutional
right to such a warning, departments may be less likely to train their officers to
give such warnings.'99 These costs to government accountability accrue wheth-
er or not qualified immunity protects government officials from discovery and
trial.
D. Moving Forward
The Supreme Court has written that evidence undermining its assumptions
about the realities of constitutional litigation might "justify reconsideration of
the balance struck" in its qualified immunity decisions.2 00 My research has, in-
deed, undermined the Court's assumptions about the purposes served by qual-
ified immunity doctrine. In this Section, I consider how these findings should
shape qualified immunity doctrine moving forward.
My findings suggest that the Court's efforts to advance its policy goals
through qualified immunity doctrine has been an exercise in futility. In Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court "completely reformulated qualified immunity
along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry
into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective
inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action."2 01 The Court be-
lieved that "[tihe transformation was justified by the special policy concerns
arising from public officials' exposure to repeated suits."'202 Some-including
Justice Thomas -have argued that this transformation was a mistake because
the scope of qualified immunity doctrine should mirror the common law de-
%20principles.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9YU-C4UA] (explaining that after the Fourth Circuit
held that using a Taser repeatedly in drive-stun mode was unconstitutional, "several agen-
cies in jurisdictions covered by the Fourth Circuit ruling amended their use-of-force and
ECW [Electronic Control Weapons] policies" in response to the decision); and Joanna C.
Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. L.F. 437, 452n1.53,455 n.68.
199. See David Alan Sldansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIo ST. J. ClM. L. 567, 58o-81
(2008) (observing that, when a United States Supreme Court decision removed the exclu-
sionary rule as a remedy for conduct that violated California constitutional law -searching
garbage without a warrant-police in California were "trained to ignore" California law).
200. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 n-3 (1987).
201. Id. at 645 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20).
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fenses that existed in 1871, and should not reflect the Court's policy preferences
at all.2 0 3
This Article offers an additional reason to conclude this transformation was
a mistake: the doctrine does not serve its intended policy objectives. Although
the Supreme Court repeatedly describes qualified immunity doctrine as a
means of shielding government officials from the costs and burdens of litiga-
tion, I have found officers are virtually always indemnified, and that qualified
immunity is rarely the reason that Section 1983 cases end. Future research can
explore whether qualified immunity causes plaintiffs not to file or pursue in-
substantial claims, or advances the doctrine's goals in other ways. At this point,
however, available evidence contradicts the Court's assumptions about the role
qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation.
Justices sympathetic to qualified immunity's policy goals might conclude
based on my findings that they should further strengthen qualified immunity
doctrine to protect defendants. I would discourage this approach for several
reasons. First, it is far from clear that qualified immunity doctrine is well de-
signed to weed out only "insubstantial" cases. Available evidence suggests that
some people may decline to file or pursue their claims because of the cost of lit-
igating qualified immunity, even when they might succeed on the merits.204
And cases alleging clearly unconstitutional behavior may be dismissed on qual-
ified immunity grounds simply because no prior case has held sufficiently simi-
lar conduct to be unconstitutional.2 05 Strengthening qualified immunity doc-
trine would presumably aggravate these preexisting concerns.
Setting aside the question of whether such a shift is desirable, I am not
convinced that it is feasible. It is hard to imagine how the Court could make
qualified immunity doctrine any stronger than it already is.206 Perhaps mem-
bers of the Court believe that lower courts are not applying qualified immunity
doctrine as expansively as they should. Indeed, the Court's flurry of recent
203. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) ("Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law
backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in 'inter-
pret[ing] the intent of Congress in enacting' the Act.... Our qualified immunity precedents
instead represent precisely the sort of 'freewheeling policy choice[s]' that we have previously
disclaimed the power to make." (citations omitted)).
204. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
2o6. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (describing recent shifts in the doctrine).
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summary reversals suggests that it is attempting to encourage lower courts to
follow course.207
But even if all judges applied qualified immunity doctrine as expansively as
does the Supreme Court, qualified immunity doctrine would likely still fall
short of its intended role in many cases filed against law enforcement. Plaintiffs
could often still plead a plausible entitlement to relief at the motion to dismiss
stage, and could often still raise factual disputes at summary judgment that
prevent dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs would continue to
include claims against municipalities, claims for declaratory or injunctive relief,
and state law claims in their cases that qualified immunity cannot resolve.208
Defendants would still sometimes conclude that other defenses or an inexpen-
sive settlement is preferable to the added costs of qualified immunity motion
practice. And courts would continue to dismiss cases for multiple other reasons
besides qualified immunity. Presumably the number of cases dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds would increase somewhat, but given litigation dy-
namics and other applicable doctrines, many cases would remain in which
qualified immunity never shielded government officials from discovery or trial.
Qualified immunity is the Supreme Court's hammer. But many civil rights
damages actions against law enforcement are not nails.
The fact that qualified immunity is often ill suited and unnecessary to ad-
vance the Court's policy objectives provides additional reason to adopt Justice
Thomas's view and realign the doctrine with historical common law defenses.
According to those who have studied the common law at the time Section 1983
was passed, little would remain of qualified immunity if the Court adopted this
approach.2 09 But other defenses would remain- including arguments that
207. See Baude, supra note 3 (commenting on numerous summary reversals by the Supreme
Court).
208. The Court could conceivably hold that qualified immunity can be asserted by municipalities
and in claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. But the Court has already held that quali-
fied immunity does not apply to both types of claims. And the Court has no power to create
a qualified immunity defense for state claims.
209. For discussion of the common law and government practices in place when Section 1983 be-
came law, see Alschuler, supra note 179, at 5o6 ("A justice who favored giving § 1983 its orig-
inal meaning or who sought to restore the remedial regime favored by the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment could not have approved of either Pierson or Harlow."); Baude, supra
note 3, at 1 (observing that qualified immunity is justified as "deriv[ing] from a common
law 'good faith' defense,' but that " [t] here was no such defense"); James E. Pfander & Jona-
than L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability
in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1862, 1924 (2010) ("During the early republic, the
courts-state and federal-did not take responsibility for adjusting the incentives of officers
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plaintiffs cannot state plausible claims for relief in their complaint or cannot
establish material factual disputes at summary judgment. Defendants would
still be able to argue that plaintiffs cannot meet the Court's exceedingly rigor-
ous standards for constitutional violations.210 Even in the absence of qualified
immunity, these other procedural and substantive barriers would prevent many
Section 1983 cases from being filed, proceeding to discovery, or advancing to
trial.
If the Court is unwilling to eliminate or dramatically restrict qualified im-
munity, it could make more modest alterations that would align the doctrine
with evidence of its role in constitutional litigation. For example, the Court
could undo adjustments to qualified immunity doctrine that were expressly
motivated by an interest in shielding government officials from discovery and
trial in filed cases. In Harlow, the Court eliminated consideration of officers'
subjective intent because it believed doing so would "avoid 'subject[ing] gov-
ernment officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery' in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violat-
ed were not clearly established at the time."211 My study shows that the Court's
elimination of the subjective prong of qualified immunity in Harlow should be
viewed as a failed experiment. Despite courts' and commentators' assumptions
to the contrary,2 12 the decision in Harlow appears to have done little to shield
government officials from discovery and trial in filed cases.
Restoring the subjective prong to qualified immunity analysis could also
mitigate at least one serious concern with the doctrine. Currently, government
officials acting in bad faith or with knowledge of the unconstitutionality of
their behavior can be shielded from liability simply because no prior case pro-
scribed their conduct. If the subjective prong were restored to the qualified
immunity analysis, government officials would not be entitled to qualified im-
munity if they knew or should have known that their conduct was unlawful. A
recent Supreme Court case, Mullenix v. Luna, illustrates how reversing Harlow
might address this concern.2 13
ters for Congress to adjust through indemnification and other modes of calibrating official
zeal.").
210. For discussions of the difficulty of establishing constitutional violations against law en-
forcement see, for example, Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (2017).
211. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)).
212. See supra notes 6 and 56 and accompanying text.
213. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).
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The facts relevant to Mullenix began when Tulia Police Department officers
attempted to arrest Israel Leija, Jr. for violating misdemeanor probation.2 14 Lei-
ja fled the scene in his car, and officers from several agencies participated in the
pursuit. Officers set up spike strips on the highway to puncture Leija's tires as
he drove by- a strategy they had been trained to use in just this type of situa-
tion. Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Chadrin Mullenix decided
that instead of setting up spike strips he would try to disable Leija's car by
shooting at it.2 1 5 He had received no training in shooting at a car to disable it
and was instructed by his supervisor not to do so.2 16 Nevertheless, Mullenix
fired six rounds at Leija's car as it passed under the bridge where Mullenix was
standing. Leija died, with one of the shots determined to be the cause of
death.2 17 Soon after the shooting, Mullenix remarked to his supervisor, "How's
that for proactive?" - an apparent reference to a conversation they had had ear-
ly in the day in which the superior had criticized the officer for not taking
enough initiative.2 18
The district court denied Mullenix's motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds, Mullenix filed an interlocutory appeal, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court granted Mullenix's
petition for certiorari and reversed. The Court did not answer whether Mul-
lenix violated the Constitution but instead held that prior cases had not clearly
established that his conduct was unconstitutional.2 19 Mullenix's remark to his
supervisor played no role in the analysis, as "an officer's actual intentions are
irrelevant" to the qualified immunity analysis.220 Restoring the subjective
prong to the qualified immunity analysis would likely change the outcome of a
case like Mullenix. Mullenix's "How's that for proactive?" statement would once
again be relevant to the qualified immunity analysis, and would constitute at
least triable evidence of bad faith.22 1
The Court could also reconsider other adjustments to qualified immunity
made with the express goal of shielding defendants from burdens of discovery
and trial. For example, the Court granted defendants the right to immediately
appeal denials of qualified immunity as a means of shielding defendants from
214. Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2014), rev'd per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015).
215. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 3o6.
216. Id. at 3o6-07.
217. Id. at 307.
218. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 312 (majority opinion).
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burdens of discovery and trial.222 Yet my data show interlocutory appeals of
qualified immunity denials infrequently serve that function. Defendants filed
interlocutory appeals of 21.7% of decisions denying qualified immunity in
whole or part. Of the appeals that were filed, just 12.2% of the lower court deci-
sions were reversed in whole, and just 9.8% of the interlocutory appeals filed
resulted in case dismissals. Interlocutory appeals may have prompted case reso-
lutions in another way-39.o% of interlocutory appeals were never decided,
apparently because the cases were settled while the motions were pending.223
But defendants' interlocutory appeals rarely resulted in case dismissals on qual-
ified immunity grounds. It is far from clear that interlocutory appeals shield
defendants from litigation burdens - the time and money spent briefing and
arguing interlocutory appeals may in fact exceed the time and money saved in
the relatively few reversals on interlocutory appeal. If so, the policy objectives
motivating Mitchell militate in favor of eliminating the right of interlocutory
appeal.
Finally, and still more modestly, the Court could reconsider the restrictive
manner in which it defines "clearly established law." John Jeffries has written
that the Court's narrow definition of clearly established law is inspired by its
interest in facilitating qualified immunity dismissals at summary judgment.2 24
My data show that the Court's decisions are not having their intended effect.
Yet, as others have pointed out, the Court's doctrinal framework creates confu-
sion in the lower courts and protects bad actors when there is no prior case on
point.2 Jeffries's proposed solution is to focus the qualified immunity inquiry
not on whether the law was clearly established but, instead, on whether the de-
fendant's conduct was "clearly unconstitutional."22 6 I believe that my data sup-
port a more complete transformation of the doctrine, but this adjustment
would at least be a step in the right direction.
At this point, it is impossible to predict what impact these proposed chang-
es to qualified immunity doctrine would have on the litigation of constitutional
claims against law enforcement. Perhaps narrowing the qualified immunity de-
222. See supra Section I.B.3.
223. See supra Section 1II.D; cf Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Feder-
al Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1179 (1990) (assessing the impact of interlocutory
appeals for qualified immunity denials, and reporting that "the district judges with whom I
have spoken . .. all believed that defendants used the Mitchell appeal as a delaying tactic that
hampered litigation that would otherwise be tried or settled relatively quicldy").
224. See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 866. For the Court's most recent decisions interpreting what
constitutes clearly established law, see supra note 183.
225. See supra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
226. See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 867.
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fense, restoring the subjective prong, or eliminating qualified immunity alto-
gether would dramatically increase the number of suits filed against the police,
or increase the number of filed cases that were settled or tried. On the other
hand, these changes might inspire courts to place other limits on Section 1983
claims to maintain the status quo.22 7 This Article does not predict how changes
to qualified immunity doctrine might influence the collection of doctrines rele-
vant to constitutional litigation, or suggest the ideal ways in which they should
relate. My suggestions are motivated by a less lofty ambition -to achieve great-
er consistency across qualified immunity doctrine's structure, intended policy
goals, and actual role in constitutional litigation.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has dedicated an outsized portion of its
docket to qualified immunity motions in cases against law enforcement be-
cause, it has explained, the doctrine is so "important to 'society as a whole."'2 28
But the Court relies on no evidence to back up this fervently held position. In-
stead, my research shows that qualified immunity doctrine infrequently plays
its intended role in the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforce-
ment. Qualified immunity doctrine is unnecessary to shield law enforcement
officers from financial liability, and the doctrine infrequently protects govern-
ment officials from burdens associated with discovery and trial in filed cases.
Further exploration of dynamics unobservable through my dataset could reveal
other ways in which qualified immunity influences the litigation of civil rights
actions against law enforcement. At this point, however, available evidence in-
dicates that qualified immunity often is not functioning as assumed, and is not
achieving its intended goals. In an ideal world, all open empirical questions
about Section 1983 litigation would be answered before any applicable doctrine
was adjusted. But it is my view that the perfect should not be the enemy of the
good.22 9 The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, should adjust their quali-
fied immunity decisions to comport with this evidence.
227. See Fallon, supra note 59, at 486-89 (observing that adjustments to qualified immunity may
influence other aspects of constitutional doctrine).
228. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n-3 (2015)).
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